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Crafting this dissertation, like the overall experience of graduate school, 
occasionally left me adrift at sea.  At other times it saw me stuck in the doldrums.  
Periodically I was tossed around by tempestuous waves.  But two beacons always 
pointed me to quiet harbors where I gained valuable insights, developed new 
perspectives, and acquired new momentum.  My advisor and mentor, Josh Piker, has 
been incredibly generous with his time, ideas, advice, and encouragement.  His 
constructive critique of my thoughts, methodology, and writing (I never realized I was 
prone to so many split infinitives and unclear antecedents) was a tremendous help to a 
graduate student beginning his career.  In more ways than he probably knows, he 
remains for me an exemplar of the professional historian I hope to become.  And as a 
barbecue connoisseur, he is particularly worthy of deference and emulation.  Our 
profession would certainly be better off with more people like him.  Cathy Kelly’s 
insights, criticisms, and interminable support have done more for my career than she 
realizes.  By way of a graduate seminar, directed readings, and countless discussions, I 
have learned to value her brilliance.  Our conversations about this project and my future 
in the academy have built in me a level of confidence I never thought possible.   
I am also indebted to Jamie Hart for deepening my interest and understanding of 
early modern England.  Through coursework and directed readings with him, I first 
began to explore the possibilities of developing an Atlantic history of American Indians.  
Jamie was tremendously enthusiastic and patient with this student of early America 
whose peripheral interests lay far beyond his metropolitan expertise.  Paul Gilje, 
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Sterling Evans, Judy Lewis, and Sandie Holguin were also eager to share their time and 
ideas.  This project is certainly much stronger because of their generosity.        
Researching and writing a dissertation on the native northeast and Atlantic while 
residing on the dusty Plains has often been a challenge.  But several generous 
individuals and institutions eased the burden, allowing me to temporarily trade the deer 
and the antelope for the saltwater and pines.  The Department of History at the 
University of Oklahoma – especially the department chair, Professor Rob Griswold – 
offered immeasurable support throughout my tenure as a doctoral student in their 
program.  With a Hudson Fellowship, an A.K. Christian Scholarship, a Morgan Family 
Fellowship, and a semester free of teaching responsibilities, the History Department 
generously equipped me with the tools to develop as a scholar and make a worthwhile 
contribution to our profession.  The American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia 
likewise offered their support by awarding me a grant from their Phillips Fund for 
Native American Research.  In addition, a Legacy Research Fellowship from the 
American Antiquarian Society in Worcester, MA and an Andrew W. Mellon Research 
Fellowship from the Massachusetts Historical Society in Boston afforded me  
opportunities to conduct extensive archival research at their prestigious institutions and 
present my project to other fellows, society members and staff.   
Certain people closest to me deserve the most credit for this accomplishment.  
My family has always been the ballast in my life; their own commitments and 
achievements, and their constant support of mine, continue to lend me invaluable 
strength and stability.  Their genuine curiosity about my scholarly endeavors also 
sustains my own energy and enthusiasm for this project.  My parents, in particular, 
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remain my compass in so many areas of life.  They taught me at a very young age the 
importance of education, hard work, and commitment, and encouraged me to pursue my 
goals with a spirit of humility, simplicity, and authenticity.  This dissertation would not 
have been possible, either, without the patience and boundless support of Allison.  She 
has a knack for distracting me from the pressures and frustrations of academic life and 
refocusing my attention on its bright spots.  Most significantly, she has shown me time 
and again what is truly important in life, what passes and what endures.  This project, 
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This dissertation explores the active engagement of an American Indian culture 
with the early modern Atlantic world.  It argues that the Wabanaki of the American 
northeast were a quintessentially maritime-oriented people who time and again looked 
to the Atlantic as an essential means of mitigating the quotidian rigors of their society 
and enhancing its overall welfare.  This process had sustained native life long before the 
arrival of Europeans, and afforded it valuable cultural and material resources to assuage 
the disruptive effects of colonialism from the early sixteenth through the mid-eighteenth 
centuries.  In their exchanges with Euro-Americans, these people increasingly cultivated 
an array of novel Atlantic opportunities to enrich, augment, and protect their vision of 
this pelagic world in the face of increasing pressures to redefine its meaning and 
significance.  By shrewdly engaging in trans-Atlantic gift-giving networks, astutely 
exploiting European imperial conflicts, carefully manipulating economic exchange 
complexes, respectfully invoking European monarchical authority, and strategically 
appropriating Euro-American sailing technology, Wabanaki consistently reinforced 
their presence on the high seas and elaborated their longstanding notion of the Atlantic 
world: the ocean was a profoundly generative and life-sustaining locus of power.   
Yet over the course of the colonial period, Wabanaki came to recognize that 
their Atlantic vision did not stand alone.  As it ran up against European – and later 
primarily British – efforts to forcefully consolidate the Atlantic into a coherent and far-
flung imperial network, Indian marine-warriors decimated and plundered the Euro-
American maritime presence to fortify their conception of the Atlantic’s opportunity 
and their command of its waves.  Countless imperial and colonial architects struggled 
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relentlessly to rationalize and reign in this corner of the world, but the economic, 
diplomatic, and martial pursuit of a Wabanaki Atlantic constantly defied their efforts at 
cohesion.  Ashore and afloat, a brutal contestation of oceanic spaces ensued in the 
northeast, and endured throughout much of the colonial era.  British attempts to render 
the native Atlantic amenable to their own imperial designs gradually made headway in 
the middle decades of the eighteenth century.  By the end of the Seven Years’ War in 
1763, the imperial equilibrium that long afforded Indians control of their seas, and 
nourished so much of their Atlantic vision, had dissolved, and with it the world that 




Charting a Course and Weighing Anchor 
 
In Spring 1759, a familiar supplicant stood before the legislature in Boston’s 
State House.  As royal governor of Massachusetts during the Seven Years’ War, 
Thomas Pownall envisioned a lasting victory for his empire through the conquest of the 
Penobscot River Valley on the colony’s northeastern frontier, the very heart of the 
Wabanaki Indians’ ancestral homeland.  “For many Years a Den for Savages,” he 
reminded his lawmakers, a “Rendevouz of the Eastern Indians when they come against 
our Frontiers,” circumstances in the region now necessitated the appropriation of assets 
for a strong garrison.  The moment to act was at hand since “the Enimy have now no 
Outlet to ye sea but thro this River Penobscot; The Door being Shutt upon them in every 
other Part.”  Pownall’s incessant agitation of the General Court to slam shut this final 
door eventually paid dividends.  Bolstered by British military victories throughout this 
borderland in early 1759, and by the subsequent allotment of funds for the construction 
of Fort Pownall, the jubilant governor could finally declare in a victory speech that “this 
River was ye last & only door That the Enimy had left to ye Atlantic & I hope this is 
now fairly shutt upon them.”  Equally confident of the strategy’s success, the legislature 
lauded him with congratulations on his defeat of the Indians now, they affirmed, 
“deprived of the only Opening they had left to the Atlantick.”  Pownall also attempted 
to infect his superiors at Whitehall with the same enthusiasm, boasting in a letter later 
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 The curious anxieties embodied by Boston’s political elite over the perilous 
consequences of Indian access to the ocean, and their faith in the new fortification on 
the Penobscot River that aimed to sever that connection, point to a peculiar facet of the 
Wabanaki experience in the early modern world.  The strength and vitality of this native 
culture ashore was predicated on its relationship to the Atlantic.  Yet what colonials like 
Pownall did not always recognize was that these ties bound Indians to far more than a 
small corner of the Atlantic Ocean; they also connected them in profound ways to a 
wider and more complex world of processes circulating around the Atlantic basin in the 
early modern period.  Throughout the colonial era, Wabanaki came to understand that 
the preservation of their autonomy in the American northeast necessitated an aggressive 
command of this Atlantic world, a mastery of its manifold opportunities and pressures.  
When we pry open and peer back through Governor Pownall’s door we can survey the 
development of this Atlantic power, and the vista is arresting.   
 This dissertation is that survey.  It argues that the Wabanaki were a 
quintessentially maritime-oriented people who time and again looked to the Atlantic as 
an essential means of mitigating the quotidian rigors of their society and enhancing its 
overall welfare.  This process had sustained Wabanaki life long before the arrival of 
Europeans, and afforded it valuable cultural and material resources to assuage the 
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disruptive effects of colonialism from the early sixteenth through the mid-eighteenth 
centuries.  In their exchanges with Euro-Americans, these people increasingly cultivated 
an array of novel Atlantic opportunities to enrich, augment, and protect their vision of 
this pelagic world in the face of increasing pressures to redefine its meaning and 
significance.  By shrewdly engaging in trans-Atlantic gift-giving networks, astutely 
exploiting European imperial conflicts, carefully manipulating economic exchange 
complexes, respectfully invoking European monarchical authority, and strategically 
appropriating Euro-American sailing technology, Wabanaki consistently reinforced 
their presence on the high seas and elaborated their longstanding notion of the Atlantic 
world: the ocean was a profoundly generative and life-sustaining locus of power.   
At other times and under other circumstances, Wabanaki responded to the most 
threatening aspects of colonialism with carefully-orchestrated acts of maritime violence.  
When their conception of the Atlantic ran up against European – and later primarily 
British – efforts to forcefully consolidate it into a coherent and far-flung imperial 
network, Wabanaki marine-warriors decimated Euro-American ships and sailors to 
reinforce their command of the waves.  Countless imperial authorities subsequently 
decried Indians’ seemingly-incessant devastation of the north Atlantic fishery, their 
serial impressment of British seamen, their commandeering of British sailing vessels, 
and their destructive method of naval warfare they often waged with them.  Indian land-
based violence also stymied the Crown’s exploitation of Wabanaki forests for ship 
stores slated for the Royal Navy, an enterprise that was alleviating Britain’s dependence 
on Scandinavia and the Baltic States for such commodities.  Native power ashore and 
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afloat thus wreaked havoc on Britain’s ongoing struggle to integrate the northwest 
Atlantic into a seamless imperial economy.   
Over the course of the colonial period, Wabanaki came to appreciate Britain’s 
maritime presence as much more than a target of their retributive violence.  Its sheer 
vulnerability also increasingly rendered it a valuable extractive economy for native 
communities.  This floating warehouse offered plundering Indian marine-warriors 
convenient access to British sailing vessels, maritime labor, and material goods, fruits 
that were quickly incorporated into Wabanaki communities or pressed into further 
service for their interests on the native Atlantic.  The soft underbelly of the British 
imperial economy came to function as an object of native retaliatory violence as well as 
a cache of lucrative resources.  For nearly two centuries, Wabanaki creatively 
engineered the northwest Atlantic into a conduit for enhancing their ancient maritime 
identity and extending its autonomy through violence and theft.   This seaborne tenacity 
filled the pages of a letter from panic-stricken settlers in Maine to their colony’s London 
agents in 1690, a plea begging officials to “see the Sea of trouble we are Swimming in.”   
While imperial and colonial architects struggled relentlessly to rationalize and 
reign in this world, the economic, diplomatic, and martial pursuit of a Wabanaki 
Atlantic constantly defied their efforts at cohesion.  The native Atlantic vision – an idea 
that the ocean and its variegated opportunities functioned to serve native interests – 
frequently interrupted and fiercely contested that of newly-arrived imperial neighbors.  
Thomas Pownall’s ambitious plan in 1759 was the latest recognition of the 
incompatibility and hostility enveloping these competing worlds, and indicated the 
striking marine violence with which Wabanaki pursued their unique vision.  Cracking 
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open the governor’s door thus affords us both a glimpse into the salty past of these 
People of the Dawnland – a culture carefully cognizant of the potentiality of their 
eastern horizons – and a more holistic understanding of the contestation and plurality 
fracturing the Atlantic world.  
 
The colonial-era Wabanaki were a northeastern Algonquian cultural group 
comprising numerous hunter-gatherer peoples in what are now northern New England 
and the Canadian Maritimes.  The Wabanaki sub-cultures central to this dissertation are 
those today referred to as the Eastern Abenaki, Penobscot, Maliseet-Passamaquoddy, 
and Micmac peoples.  By the mid-eighteenth century, most Eastern Abenaki had 
migrated from southern Maine to the French Jesuit mission villages along the St. 
Lawrence River or joined their native neighbors in communities on the Penobscot 
River.  The Penobscot, Maliseet-Passamaquoddy, and Micmac tribes reside today on 
reservations in Maine, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia.  In the spring, summer, and 
fall of the early historic period, these migratory people inhabited coastal and island 
settlements where they harvested numerous marine resources including large sea 
mammals such as grey and harbor seals, porpoises, and even baleen whales.  From late 
fall to early spring, they dispersed to interior camps where they hunted terrestrial 
quadrupeds including moose, white-tailed deer, and beaver.  Their ancestral homeland, 
what I periodically refer to as Wabanakia or the Dawnland, consisted of nearly all 
present-day Maine, eastern and northeastern New Brunswick, the Gaspé Peninsula, 
Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia.
2
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Figure 1 – New England and the Canadian Maritimes –  
 From David Sanger and M.A.P. Renouf, eds., The Archaic of the Far Northeast (Orono, ME: 
University of Maine Press, 2006), viii 
 
The implications of this maritime history, however, range well beyond 
Wabanakia.  Conceptually it problematizes certain foundational principles undergirding 
Atlantic and Native American history, two of American history’s most prominent sub-
fields.  In light of Atlantic world studies’ prolific stature and the extraordinarily creative 
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ways it has made good on its mantra of geographic and cultural inclusivity, the absence 
of American Indians from its collective consciousness remains all the more glaring.
3
  
The few attempts by Atlanticists to test their model’s applicability to native history have 
resulted in a nearly unanimous consensus: the vast instances of Indian autonomy and 
cultural continuity in early America proved that these people sought desperately to 
prevent the Atlantic’s functioning in any meaningful way in their societies.
4
  Thus, from 
“an Indian perspective, it might well seem that nothing good came from the Atlantic,” a 
destructive sphere that prompted an “avoidance strategy” to fortify their “authority 
structures.”  An Atlantic perspective of native America, moreover, will simply 
acknowledge “the stiff resistance at times” encountered by British newcomers from 
“Amerindian nations” and other non-English peoples “who resisted assimilation.”  
Given the sheer expansiveness of North America, another skeptic argues, “[t]he domain 
of the Atlantic world ended where that of the autonomous peoples began.”  Even the 
                                                 
3
 A germinal literature is emerging among Native Americanists, however, that illuminates Indians’ 
shrewd participation in British imperial politics: Jenny Hale Pulsipher, Subjects Unto the Same King: 
Indians, English, and the Contest for Authority in Colonial New England (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2005); Joshua Piker, “Lying Together: the Imperial Implications of Cross-Cultural 
Untruths,” American Historical Review 116 (October, 2011), 964-986. For a more Anglo-centric 
perspective, see Michael Leroy Oberg, Dominion and Civility: English Imperialism and Native America, 
1585-1685 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).  For the fascinating ways in which natives 
fashioned British knowledge of natural history, see Susan Scott Parish, American Curiosity: Cultures of 
Natural History in the Colonial British Atlantic World (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2006), chapter six.  Distinctly Mesoamerican aesthetics also shaped European 
consumption patterns in Marcy Norton, Sacred Gifts, Profane Pleasures: A History of Tobacco and 
Chocolate in the Atlantic World (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).  
 
4
 The historiography of Africans and their descendants in the Atlantic world, however, is well-
established.  See, for example, John Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 
1400-1800 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); James Sidbury, Becoming African in 
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most sustained engagement with several theoretical possibilities for integrating Indians 
and the Atlantic ultimately concedes “that the Atlantic is not the appropriate paradigm 
with which to pursue Amerindian history.”
5
    
Such scholarly reticence to stretch the parameters of Atlantic studies into Indian 
country is further sustained by a seemingly paradoxical orthodoxy at the very heart of 
the model itself.  That the Atlantic world was a fundamentally European construction is 
explicitly accepted as a largely unchallenged tenet among the field’s ardent supporters.  
Europe’s merchants, sailors, cartographers, and intellectuals, the established precept 
maintains, were the first to integrate the ocean’s trade winds and currents into a 
coherent early modern superhighway connecting its adjacent and disparate landmasses.
6
 
This study contends, by contrast, that Atlanticists have too quickly acceded to a 
singular and coherent Atlantic space, and too frequently dismissed non-Europeans’ 
roles in shaping its contours.  Wabanaki did not simply yield their vast watery frontier 
to the dominion of others or accept that frontier as an impediment stifling cultural 
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dynamism.  Indian sagamores, naval warriors, mariners, traders and diplomats instead 
viewed the ocean as a powerful catalyst for extending political and cultural autonomy 
and enriching material life.  The Dawnland’s pelagic world could retain this 
recognizable distinction in the cosmos of its native inhabitants through their careful 
cultivation of its potential and aggressive command of its spaces.  In short, the Atlantic 
assumed as prominent a role in native configurations of their social, political and 
economic identity as it did among Europeans’ in the early modern era.  When Indian 
efforts to accordingly define and defend their ocean’s significance disrupted Britain’s 
struggle to do the same, a profoundly contentious and brutally violent Atlantic space 
surfaced.
7
   
Beyond the methodological conundrums posed by current assumptions about the 
Atlantic world, scholarly ambivalence towards a red Atlantic stems in large part from 
popular and academic conceptions of native culture itself.  Put simply, we commonly 
envisage American Indians as a quintessentially terrestrial people.  Contemporary 
political conversations involving Indian country nearly always accentuate land rights 
and the inextricability of sovereignty and territoriality.  Native peoples’ unique and 
intimate communion with their natural landscapes is well documented, and serves as 
further justification of the land’s indispensible quality to indigenous identity.
8
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Classroom treatment of Indian history invariably covers critical topics like land 
dispossession, forced migration from ancestral homelands to new territories, the Dawes 
Severalty Act, the Indian New Deal, the termination of reservations, and urban 
relocation.  A fascination with natives’ indelible attachment to land has even shaped our 
scientific understandings of their origins.  How did Paleoindians first arrive in the 
Americas?  They walked, and then they walked across the Bering Land Bridge, and then 
they walked some more, at least according to the long-held archaeological consensus 
dominating the subject.  New paradigm-shifting research, however, is beginning to 
suggest that these Pleistocene migrations may have been wetter than previously 
supposed.  Instead they likely relied on watercraft to drift along the continental 
coastlines or perhaps island-hop across the Pacific prior to the accessibility of a land 
bridge.
9
  If indeed native America was borne by gusty currents and salty corridors, the 
maritime heritage of the New World and its first settlers is much richer, and much older, 
than historians have ever imagined.  
Fixations with the terra firma Indian have also been assiduously reified by trends 
in Native American historiography.  The most influential and enduring theoretical 
constructs preoccupying the field’s collective concern and orienting much of its 
scholarship over the last two decades sustain this familiar trope.  Middle grounds, native 
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grounds, divided grounds, crossroads, borderlands, and backcountries, to name a few, 
while providing the fruitful impetus for the field’s tremendous efflorescence, have also 
served to rivet its gaze on the continental interior and focus its attention on adjoining 
processes.  The dictatorship of these models also explains how one of today’s most 
innovative and influential Native Americanists can reduce “the Native American 
experience in the Atlantic world” to not much of an experience at all, other than “one of 
loss: of life, of land, of autonomy, and of culture,” or how another can posit that “for 
many Indians the challenge of the Atlantic world” was “to hold on to the land” that 
preserved recognizable identities.
10
   
It likely explains too why modern historians have generally neglected the 
Wabanaki experience in early America.  Anthropologists and archaeologists, in fact, 
have produced the lion’s share of this historiography.  The work of such prolific 
authorities as Bruce J. Bourque, Harald E.L. Prins, and Willard Walker continues to 
represent the leading edge of Wabanaki scholarship.  Along with Frank G. Speck, 
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ethnographer and folklorist Fannie Hardy Eckstorm, Dean R. Snow and other of their 
predecessors, these social scientists have illuminated our understanding of the political 
character, social life, and material culture of the native northeast.  But this important 
work, particularly when it arrives at the historic period, is dominated by landlocked 
portrayals of native society.  A maritime-centered Wabanaki culture certainly prevailed 
before the advent of European colonization, this scholarship often implies, but quickly 
dissolved in its wake.
11
   
 While the corpus of work from historians of early Wabanakia is not nearly as 
corpulent, it is equally terrestrial and continental in nature.  Earlier generations of 
Roman Catholic religious figures produced detailed histories of Wabanaki tribes, much 
of which focused on their rich Catholic heritage dating back to encounters with 
Europeans in the sixteenth century.  More recently, scholars like Kenneth M. Morrison 
and L.F.S. Upton were among the first to apply the native-centered, and often land 
rights-focused, interpretive framework of the New Indian History to Wabanaki.  
Upton’s study of Indian-white relations in the early Canadian Maritimes touched on the 
Micmac’s maritime presence, though the majority of it was given over to their gradual 
dispossession of ancestral homelands at the hands of Euro-Americans.  Since that time, 
a small number of unpublished doctoral dissertations have examined themes such as 
gender, family and violence within certain Wabanaki cultures.  An article by Emerson 
T. Baker and John G. Reid, as well as Christopher John Bilodeau’s informative 
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dissertation, have explored in insightful ways the ascendancy of native violence and 
warfare in colonial-era Wabanakia, but do not mention the Atlantic’s indispensible role 
in that phenomenon.  An entire historiographic discourse on Indian military tactics in 
early New England also overlooks Wabanakis’ striking nautical prowess.
12
    
Considering these prevailing perceptions of Indians – and Wabanaki, 
specifically – inside and outside academia, it is little wonder that scholars have ambled 
past  Governor Pownall’s door, and been disinclined to explore what lies beyond.  We 
are left with the assumption, as one Atlanticist asserts, that Indians simply “turned their 
back on the Atlantic world” and gave “it no more than myopic glances.”  An image of 
Wabanaki pirates hijacking European sailing ships and plying the rough waters of the 
north Atlantic consequently risks consignment to a surreal realm of the fantastical.  A 
picture of native marine-warriors at ship’s helm successfully laying siege to colonial 
garrisons is naturally confined to the level of the absurd.  And the notion of an Indian 
navy pressing British seamen into its ranks can be instinctively relegated to a world of 
the fanciful.  Yet history indeed is often stranger than fiction.
13
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This project speaks to scholars of the Atlantic world, European empires, and 
native and colonial America.  I ask them not simply to acknowledge the active presence 
of Indians beyond the terrestrial confines of North America and in the Atlantic, but 
more significantly to consider and explore their role in defining the contestation and 
plurality that increasingly fractured this watery realm into a myriad of competing 
visions.  I urge Atlanticists and scholars of empire to rethink the conventional Euro-
dominated applications of their models in order to encompass a wider array of non-
European peoples who not only maintained their autonomy outside of European control, 
but conditioned the possibilities Europeans conceptualized in the Atlantic.  Scholars of 
Native America are also encouraged to consider the Atlantic as a dynamic locus of 
change shaping Indian country and continually offering its inhabitants opportunities to 
refashion themselves and their worlds.  A decade ago, historian Daniel K. Richter 
illuminated early America from the perspective of native people “facing east from 
Indian country.”  We ought to take seriously this indigenous posture as it extended 
beyond North America to the processes and pressures carried west on Atlantic waves.
14
 
This dissertation accordingly positions the Wabanakis’ pelagic world at the 
center of their early modern experience.  From the heart of this world these People of 
the Dawnland experienced Gluskap’s life-giving touch in the beginning, and received 
each successive new day.  Chapter One, “Uniting and Reuniting Dawnlands and 
Oceans,” traces the sea’s ancient prominence in the native northeast by exploring 
mutually-reinforcing scientific records and native oral traditions.  It demonstrates that 
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the ocean had long been valued as a profoundly generative and sustaining locus of 
power, and was thereby inextricable to Wabanaki welfare in their terrestrial 
communities.  This native understanding of the Atlantic also colored the interpretive 
lens through which Indians perceived their earliest encounters with Europeans.  Yet this 
Atlantic vision was neither static nor rigid.  Chapter Two, “Steering the Course of 
Transition in an Expanding Atlantic World,” explores its dynamism during the first 
wave of colonization in the early seventeenth century.  The evolving Atlantic became a 
conduit for extensive economic exchange networks linking the native northeast to 
foreign markets, and a source of valuable sailing technology increasingly coveted by 
Indian communities.  This bounty enhanced Wabanakis’ command of their waves while 
simultaneously ushering in significant socio-political changes to their communities.   
The Atlantic’s expanding fecundity also introduced hostile new pressures into 
the native northeast that threatened to disorder Wabanaki society and disorient their 
relationship to the ocean.  Chapter Three, “Contesting Atlantic Colonialism and 
Regenerating Atlantic Autonomy,” analyzes the disruptive effects of Euro-American 
trade practices, seaborne violence and environmental exploitation.  When coupled with 
a concerted effort by New England governments to undermine and police the Wabanaki 
maritime presence, these dangerous forces marked the emergence of an unmistakable 
pattern.  To Indians, nothing short of the native Atlantic world was in jeopardy.  This 
chapter also explores the Atlantic solutions Wabanaki sought out to mitigate these 
threats, and the campaign of naval warfare they executed against New England as King 
Philip’s War raged to their south.   
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By extending King Philip’s War to the northeast and into the sea in 1675, 
Wabanaki succeeded in reordering their world and renewing their authority in it.  But 
these advances proved ephemeral, and Wabanaki again explored new Atlantic 
opportunities to manage the revived colonial pressures eroding their relationship to the 
Atlantic.  The following two chapters examine Indians’ creative cultivation of these 
increasingly imperial solutions.  Chapter Four, “Manipulating Power and Prestige in an 
Imperial World,” explores how Wabanaki embarked on long-distance migrations to 
forge connections with another nexus of Atlantic power in New France.  It also analyzes 
how native interests became enmeshed in European political affairs, particularly 
England’s Glorious Revolution in 1688 and the subsequent imperial war it spawned.  
Wabanaki strategically exploited both conflicts in order to again strike at the English 
Atlantic economy and plunder it of considerable wealth.  Chapter Five, “Navigating the 
Shifting Winds of Imperial Conflict,” traces the persistence and elaboration of this 
strategy through Queen Anne’s War, another Anglo-French contest enveloping the 
northeast in 1703.  Native participation in this war thus emerged as the latest phase in a 
developing pattern.  The power politics of European courts, Indians recognized, 
afforded lucrative opportunities to augment a native Atlantic constantly disordered by 
its imperial counterpart. 
By the end of Queen Anne’s War in 1713, Wabanaki were experiencing the 
limitations of this approach.  New England’s land-based military campaigns decimated 
several of their communities in southern Maine and compounded the problem of 
France’s wavering assistance, a development stemming from Louis XIV’s dire 
economic straits.  When French imperial authorities unilaterally relinquished much of 
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the northeastern Dawnland to Britain at the Treaty of Utrecht, Wabanaki began to 
reassess their relationship with this nexus of Atlantic power and rethink their 
dependence on colonial wars to undermine and plunder the British imperial economy.  
Chapter Six, “Struggling to Secure a Fleeting Vision,” analyzes how Indians 
refashioned their Atlantic vision from these difficult lessons of Queen Anne’s War.  
After receiving word of the 1715 Jacobite Rebellion in Britain, Nova Scotia Wabanaki 
aimed to extend the uprising to the northwest Atlantic by orchestrating another 
campaign of maritime violence against the British fishery.  And when rampant colonial 
speculation in native lands culminated in war in 1722, Indians advanced their cause 
without French cooperation for the first time since King Philip’s War in 1675.  Yet this 
change of course eventually proved limited in its capacity to forge a durable and 
meaningful native Atlantic.  The buffeting waves of persistent colonial encroachment 
against the Wabanaki presence ashore and afloat, and the unraveling of the imperial 
equilibrium in the Seven Years’ War, ultimately wore away native ties to their saltwater 
world.  The construction of Governor Pownall’s fort at the mouth of the Penobscot 
River in 1759 not only slammed shut their last door to the ocean but also consummated 





“On some rocks where the breakers were most violent”: Uniting and Reuniting 
Dawnlands and Oceans 
 
The Atlantic Ocean obtained its ubiquity in native northeastern history long 
before it conveyed foreign people and material to the Dawnland.  This sea-centered 
past, moreover, has retained such salience that ways of remembering it too are saturated 
with saltwater.  As late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century students of native 
American culture traveled to Wabanakia to capture whatever vestiges of its primordial 
character remained, they recorded a complex of oral traditions steeped in a maritime 
consciousness and positioned in an aquatic world that hardly resembled its peoples’ 
contemporary confinement on land-based reservations.  These stories of the native past 
include intricate portraits of the Dawnland’s earliest days, when the Wabanaki culture 
hero emerged from the east, breathed life into its first People, and ultimately departed 
into its depths.  Others describe the amicable and devious forces lurking just beneath the 
surface of the waves.  Still others portray a watery world tamed and harnessed in the 
beginning to ensure the Peoples’ welfare and happiness.  This corpus of folk lore 
rationalizes and centers the ocean in the historical memory of a people since removed 
from their quotidian relationship with it. 
 The connection of the People and their Atlantic world is an ancient one.  
Anthropologists and archaeologists of the northeast believe that humans began utilizing 
the ocean’s resources in varying ways as early as ten thousand years before the present.  
During the middle to late Archaic Period – about five thousand years B.P. – people 
constructed more elaborate and durable watercraft to harvest deepwater marine life and 
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populate offshore islands.  The more recent Ceramic Period – about two thousand to six 
hundred years B.P. – saw year-round habitation of coastal and island sites grow in 
frequency and size, along with adaptations to newer resources introduced from the 
ocean’s ongoing ecological changes.  Pre-contact northeasterners also venerated the 
sea’s life-giving power by constructing large marine mammal effigies in their 
communities.  In short, the extant remains of boat-building tools, island encampments, 
fish, seal and whale bones, and even a Norse coin indicate that the Wabanaki and their 
ancestors were deeply enmeshed in the possibilities and processes of a larger maritime 
world that extended far beyond the Dawnland’s rocky shoreline.     
 This chapter explores the primordial saltwater-saturated past of the native 
northeast.  Taken together, it argues, oral traditions and scientific representations afford 
us a glimpse into the imaginative context within which Wabanaki understood a strange 
phenomenon increasingly common on their sixteenth-century horizons.  The foreign 
sailing vessels that emerged from their watery eastern frontier were approached with the 
same spirit of cautious opportunism that had long shaped native attitudes toward the 
sea’s valuable but potentially hazardous offerings.  While these European explorers and 
fishermen often provided lucrative trade goods that enriched Indian culture and 
facilitated their modes of production and consumption, they sometimes harbored 
deceitful and destructive motives.  More than a few Wabanaki endured trans-Atlantic 
voyages in captivity as a result, while their kin left on the shores of the Dawnland 
returned to communities robbed of goods esteemed in foreign markets.  The earliest 
native experiences of European contact, this chapter asserts, thus sprung out of the 
paradoxical duality that long lay at the heart of the Wabanaki ocean; it was at once a 
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profoundly generative and sustaining source of life while also a mysterious, perilous 
and destabilizing threat.   
 Indian involvement in these pressures and processes now circulating throughout 
the Atlantic ironically reoriented their attention away from it.  In their meetings with 
French, English, Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch explorers and fishermen possessing a 
myriad of ambitions, Wabanaki learned that the valuable material goods these visitors 
transmitted were most easily acquired with the furs of inland mammals their hunters 
occasionally harvested during the winter season.  By way of nascent fur trade 
relationships, and as periodic victims of theft, Wabanaki and their natural resources 
were being drawn into an extensive network of material exchange that stretched 
throughout and across the Atlantic.  Valued in this system were not the fruits of their 
marine economy but the furbearers that inhabited the dense inland forests opposite the 
sea.   Participation in this Atlantic complex encouraged many Indian communities to 
move away from their Atlantic ocean.   
 The same body of water that extended this network and its human agents to the 
northeast also introduced new technology into Wabanaki society that allowed Indians to 
manage the changing dynamics of their maritime world.  Near the turn of the 
seventeenth century, Indians were frequently commanding European sailing vessels and 
plying the waters of the northwestern Atlantic.  The nautical competencies developed 
over centuries of interaction with the ocean now grew more elaborate and extensive 
with their utlization of sailing technology often seized violently from European 
newcomers.  Wabanaki-commandeered ships permitted Indians a more conspicuous 
presence in their diversifying pelagic world, as well as a more aggressive stance against 
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the potentially disruptive forces that accompanied European explorers.  Some Indians 
also took advantage of these ships and the ocean’s corridors to forge an intermediary 
role in the emerging fur trade.  They sailed Dawnland waters accumulating native goods 
from neighboring communities that were later transferred to European ships.  The same 
seafaring skills that grew out of Indians’ longstanding maritime identity were 
increasingly strengthened with this novel technology in order to fortify and enhance that 
identity amidst a sea of strangers struggling to shape it with their own vision.   
 
When renowned ethnographer Charles G. Leland journeyed to the Dawnland in 
the summer of 1882, he hoped to assemble a collection of native folklore from often-
unrecognized and frequently-overlooked Indian communities in the northeast.  A stark 
ambivalence, though, pervaded his mission from the beginning.  Like many of his 
contemporaries, Leland doubted the cultural and ethnic authenticity of eastern Indians at 
the time, particularly in relation to the more numerous and recognizable native people 
of the American West.  “Few in number, surrounded by white people, and thoroughly 
converted to Roman Catholicism,” he lamented, the Wabanaki most likely retained 
scant traces, if that, of an unadulterated Indian heritage.  But what Leland discovered in 
his interviews shocked him.  Countless native informants from communities scattered 
across Maine and New Brunswick related a complex of legends and histories more 
elaborate, evocative and “far grander” than he, or any other American of the time, 
anticipated.  “I soon ascertained that these were very ancient,” he later marveled, many 
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of which were sung by elders in times past to facilitate their transmission through the 
generations.
1
   
Regardless of Leland’s desire to encounter and convey their primordial nature, 
these oral histories also reveal a pattern striking to modern sensibilities that view 
Indians—past and present – as fundamentally terrestrial people.  Wabanaki 
understandings of their origins, and of the varied roles Gluskap, their mythical culture 
hero played in them, are saturated with saltwater.  The ocean is a central motif in this 
historical consciousness and it assumes such an unmistakable prominence in the self-
identity of this people that any analysis of Wabanaki history must consider its formative 
influence.  These aquatic accounts are rendered even more peculiar and remarkable 
considering that their exponents by the time of Leland’s visit were largely relegated by 
imperial and state governments to confined inland territories where the native 
relationship to the ocean was only a fragment of its former complexity.  
 When the first dawn came to Wabanakia, its inhabitants were raw and lifeless 
beings wandering in a dark abyss and awaiting an enlivening energy.  This 
transformative and life-giving power was personified by Gluskap who emerged from 
the watery expanses of his peoples’ eastern horizon in a stone canoe covered with trees.  
Defying obvious laws of nature and human reason to manifest his supreme authority, 
the hero paddled his vessel ashore and embarked on his mission among the Wabanaki.  
The animals were first summoned and given names, and then bestowed with an 
instinctive fear of humans.  To the Wabanaki he bequeathed an intimate knowledge of 
the natural world, teaching them to make use of the earth’s resources for food and 
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medicine and for the construction of huts, canoes, and equipment to harvest fish and 
game.   
Other folklorists, linguists and ethnographers who succeeded Leland in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century recorded subtle variations on this account.  
Synthesizing Christian and native origin stories, Micmac related how God landed on the 
shores of their country after first creating the white people across the sea.  He then 
crafted their ancestors from the untouched sand softened and smoothed by the ocean’s 
turbulent waves.  Still others believed that their first people washed ashore in the froth 
created by the waves’ perpetual ebb and flow.  The singular event of these slightly 
varied landings, however, bridged the cognitive chasm hitherto separating the 
mysterious unknown of this pelagic world from the Dawnland, the birthplace and home 
of its People.  Their quickening ashore stemmed from attendant forces afloat.  By 
imbuing the ocean with spiritual and material meaning, and by respecting its profoundly 
generative and life-giving power, the Wabanaki effectively imbricated their marine and 
terrestrial worlds in the very beginning.
2
  
 The conjugation of sea and land is so prominent in Wabanaki folk life that it 
resonates elsewhere in their traditional belief system, particularly in attitudes toward 
animal life.  Micmac have long anthropomorphized their ocean and land environments 
as kingdoms each ruled by a headman-type figure; the moose oversees the terrestrial 
world while the whale governs the water.  These chief species, moreover, are capable of 
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reincarnating as one another when advanced in age, thereby avoiding natural death.  
One will thus never find a moose, or other subservient animals like the bear or caribou, 
dead in the forest because of old age since they simply walk into the sea and transform 
into whales in the autumn of their lives.  The near identical brackish taste of both moose 
and whale flesh, such folklore maintains, is proof of this symbiotic metamorphosis.  The 
fluidity of these two environments and their governing creatures is reflected in the story 
of Indians tracking a moose along the coast.  After killing and butchering the game they 
discovered seaweed in its stomach rather than ordinary woodland forage.
3
  Such tales, 
and the sacred belief systems they embodied, rendered the Wabanaki’s marine and 
terrestrial worlds fungible and their natural distinction ambiguous.  
After first conjugating the ocean and land, this culture’s oral traditions proceed 
to reflect an understanding of the sea as an invaluable resource positioned for 
manipulation.  A plethora of Gluskap’s subsequent exploits among the ancestral 
Wabanaki are predicated on his successful exploitation of the oceanic world.  Once 
while residing on a faraway island at sea, Gluskap became aware of mainland creatures 
who acquired strength and wisdom that rivaled his own, but who disparaged his absent 
and distant authority.  To assist his continental return to reestablish social order, 
Gluskap looked out onto the sea and chanted a magical song that the whales obeyed.  
Many emerged enchanted, and offered their assistance to the hero.  Gluskap chose the 
mightiest female, whom he rode close to shore before she expressed worry about 
running aground.  Gluskap, however, did not wish to wet his feet and pushed on until 
she beached.  Before embarking on foot to the Wabanaki, he pushed the whale back into 
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the sea and obliged her request for a pipe of tobacco to compensate her efforts.  On 
another occasion, Gluskap chased a number of evil witches to the nether regions of the 
sea on the backs of whales again summoned with his magical song.
4
   
In addition to facilitating mobility and broadening spatial reality, the ocean also 
functioned as a repository of nutritional and material sustenance for Wabanaki’s culture 
hero, as it would continue to do for generations of descendents.  After Gluskap received 
an invitation from the magician-giant, Kitpooseagunow, to accompany him on a whale- 
hunting expedition, the two set out in a boat by torchlight carrying harpoons that 
resembled lightening bolts when thrust into the sea at their game.  The two proceeded to 
enjoy a rich seafood feast from their labor.  When his feeble grandmother expressed her 
frustrating inability to catch fish, Gluskap came to her aid by cruising the ocean, 
rounding up abundant schools of fish, and herding them up a river and into his 
grandmother’s trap.  Elsewhere in Wabanaki lore, a young warrior wished to pursue the 
attractive daughter of a great chief, but their people inhabited a land somewhere along 
the distant reaches of the ocean.  Gluskap came to the aid of the discouraged youth and 
transported him in his canoe to a large island of granite and enormous pine trees.  This 
rock was transformed into a magnificent sailing ship replete with multiple masts, which 
the warrior plied over the waters to his remote love.  The vast opportunities afforded by 
the sea, such lessons conveyed, could mitigate the quotidian rigors and pressures faced 
by people in every age.  Additionally, they worked to familiarize a seemingly foreign 
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Yet the ocean simultaneously figured as a precarious and potentially sinister 
realm, in whose shadowy recesses lurked bizarre and menacing forces, constantly 
scheming to wreak havoc on the unwary.  On his homeward journey with the great 
chief’s daughter, the young warrior’s ship encountered stormy seas and was bombarded 
by tremendous waves.  Out of the murky depths emerged the giant beaver Quahbeet, a 
formidable nemesis of Gluskap.  Quahbeet furiously attacked the boat with his tail in an 
attempt to sink it and kill the crew, but Gluskap came to the assistance of the young 
man and together they slew the dreadful beast.  The same watery chasm that initially 
impeded the young man’s pursuit of his desire posed a more deadly hazard later on his 
voyage, though both obstacles were overcome with material and supernatural power.
6
   
Gluskap too experienced the sea’s malevolent forces while captivated by a 
young girl.  This maiden, however, was a disguised witch whose real identity was not 
discovered until she accompanied Gluskap in his canoe on the calm ocean waters.  After 
the frightful epiphany, he jumped overboard, pushed the witch out into the open sea and 
swam safely to shore.  She was subsequently transformed into keegunibe, a vicious 
serpent with a fin resembling a sail protruding from the water, who some Wabanaki 
believe continues to stalk the seas today.  Gluskap was also known to have once 
harnessed the ocean’s violent weather.  After extreme wind thwarted his plans to hunt 
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seafowl in his canoe, he sought out and subdued the giant bird whose beating wings 
created the gusty waves, thereby forging a maritime environment more hospitable to 
Indian use.  The paradoxical duality of the sea in Wabanaki oral tradition – at once life-
sustaining and life-threatening – did not force this watery realm to the fringes of their 
cosmology.  Instead it served to stabilize it.  Like the spiritual power animating the 
Dawnland’s forests, mountains, rivers and lakes, the ocean perpetually exhibited a 
power capable of both ameliorating and destabilizing human life.
7
    
 The material and spiritual potential that characterized the very nature of the sea 
in the Wabanaki ethos was also indefinite and ongoing.  When Charles Leland inquired 
of his native informants regarding the whereabouts of their culture hero, they noted that 
everyone believes him to reside somewhere out at sea.  After instilling life in 
Wabanakia and instructing its denizens in the ways of their terrestrial and maritime 
world, Gluskap’s departure from his peoples’ oral tradition mirrored his appearance in 
it; he simply sailed his stone canoe into the ocean’s immense and boundless expanses.  
From his undefined residence in the east, the Wabanaki believed, Gluskap would again 
enter their lives as the rising of the sun daily enlivens the Dawnland.  Both his 
emergence and leave-taking were thus impermanent phenomena that signaled to natives 
the interminable potentiality bound up in their eastern horizon.  If Gluskap’s incarnation 
from a murky abyss and subsequent adventures in it served to rationalize an otherwise 
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unknowable void, his temporary exit into that now recognizable milieu marked it as a 
locus of indefinite power demanding ongoing anticipation.
8
   
The dynamic and adaptive nature of American Indian oral history adds a level of 
peculiar complexity to these renditions of the Wabanaki’s saltwater-saturated folklore.  
While offering up insights into native understandings of their relationship with the 
ocean, such stories also implicitly reflect the evolution of those perceptions by way of 
the constantly-changing concerns they are intended to address in Indian country.  
Leland and other cultural voyeurs desperately hoped the legends they heard were “very 
ancient” and antedated the corrupting influences of contemporary American society.  In 
reality, they were the most recent manifestation of native attempts to rectify their place 
in a changing and seemingly irrational world.  What, then, does this body of knowledge 
reflect in Wabanaki culture at the time – a culture long since distanced spatially and 
materially from the Atlantic by the pressures of Euro-American colonization?  What 
does this elaborate marine mythology suggest about a people now retaining only 
remnants of their former maritime identity and command of an Atlantic world?  Just as 
many oral traditions of the Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, Chicksaw and Seminole peoples 
aim to preserve elements of their pre-Removal societies, these Wabanaki stories 
represent the distant echo of a past so formative in their collective sense of self that they 
were unwilling or unable to forget it.  Such an inescapable legacy was perpetually 
reified through these tales, which additionally served to express a profound anxiety 
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about its potential deterioration on nineteenth- and twentieth-century reservations 
exhibiting few other reminders.
9
     
Wabanaki maritime heritage, as well as that of native America more broadly, is 
likely more complex and more ancient than antiquarians and scholars of the native past 
have acknowledged.  Perhaps influenced by popular conceptions of Indians as 
fundamentally terrestrial peoples, anthropologists and archaeologists have long 
maintained that the first inhabitants of the Americas arrived on foot.  Walking from 
modern-day Siberia across the Bering Land Bridge, the Beringia consensus argues, 
Paleoindians subsequently trekked south via a corridor along the Rocky Mountains and 
dispersed throughout the American continent with incredible alacrity.  New paradigm-
shifting research, however, is beginning to suggest that these Pleistocene migrations 
may have been wetter than previously supposed.   Instead, some now believe, the first 
settlers relied on watercraft to drift along the continental coastlines of the north Pacific 
or perhaps island-hop across the southern reaches of this body of water prior to the 
accessibility of a land bridge.  These arguments would also provide a viable explanation 
for the speed with which the southernmost regions of South America were populated.  
A fringe school of anthropologists have asserted an even more jarring possibility.  
According to their controversial new evidence, the first discovery voyages were not 
only afloat, but also Atlantically-centered with origins in the Solutrean culture of 
Western Europe where the Clovis tradition experienced its genesis.
10
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If indeed Wabanaki’s paleo-era ancestors were borne by watercraft and an 
accompanying nautical competence, their descendants’ oceanic folklore ought to be 
situated in a cultural context much richer and more primordial than scholars have 
suggested.  It is highly doubtful, of course, that the legends recorded by nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century folklorists and ethnographers were conceived in these prehistoric 
cruises and bequeathed in toto through succeeding generations.  But less improbable is 
that such monumental journeys retained some enduring salience in the historical 
memory of a people who continued to preserve and utilize the maritime competencies 
acquired from them.     
A similar intimacy with marine environments and an associated skill set for 
nautical mobility existed among many pre-Columbian cultures of the northeast.  In the 
land that the Wabanaki inhabited during the historic period, several societies including 
those of their ancestors came to depend in varying degrees on marine resources for their 
physical and material sustenance, some even leaving traces of their spiritual centrality 
to the native ethos.  This longstanding cultivation of the ocean’s resources was also 
predicated on an equally-longstanding nautical aptitude, a knowledge that would grow 
more sophisticated to meet the changing needs of human cultures and the changing 
dynamics of the ocean itself.   
Understanding the role of the ocean across the broad span of the Dawnland’s 
prehistoric past, including those cultures from which the historic-era Wabanaki were not 
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direct derivatives, illuminates the wider context of the northeast’s human and 
environmental history.  From this primordial world emerged Wabanaki culture, part and 
parcel of an aged record of human interaction with the sea and its resources.  Exploring 
the long duration of the Dawnland’s maritime past also unearths certain characteristics 
that transcended the region’s prehistoric societies and cultures, and were by no means 
unique to the historic-era Wabanaki.  Since the ocean functioned so prominently in 
nearly every facet of the regional environment, its ecological shifts directly shaped the 
cultural formation of local human populations.  Those that more thoroughly integrated 
the maritime world into their patterns of production and consumption generally proved 
more successful at sustaining their culture over longer periods.  Those that instead relied 
more exclusively on their terrestrial environment experienced less longevity and 
migrated south to more habitable environs.  The Wabanaki and their ancestors were able 
to thrive after their arrival in the region, and through their encounters with Europeans in 
the sixteenth century, when they shaped their economy directly around the ocean’s 
productivity.  In sum, by taking a wider lens to a study of Wabanaki maritime identity, 
we can discern the ocean’s perennial ubiquity in this corner of the world and the 
profound consequences of this presence for the diverse human beings who called it 
home.   
The earliest record of human occupation in this maritime region is from the 
early Archaic era, about 10,000 to 8000 years ago.  Most settlements from this period 
have been found on inland waterways, locales that positioned them to harvest the 
numerous saltwater fish species that spawned on their riverine migrations.  Such 
anadromous marine life included the alewife, shad and Atlantic salmon, all species that 
32 
 
would continue to supply a large part of the Wabanaki diet in the historic period.  Non-
anadromous ocean life including other fish, shellfish and sea mammals were also likely 
utilized, though sparse evidence remains of these people’s coastal presence and the 
ocean’s productive capacity because of subsequent fluctuations in sea level.  These 
settlements constructed dugout canoes and fish weirs to assist in their acquisition of 
such resources and increase their range of mobility, judging from extant remains of 
woodworking tools discovered in local sites.
11
 
Watercraft construction became more elaborate by the middle Archaic period 
(8000 to 6000 B.P) as evidenced by the confluence of numerous technical and 
ecological developments.  The types of woodworking tools periodically used in the 
early Archaic period now became abundant among more numerous inland and coastal 
habitations and were increasingly supplemented with modified styles introduced from 
the southeast.  The sustained settlement of islands off the coast of present-day Maine 
also became more frequent, and was likely induced by an increase in productivity levels 
of adjacent waters.  Because of ocean levels now more conducive to a regularized 
maritime economy, marine life including oysters and quahogs were widely accessible to 
these communities.  An increase in the number, size and durability of seafaring 
watercraft capable of augmenting the exploitation of these opportunities was thus 
required.  This period provides the earliest evidence for an emerging maritime aptitude 
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in the region that included seaborne exploration and settlement accompanied by a more 
active engagement with ocean life.
12
 
The archaeological record is more abundant from the late Archaic period around 
5000 B.P, and indicates the continuation of these trends.   Meager evidence points 
toward early and middle Archaic peoples’ systematic cultivation of their maritime 
environments, but subsequent and possibly derivative cultures left conclusive 
indications of their common use of marine resources.  Named for the type of projectile 
point upon which they relied, the Small Stemmed Point Tradition predominated 
throughout much of the northeast.  In Maine these communities were situated primarily 
along coastal regions where they regularly harvested large saltwater fish including cod 
and swordfish, a practice that later endured among the Wabanaki according to reports of 
several European explorers and colonists.  These species became increasingly 
accessible to coastal and island populations around 5000 B.P. as local water 
temperatures warmed and forced these large predators to follow their schools of smaller 
prey nearer to the coast.  Despite the increased facility with which they could be hunted, 
the formidable size of cod and swordfish at the time demanded fluency with larger and 
more durable watercraft and a level of competence with mobility on the open sea.  The 
evidentiary basis of these growing practices surfaced at numerous sites throughout 
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 By 4000 B.P., a descendant culture of the Stemmed Small Point Tradition 
occupied coastal sites throughout Maine and continued to elaborate on the marine 
economy of their forebears.  Among the most defining characteristics of this people 
were their decorated ceremonial tools interred in peculiar human burial grounds with 
significant amounts of red ochre.  These “Red Paint People” also enriched their spiritual 
customs with the construction of large effigies that often depicted marine creatures.  
Because of their apparent symmetry with practices of the Maritime Archaic Culture 
further north in Labrador and eastern Quebec, Red Paint societies have been depicted as 
southern expressions of this broader saltwater culture by many scholars.  Evidence of 
extensive sea mammal effigies and slate spears used to hunt large marine life such as 
seals also abounds.  Others, however, argue that while its explicit maritime orientation 
resembled components of the Maritime Archaic Culture, this culture was an entirely 
separate tradition locally confined to the Gulf of Maine, and consequently ought to be 
understood as the Moorehead Phase.  The elaborate mortuary practices present in both 
are typical of maritime societies that depend on hazardous deepwater travel and hunting 
for procuring food.  Regardless of discrepancies in nomenclature, humans in the 
northeast were now integrating their lifeways and the Atlantic to a degree previously 
unseen.
14
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The rising specialization and magnitude of deepwater swordfish hunting and cod 
fishing, as well as the species’ dietary importance for these people, far surpassed its 
tangential status in their predecessors’ societies.  In some locales, certain scholars 
assert, swordfish and cod now became so critical to this maritime way of life and its 
harvest so intensive, that certain marine ecosystems were nearly exhausted.
15
  Other 
resources increasingly central to these people included soft-shell clams and quahog 
accessible near shorelines, as well as seals, walrus, and sea fowl hunted from island and 
offshore locations.  A diverse marine resource base permitted these people to occupy 
many coastal and island sites year-round while also embarking on short forays into the 
inland forests for deer and moose hunting in the winter.  The late Archaic period also 
included the occupation of Monhegan Island off the south-central coast of Maine, a 
prime position in a particularly rich marine environment.  This valuable stage would 
consequently be a site of violent contestation between Wabanaki inhabitants and 
English fishermen in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  The architectural styles 
of northeastern Algonquians in the early historic period can also be traced as far back as 
the Moorehead Phase.
16
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Sometime between 4000 and 3500 B.P. this maritime culture vanished from the 
northeast, leaving little trace of its economic system in the succeeding tradition.  Its 
abrupt and seemingly mysterious departure, like its emergence and maintenance, has 
been attributed by archaeologists to concurrent ecological changes in the north Atlantic 
that effectively closed off the availability of vital resources.  Declining water 
temperatures similar to those of today combined with alterations in sea level and 
salinity, for example, forced swordfish to seek warmer environments further south.  
Human populations in the region including Maritime Archaic Culture groups to the 
north, long since accustomed to and reliant on recognizable patterns in their marine 
environment, consequently declined and eventually disappeared.  In Maine and the 
Canadian Maritime provinces, a new population migrated from the southwest as far as 
Kentucky and replaced this waning culture.  Known as the Susquehanna Tradition, 
these people exhibited little of the maritime character of their predecessors, and instead 
developed tools to assist their cultivation of inland forest resources.  Few Susquehanna 
Tradition coastal settlements have been uncovered, and those nearest the sea possessed 
no substantial remnants of harvested marine life.  When the local woodland ecology 
underwent significant changes that ushered in flora and fauna dissimilar to that of their 
southern origins, these peoples were severely affected.  The northeast accordingly 
experienced another ecologically-induced dispersal as this terrestrial society retreated 
south.  Thus by the late Archaic period, populations who had come to rely too heavily 
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or sparsely on the Atlantic’s productive capacity were consequently unable to maintain 
cultural continuity beyond the drastic changes that periodically refashioned their natural 
world.  In order to successfully manage such disruptive forces, a more equitable 
integration of maritime resources was needed.
17
  
The southward migration of the Susquehanna Tradition to more habitable 
woodland environments marked the end of the Archaic Period in the northeast.  By 
about 2700 B.P., a new human occupation emerged along the region’s coasts that 
possessed the strongest linkages yet to modern Algonquian populations.  Known as the 
Woodland Period in other areas of North America, the Ceramic Period in the northeast 
was principally characterized by its peoples’ decorated clay pottery used for food 
preparation, an innovation that replaced older bark and wooden vessels unable to 
sustain heating from fire.  The labor-intensive manufacturing of this technology and the 
fragility of the final product made it quite impractical for highly mobile hunter-gatherer 
groups.  In the northeast, extant remnants of pottery are more abundant in seaside 
settlements than in the interior, and therefore indicate a sedentary lifestyle among these 
coastal people.  The increased productivity of the ocean during the development of the 
Ceramic Period, moreover, provided an environment conducive to a nearly year-round 
habitation of coastal and island locations.
18
      
When coupled with artifacts of novel cooking equipment, remains of dietary 
trends among Ceramic Period peoples further suggest that this culture mirrored and 
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perhaps surpassed the maritime-centeredness of many Archaic era peoples.  Humans 
along the northeastern coast now diversified their consumption patterns in response to 
the proliferation of new oceanic resources.  Baleen whalebones dating from this era 
have been uncovered at a few archaeological sites in Maine, as has a large harpoon 
point developed for their harvest.  The tremendous material and nutritional value of this 
mammal would undoubtedly have been sufficient to serve multiple communities, 
though the great risk, effort and technology involved in their hunting likely made 
whaling a marginal activity.  More probable is this culture’s periodic utilization of 
beached whales.  Other large sea mammals including the grey and harbor seal assumed 
unprecedented levels of importance to Ceramic people, particularly closer to the historic 
period.  Coldwater shellfish such as soft-shell clams, mussels, snails and sea urchins, 
ancillary in prior times, now increased in population and use as both a human food 
source and bait for larger deepwater fish.  Crabs and lobsters also likely constituted a 
vital component of the diet, though the quick disintegration of their skeletons would 
make them absent in the archeological record.  Flounder, sculpin and sturgeon replaced 
the previous centrality of swordfish and cod, the former since retreating with warming 
temperatures and the plenitude of the latter perhaps diminishing from frequent over-
harvesting.  Marine waterfowl including the now-extinct great auk, a terrestrial-bound 
bird resembling a penguin, required little effort to hunt and their eggs were also easily 
accessible.  The maritime ecosystem of the Ceramic Period, in sum, fostered the 
development of a human culture attuned to its varied and sustainable resource base.  
The long-term growth of this population was largely predicated on the successful 
balance of its oceanic and terrestrial ecosystems.
19
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An exotic piece of evidence uncovered by archaeologists reveals a more peculiar 
aspect of the Wabanaki’s connection to their larger maritime world.  In 1957 at the 
Goddard Hill Site on Blue Hill Bay in Maine, a small medieval Norse coin was 
discovered alongside several nonlocal Indian artifacts dating from the late-Ceramic 
Period.  Though much of its history remains obscure, the coin was likely minted in the 
eleventh century A.D. and traveled with a Viking expedition to North America shortly 
thereafter.  These European explorers were not known to have traveled as far south as 
Wabanakia, but were active throughout the Gulf of St. Lawrence and Labrador where 
they encountered local people who were likely the initial recipients of the coin.  Its 
transmission southward to Wabanaki ancestors is discernible when collaborated with 
the recent discovery of other contemporaneous materials originating with these northern 
cultures at various sites in Maine.
20
  The exchange of such an exotic article through 
native trade networks could also have been accompanied by oral descriptions of its 
unusual origins and acquisition, accumulating into legends that rationalized the ever 
new potentiality of the sea from whence its progenitors appeared.  Regardless of the 
circumstances surrounding the coin’s journey, its arrival in the Dawnland initiated a 
trend that would continue to unfold throughout the early historic period.  Through their 
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extensive and carefully-cultivated trade networks, Wabanaki participated in a trans-
Atlantic web of material exchange that afforded them opportunities to enhance their 
aesthetic culture and augment the social standing of their communities and its leaders.   
The socio-political structure of Wabanaki society in the Ceramic Period would 
persist into the historic era.  These semi-nomadic hunter-gatherers lived in bands of 
extended kin characterized by a strong degree of egalitarianism.  Their scattered 
settlements and seasonal migratory pattern precluded the formation of a rigid 
authoritarian hierarchy.  In late fall, bands left behind their maritime economy and 
departed coastal encampments for the interior forests, but carried with them the fruits of 
the sea to assist them in their time apart.  They spent the winter hunting game such as 
moose, deer, elk and beaver.  The harsh climate combined with the unpredictability of 
the hunt, often made this “starving time” a season of deprivation and immense hardship.  
In early spring, bands moved back to the sea in time to harvest its more plentiful and 
dependable resources.  Thus for nearly ten months out of the year, their economy was 
directly tied to the maritime world which comprised upwards of ninety percent of their 
diet.
21
     
Wabanaki bands also inhabited semi-permanent villages overseen by leading 
men in the community.  These band-centered settlements were primarily situated along 
the major riverine systems of Maine and eastern Canada, though anthropologists 
continue to debate whether these river-centered peoples were the direct antecedents to 
historic-era polities.  The headmen, or sagamores, of such villages generally achieved  
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Figure 2 – Major River Systems of Wabanakia – 
From Bruce J. Bourque, Twelve Thousand Years: American Indians in Maine (Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2001), 6 
 
their prestige not through hereditary rights but by an ability to materially provision their 
community and build consensus among its members.
22
   
By the conclusion of the Ceramic Period and the transition to the historic era, 
the Wabanaki believed themselves quite literally to be surrounded by saltwater.  Their 
ancestral homeland had become Ketakamigwa – “big land on the seacoast” – and was 
conceived as one parcel of a large island, a macrocosm of each tiny island settlement 
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scattered throughout northeastern waters.
23
  Yet the ocean did not mark the edge of a 
landlocked cosmology, or serve as a barrier confining them to a continental vision.  It 
was not an alien abyss tangentially positioned in the quotidian world of native people.  
Its spiritual and material meaning was not unfathomable, intangible or extraneous, nor 
was it only reflected on from a terrestrial posture.  This native ocean was not an 
aberration of nature where human presence was taboo.  It was instead a world in which 
to expand, settle, and colonize, a world whose fecundity could be harnessed, harvested 
and cherished.  Human interaction with and dependence on the living ocean – and a 
resultant comprehension of its generative, life-giving and sustaining capacities – 
substantially defined much of the native northeastern past prior to the arrival of 
Europeans.  The material record of this maritime orientation, rich with the remains of 
aquatic fauna and megafauna, marine effigies, sea-hunting implements, offshore 
habitations and even European currency, reflects a series of profoundly dynamic, 
interconnected and adaptive cultures, attuned to ever-changing opportunities afforded 
by their eastern horizon.  
This longstanding pelagic heritage also shaped the context of possibilities within 
which the Wabanaki comprehended their earliest encounters with seaborne strangers 
from the east.  As a locus of material and spiritual nourishment, a dwelling place of 
forces both menacing and amiable, and the doorway through which Gluskap had 
emerged and departed, the ocean’s variegated and oftentimes unpredictable character 
framed in the collective native imagination Europe’s early entrance into the Dawnland.  
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Thus when Wabanaki from the Kennebec River region in Maine witnessed the 
materialization of a massive sailing vessel from their vast watery horizon one day in 
1524, their reaction reflected a profound degree of ambivalence about its potential.   
The foreign watercraft entering Wabanaki waters was the Dauphine, a ship 
commanded by Giovanni da Verrazzano, an Italian navigator in the midst of an 
exploratory expedition for the French monarch Francis I.  The European crew caught 
glimpses of the Indians’ rich maritime culture as the two groups drew together for a 
closer look near Casco Bay.  Clothed in skins of the “sea-wolf” (seal or walrus), as well 
as other animals, the local Wabanaki came down “to the seashore on some rocks where 
the breakers were most violent,” thereby utilizing their familiarity with the sea’s natural 
features to manage the instability of this encounter.  Even after Verrazzano’s men 
expressed their desire to trade European for native goods, the Indians stood their 
ground, “continually shouting to us not to approach the land.”  European sailing 
technology and material culture did not imbue these native people with an 
overwhelming sense of awe or respect.  Along the Maine coast in 1524 it rather elicited 
extreme caution and ambivalence over its potentially threatening power.
24
    
But the Wabanaki ocean was also a source of life-enriching bounty.  Those 
apprehensively watching the French boat’s approach from shore decided to seize a 
valuable opportunity to enhance their material well-being and “sent us what they 
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wanted to give on a rope,” according to Verrazzano.  Shrewd, demanding and eager to 
deal quickly, the Indians curiously took “in exchange only knives, hooks for fishing, 
and sharp metal,” revealing their acquaintance with European wares and an appreciation 
of their cultural and practical utility.  This first recorded encounter between the 
Wabanaki and Europeans proceeded in a terse and unceremonious fashion, only lasting 
until the strangers’ coveted goods were exhausted.  Trading with an alien people 
drifting in on waves from the east evidently demanded a departure from customary 
modes of native exchange that involved more lengthy and formalized rituals to cement 
social bonds, in addition to the simple transference of material goods.  On these Atlantic 
shores, Wabanaki wished to dispense with the former in order to ensure the safety of the 
latter.  At the conclusion of this abbreviated process, the Indian men “made all the signs 
of scorn and shame that any brute creature would make, such as showing their buttocks 
and laughing” in celebration of their mastery of an initially-precarious maritime 
phenomenon.  By standing guard on the treacherous and wave-battered rocks jutting out 
from the coast, the Indians carefully positioned themselves in and claimed the liminal 
space that yoked their Dawnland to its rich and indispensable marine sphere.  Their 
collective decision to set out and confront the Atlantic’s unfamiliar offering before it 
approached them, and to assertively manipulate it to their own satisfaction, allowed the 
Wabanaki to effectively harness the boundless potential of their ocean.  This event 
exhibited once again the deep cultural resonance of their maritime identity.
25
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Though Giovanni da Verrazzano’s foiled landing served as a watershed moment 
for Indians near Casco Bay, his crew were not the first Europeans encountered by 
natives in the region.  The cautious ambivalence and unilateral negotiation that marked 
this cultural encounter indicate that Wabanaki conceptions of the Atlantic were already 
assimilating some level of knowledge about European newcomers.  By the early 
sixteenth century, Basque and Breton fishermen were beginning to interact with native 
communities near the increasingly popular Grand Banks fishery off the coasts of 
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.  These unrecorded experiences most likely centered on 
the exchange of European metal goods for native furs, sexual relationships between 
fishermen and native women, and the inevitable misunderstandings and tensions that 
accompanied both.  These fishing voyages, however, were not known to have extended 
south into the Gulf of Maine where Wabanaki met Verrazzano in 1524, though 
information about them would have passed through Indians’ extensive trade networks.  
The Kennebec River Indians who attempted to stave off the novel pressure from the east 
near Casco Bay were thus likely encountering Europeans for the first time.  Rumors 
originating from Wabanaki and other native people to the far northeast would have 
prepared these people for the possibility that their maritime world was more diverse, 
productive and malevolent than previously imagined.  To Europeans like Verrazzano, 
the resulting defensive opportunism embodied by Indians came across as “full of 
crudity and vices” in a people “so barbarous” and “devoid of manners and humanity” 
that “we found no courtesy in them.”
26
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The following year, Wabanaki elsewhere in the northeast endured a traumatic 
experience that sharply reminded them of the Atlantic’s menacing and destructive 
potential that often accompanied its life-giving fruitfulness.  In 1525, Portuguese 
navigator Estevão Gomes set out from Spain in the employ of Emperor Charles V to 
find a route to the East Indies said to lie somewhere between Florida and 
Newfoundland.  Consisting of only a single ship, Gomes’ expedition eventually reached 
the northwestern Atlantic somewhere between Penobscot Bay and Nova Scotia where 
he found an extensive country home to “excellent martens of the sable kind, and other 
find fur-bearing animals,” according to European chroniclers who described his detailed 
report to the Spanish government.  The expedition arrived in the Dawnland’s waters 
sometime after late spring, since they encountered coastal Indians well into their 
seasonal fishing and clamming practices.  Gomes’ mission to discover a route to 
Cathay, however, met with failure.  Unwilling to return empty-handed to Europe after 
just ten months, he “filled his ship with innocent people of both sexes, half naked” who 
he believed would turn a large profit in the Iberian slave markets.  The crew sailed back 
to Seville directly from the northeast where the fifty-eight Indian slaves who survived 
the voyage were unloaded, housed and prepared for sale.  Unimpressed with the 
navigator’s exotic gifts, and angered at his callous disregard of official orders not to 
agitate indigenous populations, Charles V ordered the Indians’ freedom though they 
never returned to their home across the Atlantic.
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How, precisely, these Wabanaki were enslaved to the number of about one 
hundred is not revealed in the travel accounts, though some combination of deception 
through trade and force of arms likely aided Gomes’ men.  In contrast to their 
neighbors’ successful, and profitable, repulsion of Verrazzano’s boat a year earlier near 
Casco Bay, unfortunate Wabanaki to the northeast learned once again that the pressures 
emanating from their maritime frontier demanded constant vigilance and careful 
management.  Those left on the shores of the Dawnland and forced to watch their 
kinsmen and friends fade into the watery horizon shackled aboard a stranger’s ship 
undoubtedly marked the Atlantic now as a disruptive and disabling force in native 
society.  The instinctive hope to again see their kidnapped relatives re-emerge from the 
eastern sea joined with the ongoing anticipation of many Wabanaki that Gluskap’s 
departure in his stone canoe was transitory and would ultimately result in a reunification 
with his people.  Those forced on this trans-Atlantic journey elaborated too their 
conception of the ocean’s threatening and unfamiliar character, buttressed with their 
discovery of the Wabanaki Atlantic’s immense and unrecognizable contours.  As they 
approached their final destination of Seville later that year, now watching the sun’s 
setting over the Atlantic rather than its rising, the realization that their maritime world 
was as transformational as it was productive and perilous would have slowly set in.  
These Indian slaves no doubt realized that their seaborne journey into captivity – in the 
same wake of Gluskap’s leave-taking – had ushered them into an Atlantic world more 
exotic and alien than the one they had long known.  Their voyage, and the knowledge 
achieved from it, also foreshadowed the later experiences of Wabanaki mariners, 
diplomats, and captives.
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 Other Wabanaki to the north demonstrated a more sanguine attitude toward 
these evermore frequent opportunities radiating from the eastward.  Northern Micmac 
who experienced a more prolonged and sustained engagement with fleets of European 
fishermen than their southern neighbors came to believe that the benefits of trade often 
outweighed its potential hazards.  Jacques Cartier encountered such sentiments among 
the Wabanaki near Chaleur Bay during his first voyage to modern-day Newfoundland, 
Prince Edward Island and the Gaspe Peninsula in 1534.  Under the auspices of the 
French crown, Cartier sailed west to find a route to the Far East, but terminated his 
mission near the mouth of the St. Lawrence River.  As they did with Verrazzano and 
Gomes, the Wabanaki encountered the French explorers in the summer of that year 
while camped at their seasonal coastal settlements for the customary harvest of marine 
life.  Likely a member of Verrazzano’s crew in 1524, Cartier now characterized these 
coastal natives as a people “who go from place to place… catching fish in the fishing-
season.”  After spotting them in a fleet of some forty to fifty canoes crossing the open 
water of the bay en route to the opposite shore, Cartier drew closer as the Indians “set 
up a great clamour and made frequent signs to us to come on shore, holding up to us 
some furs on sticks.”  After being refused the opportunity, the more persistent Indians 
boarded their canoes, and joining “five more of those that were coming in from the 
sea,” pursued the ship and continued to express their desire to trade.  Denied once more, 
the Indians returned to the ship the following day and “held up some furs of small 
value, with which they clothe themselves,” and finally procured Cartier’s acquiescence.  
Traders were sent ashore with several iron tools “and a red cap to give to their chief.”  
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After parting with everything they possessed, the Indians promised to return the next 
day with more furs.
29
   
In contrast to their reticent treatment of Verrazzano’s ship along the Maine 
coast, these Wabanaki were steadfast in their insistence that the foreigners come off the 
water and into their community to conduct this exchange.  Such an approach 
demonstrated their increasingly benign perception of an Atlantic experience growing in 
frequency and familiarity, one that could be effectively managed and exploited to 
enhance their culture.  Both instances also indicate, however, that Wabanaki wished to 
dictate this customary procedure according to their terms and within their chosen 
marine or terrestrial setting.  The more personalized barter afforded to Cartier’s party, in 
addition, permitted the gifting of a red cap to the local sagamore, thereby crowning with 
novel European apparel a perceived political leader in the mold of emerging nation-
states across the Atlantic.  In sum, while these Indians strove to dictate the terms of 
engagement with Cartier’s traders, they were also subject to pressures, ideas, and goods 
that drew them away from their known ocean and closer to a Europeanized Atlantic 
world.     
 The Wabanaki rationalized and participated in this quintessentially-Atlantic 
encounter by conforming it to their own recognizably native custom of trade.  A striking 
aspect of this elaborate process included reconciling a still unfamiliar maritime 
opportunity with their own longstanding comprehension of the ocean’s bountiful 
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potential.  Perhaps because Cartier had participated in the Verrazzano-Wabanaki 
meeting ten years earlier, he accentuated the divergence in each native group’s 
incorporation of European trade.  Clearly exhibiting a “marvelously great pleasure” at 
the material exchange, these northern Micmac normalized the customary process with 
alien others by “dancing and going through many ceremonies” as the European 
newcomers curiously looked on.  This ritual then culminated with the Wabanaki 
“throwing salt water over their heads with their hands,” thus sprinkling and sanctifying 
the entire experience with the waters that they knew facilitated it.  And when the 
Indians paddled out to the anchored ship the next day, their gifts of thanksgiving to the 
strangers were not more furs, venison, berries, or fresh water, but “some strips of 
cooked seal” accompanied by “signs to us that they were making us a present.”  The 
women, Cartier related, “danced and sang” while “standing in the water up to their 
knees,” as a swelling crowd of over “300 persons” congregated on shore eager to 
dispense with more furs.  Rite made right in this native cosmology, and by imbuing 
European men and material culture with their pelagic vision, the Wabanaki effectively 
situated this seaborne process – with a people ironically exercising their own ambitions 
for an Atlantic world – in a familiar locus of spiritual power.
30
  
 Alongside native efforts to carefully police the ocean’s new and occasionally 
precarious opportunities emerged a conspicuous pattern of European consumption.  
Countless encounters with explorers and fishermen in the waters of the northwest 
Atlantic indicated to Wabanaki that these people of the eastward consistently sought a 
product of their terrestrial-based economy.  By the mid-sixteenth century, Indians came 
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to understand that furs were the key to these European goods, and consequently to a 
productive manipulation of this emerging Atlantic process.  Periodically, the escalating 
commodification of Wabanakia even encouraged theft by increasingly audacious 
Europeans disembarking in Indian society, as it did with Estevão Gomes in 1525.  
English seaman and adventurer John Walker landed at the mouth of the Penobscot 
River with an exploratory expedition in 1580, and boldly penetrated a Wabanaki 
community along the Penobscot River where “he and his company did finde in one 
Cottage above 240 Hides.”  Walker stole the goods and transported them back to 
European markets, where they were “solde in Fraunce” for considerable sums, 
according to Sir Humphrey Gilbert, an English booster for the exploration and 
colonization of the northeast.
31
   
The steady stream of trade opportunities of the sixteenth century continued a 
gradual restructuring of the native economy.  Of mounting value in this maritime world 
were the furbearing creatures of the inland forests, whose skins were capable of driving 
European consumers to aggression and deceit.  The marine resources and sustaining 
spiritual power bestowed by Gluskap subsequently declined in economic importance.   
Atlantic pressures were thus encouraging Wabanaki to focus their efforts away from the 
sea.  Referring to the region’s coastlines, an aged Micmac sagamore recalled in 1610 
that in his youth Wabanaki were “as thickly planted there as the hairs upon his head,” 
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but now “very sparsely populated.”  Economic pressures were inducing demographic 
alterations.
32
   
 Three years after John Walker’s brazen venture into the Dawnland, Wabanaki in 
the same region encountered another European party that likewise attempted to force its 
claim to the resources of the native northeast.  The sailing vessel they watched approach 
on waves from the east in 1583 was the Chardon, a fifty ton bark carrying twenty men 
and commanded by a French merchant from Rouen, Étienne Bellenger.  This expedition 
was sponsored by the Cardinal of Bourbon and the Duc de Joyeuse in order to 
investigate opportunities for a joint mission settlement and fur trade station somewhere 
in the northeast.  Bellenger’s voyage surveyed the coast of Nova Scotia into the Bay of 
Fundy and as far southwest as the Penobscot River, where Wabanaki received his eager 
traders at their coastal camps in spring of that year.  “In many places he had traffique 
with the people,” according to the narrative of Englishman Richard Hakluyt, who 
bartered “divers beastes skynnes” including seal, beaver, otter and deer, typical goods 
they knew had attracted shiploads of men like Bellenger from tremendous though 
unknown distances.  The crew of the Chardon celebrated their good fortune, and hoped 
to ensure its permanency, by erecting their patron’s coat of arms high on a tree near the 
entrance of the Bay of Fundy.
33
  Installing a familiar symbol of European authority and 
                                                 
32
 “Letter from Father Pierre Biard, to Reverend Father Christopher Baltazar, Provincial of France, at 
Paris,” in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and 
Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France, 1610-1791, 73 vols. (Cleveland: Burrows 
Brothers, 1896-1901), I: 177. 
 
33
 D.B. Quinn, “The Voyage of Etienne Bellenger to the Maritimes in 1583: A New Document,” 
Canadian Historical Review XLIII, No. 4 (Dec. 1962), 332-333, 340; David B. Quinn, North America 
from Earliest Discovery to First Settlements: the Norse Voyages to 1612 (New York: Harper & Row, 
1975), 389; David B. Quinn, “Etienne Bellenger,” Dictionary of Canadian Biography, I: 87-89; T.N. 




civility in the heart of Wabanakia signaled the intentions of this nation to lay claim to its 
natural and human commodities and draw them into French material and spiritual 
markets.  The Atlantic could thus serve to extend Europe’s post-Reformation religious 
and financial economies to new sources of wealth.   
 Micmac along the southern coast of Nova Scotia quickly spoiled the confidence 
exuded by Bellenger’s party over the region’s fruitful prospects in a French Atlantic 
world.  After spying their coastal settlement and noticing its vast stores of furs, 
Bellenger ordered the ship’s pinnace sent in to take advantage of yet another lucrative 
trade opportunity.  The Wabanaki on shore, aware now of the belligerence and 
treachery that often accompanied such ships eyed the approach of Bellenger’s sailboat 
in a much different light.  Emerging from a native maritime world frequently dotted by 
non-Wabanaki watercraft, the vessel posed a serious threat to the community’s 
collective security.  As their neighbors had done in the past, the Indians went out to 
meet the unsolicited ship and dictate the exchange according to their terms.  They 
subsequently attacked the crew, killed two sailors, and decoyed the others in some way 
until they seized the sailboat.  The Wabanaki clearly did not destroy his “smale 
Pinesse,” Bellenger later related, but confiscated it and presumably used it to enhance 
their mobility and economic productivity, as subsequent Euro-American accounts 
would indicate.  The survivors in the French party fled in haste to Cape Breton and were 
luckily discovered by a fishing crew who transported them back to Europe.  Bellenger 
salvaged some benefit from his tumultuous voyage by selling his furs for exorbitant 
sums in France.  The native community that dismantled his plans for trade and 
settlement, however, now enjoyed a new watercraft and the valuable trade goods it 
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conveyed.  The French crew’s misfortune demonstrated that Wabanaki continued their 
successful manipulation of the opportunities emanating from their oceanic world, even 
through force.  In so doing, they again succeeded in conforming Atlantic trade 
processes to their longstanding maritime authority in the region.
34
         
Étienne Bellenger and Richard Hakluyt, his chronicler, attributed the loss of his 
party’s sailing ship to “their owne follye in trusting the salvadges to farr.”  This self-
blame, however, papered over the coherence and potency of Indian nautical power that 
developed through a historical presence in and around the ocean.  Centuries before they 
encountered Bellenger, Wabanaki ancestors constructed and modified dugout and 
birchbark canoes durable enough to enhance their harvest of deepwater marine 
resources.  These vessels constructed from material of the northeast’s hardwood forests 
also made possible their societies’ expansions into the sea and settlement of its offshore 
islands.  According to native oral accounts, pre-contact Micmac migrated north across 
the Gulf of St. Lawrence into Newfoundland from their ancient territory in Nova Scotia 
and carried on frequent contact with their continental relatives through a carefully-
engineered aquatic transportation and communication network.  At night when the 
unpredictable waters were calmest, the older and more experienced seafarers paddled 
their canoes rapidly ahead of their party and lit enormous beacon fires on the cliffs of 
islands to guide the followers.
35
  By so spreading their culture over tremendous 
distances of open water, and networking its subsequent far-flung communities, these 
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people utilized the ocean for their expansion projects.  Out of pragmatism in their 
patterns of subsistence and settlement, Indians thus honed their nautical aptitude and 
applied it in creative ways to facilitate mobility, augment their colonization efforts, and 
ensure the welfare of their communities.  Wabanaki seafaring prowess that cohered in a 
natural extension of their maritime identity was now relied on to fortify and protect that 
identity.     
 As Bellenger’s relation indicates, native efforts to retain a recognizable vision of 
their maritime world involved co-opting European sailing technology through violence.  
By the time of his ill-fated expedition in 1583, Wabanaki marine-warriors were already 
proving incredibly adept at hijacking sailing vessels belonging to an ostensibly more 
powerful and advanced seafaring culture, one possessing an altogether different 
conception of a coherent and productive Atlantic world.  Throughout ensuing decades, 
Indians continued to elaborate their nautical aptitude with this novel opportunity offered 
up by their ocean.  Other explorers and colonists around the turn of the sixteenth 
century were surprised to witness the Wabanaki’s creative incorporation and 
accumulation of European sailing ships, and seldom failed to remark on the peculiarity 
of these native peoples’ command of foreign modes of seaborne transportation.   
 Native dexterity with European sailing craft was likely reinforced further by the 
nautical skills absorbed by Wabanaki travelers in Europe.  Messamoet, a Micmac 
sagamore who accompanied a French fishing crew on its return voyage, lived in 
southern France for two years before returning to the Dawnland around 1570.  Another 
Micmac leader named Semcoudech was referred to as “Paris” by European visitors to 
Nova Scotia in the early seventeenth century because of his extensive time spent living 
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there.  Both men would have observed first-hand the intricacies and complexities 
involved in the command of large ships on lengthy trans-Atlantic journeys.  Since they 
spent time learning French during their stays on the continent, they would have also had 
ample opportunities to study European navigational arts.  As headmen of societies with 
a longstanding maritime presence in the northwest Atlantic, such information would 
have been appealing and culturally useful for their communities, particularly after their 
first experiences with seaborne travel of this extent.  After returning to their homeland, 
the valuable knowledge cultivated abroad could augment Wabanaki command of these 
increasingly prevalent sailing ships and strengthen Wabanaki presence on the 
Dawnland’s waves.
36
   
By the early seventeenth century, Wabanaki were frequently sailing out in their 
own ships to confront exploring Europeans.  Englishman Bartholomew Gosnold steered 
the Concord to the northwest Atlantic in 1602 on a mission to investigate the potential 
for a colony of English Catholic refugees.  After they “came to an anker” near Cape 
Neddick on the Maine coast in late spring of that year, his party was shocked when 
“sixe Indians, in a Baske-shallop with mast and saile…came boldly aboord us,” 
equipped with “an iron grapple.”  Determined to express their rightful occupation of the 
region’s waters, the native mariners also desired to know the newcomers’ intentions and 
take advantage of a trading opportunity.  Compounding Gosnold’s incredulity, and 
perhaps assisting the Indians’ effortless boarding, was the physical appearance of the 
native seamen.  Though they were “of tall stature” and exhibited “a broad and grim 
                                                 
36
 Ruth Holmes Whitehead, “Navigation des Micmacs le Long de la Côte de L’Atlantique,” in Charles A. 
Martijn, ed., Les Micmacs et la Mer (Montreal: Recherches amerindiennes au Quebec, 1986), 228; Harald 




visage,” one among them was distinctly “appareled with a waistcoat and breeches of 
blacke serdge, made after our sea-fashion,” and even donned “hose and shoes on his 
feet.”  Another of the commanders “had a paire of breeches of blue cloth.”  The rest of 
the crew “were all naked.”  After a lengthy exchange of thoughts and goods, the two 
groups parted company.
37
   
It was unclear to Gosnold exactly how these Wabanaki sailors procured their 
ship, the skills to navigate it and the mariner’s clothing that accented it, all of which 
permitted them a conspicuous maritime presence and unopposed access to the Concord.  
But to the crew of explorers, the entire spectacle was bewildering in the way it conflated 
European and native maritime identities.  In an age of rigid sumptuary laws throughout 
Europe that aimed to entrench social distinction, the striking appearance of sailing 
Indians adorned in a hodge-podge of European garb considerably undermined these 
laws’ intended effects, and the cosmological hierarchy they were predicated on.  When 
Gosnold’s chronicler accentuated such cultural blurring in detail, he expressed a 
collective alarm that permeated their ship.  This aesthetic ambiguity, however, is 
precisely what Wabanaki sought to exploit.   
Yet Europeans too had a vested interest in reshaping natives’ physical 
appearance through material mediums.  The red cap Jacques Cartier’s men lavished on a 
sagamore in 1534 bolstered the native leader’s public stature and connected his 
community to a trans-Atlantic exchange network.  English explorer Martin Pring had 
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similar intentions for his voyage to the Maine coast in 1603.  The commander ensured 
that his ships the Speedwell and Discoverer were well provisioned with “Hats of diuers 
colours, greene, blue and yellow, apparel of course Kersie and Canuasse [canvas] readie 
made, Stockings and Shooes” for the “people of the Countrey” they would likely meet.  
The Indian sailors who boarded Gosnold’s ship exhibited comparable effects of 
involvement in the same economic, political, and material processes extending 
throughout the Atlantic.  “By some words and signes they made” to Gosnold, the 
Indians indicated the regular presence of several European fishing vessels that carried 
on extensive trading relationships with local Wabanaki.  Such encounters explained the 
physical disparity plainly visible aboard the Indian ship.  The two mariners clad in 
European seafaring attire achieved their distinguished appearance by way of gifts 
intended to consolidate and enhance the authority they already garnered in their native 
community.  Those distributing gifts themselves benefited materially from a centralized 
leadership capable of commanding the obedience of a diffuse population in order to 
accumulate and dispense valuable goods into their ships.
38
   
The seaborne Indian crew of two exotically-adorned men alongside four who 
“were all naked” was thus more unconventional than Gosnold’s party recognized.  Not 
only did it surprisingly contradict European expectations of Indian culture, but it also 
represented a slight departure from the native authority structure that customarily 
governed Wabanaki people.  Traditionally, sagamores oversaw the material and 
political welfare of their local communities who subsequently deferred to them in 
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important economic, diplomatic and military matters.  These leaders emerged from 
large families which equipped them with the resources and prestige to function as first-
among-equals with their kin.  By realigning this structure to more familiar power 
arrangements, European gift-givers in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries 
privileged social hierarchy based on coercive power and material accumulation rather 
than consensus-building and collective guardianship.
39
    
These seafaring Indians were also utilizing the ocean’s corridors to forge and 
solidify their position in an emerging trans-Atlantic exchange network.  As the first 
Wabanaki to experience sustained contact with foreign fishermen in the sixteenth 
century, Micmac learned to cultivate their strategic position to assume an intermediary 
role linking other Wabanaki and Algonquian peoples to European traders.  Along with 
the nautical technology it transported to them, the sea allowed Micmac to extend their 
presence throughout the Gulfs of Maine and St. Lawrence and acquire furs from native 
communities that they in turn channeled to the fishermen-traders who often came ashore 
in Micmac country to dry their catch and mend their equipment.  The Atlantic thus 
continued to exert an ironic dual pressure on the Dawnland by the early seventeenth 
century.  It furnished northeastern Wabanaki with the vehicles and avenues of mobility 
to strengthen their status in an economic system that simultaneously began to reorient 
native patterns of subsistence away from the sea and toward the productivity of its 
interior woodlands.
40
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The early stages of the transformation in Wabanaki modes of production and 
consumption proceeded sporadically and unevenly in the northeast.  Some Indians were 
simply uninterested in exploiting the arrival of European ships on their horizons, instead 
relying on the more familiar harvest of their marine environment.  In 1605, Captain 
George Waymouth succeeded Bartholomew Gosnold’s mission to locate an English 
Catholic refuge in North America.  After anchoring near Monhegan Island off the 
Maine coast, a native site occupied for centuries because of its convenient access to rich 
oceanic resources, one of Waymouth’s crewmen noted “three Canoes coming towards 
us” full of Indians on a fishing excursion.  The native party casually bypassed the ship 
and “went to the island adjoining, where they went ashore” and built a fire.  Some of 
them stood by on the island watching the stationary vessel, to whom the curious English 
“made signes with our hands and hats” to persuade them back into the water and aboard 
their boat.  The Indians eventually responded by sending their sagamore in a canoe with 
two other paddlers, who “spoke in his language very loud and very boldly” after coming 
within earshot of the ship.  The native leader evidently wished to know why the 
strangers were stationed in this prime fishing and sealing location.  “By pointing with 
his oar towards the sea” he issued a stern command for the ship to depart from whence 
it came, indicating some understanding of the foreigners’ origins and exerting a 
unmistakable command over his people’s pelagic world.  It was not until the English 
persisted further in their solicitation of trade and revealed their metal goods that the 
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Indians grew more “desirous to entertain our friendship,” according to one sailor’s 
account.
41
   
Other Wabanaki in the area similarly demonstrated the strength and endurance 
of their maritime culture amidst a sea of foreign processes and pressures.  George 
Waymouth’s 1605 expedition offered a rare description of native whaling practices in 
the early contact period, further supporting an archeological record that indicated the 
occasional presence of this immense sea mammal in the Wabanaki subsistence 
economy.  “In company of their King,” the Indian whalers embarked on their hunts 
“with a multitude of their boats” equipped with bows, arrows and harpoons constructed 
from bone.  James Rosier, narrator on board the Waymouth voyage, chose different 
terminology that distinguished these whaling boats from more common birch bark 
canoes, suggesting a craft larger, more durable and demanding a sophisticated nautical 
competence for its command on deeper offshore waters.  When a whale was spotted 
coming up for air, “all their boats come about him” while every hunter exhausted his 
supply of arrows shooting it, producing a frenzied and dangerous scene.  After the kill 
the whale was harnessed and dragged to shore with their boats where communities 
celebrated the bounty while their sagamores “divide the spoil, and give to every man a 
share.”  The tremendous quantity and diversity of resources that whales provided 
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sustained communities for extended periods and were valued as the supreme offering 
from their maritime world.
42
 
The coastal Indians who interacted with Waymouth’s men in 1605 would 
ultimately have their suspicions about European traders reaffirmed.  Before they agreed 
to trade with the stubbornly insistent English, the Indians were certain to secure their 
women far away from the strangers’ ship on the island, further indicating their 
knowledge of such foreigners’ ulterior intentions.  While Waymouth’s crew recorded no 
involvement with native women, they kidnapped members of their community in spite 
of the amiable nature of their interaction and the Wabanaki’s “tokens of much 
thankfulness” for the goods they were given.  “Thus we shipped five Salvages, two 
Canoes, with all their bows and arrows” back to England as human and material 
curiosities for their patrons, despite numerous attempts by their kinsmen to ransom 
them onboard before the ship disappeared to the east.  Once comprehending that “we 
intended them no harm,” Rosier related, the native prisoners ceased their resistance and 
“never since seemed discontented with us, but very tractable, loving, and willing by 
their best means to satisfy us in any thing we demand of them.”  The Wabanaki 
evidently rationalized their experience of captivity in the Atlantic as an extension of 
familiar native captive-taking customs that usually resulted in either the prisoner’s death 
or his or her ritual adoption into the captors’ community.  When the potential for 
physical harm subsided aboard Waymouth’s boat, the prisoners likely believed they 
were now being incorporated into this foreign culture, and acquiesced to their fate.  As 
their Wabanaki neighbors experienced with Estevão Gomes decades earlier, those left 
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behind watching the departure of their kin over the watery horizon were once again 
reminded of the ocean’s malevolent power.
43
   
Treacherous experiences with European forces in the Atlantic did not distance 
the Wabanaki from their maritime world, but instead demanded a careful and visible 
presence in it.  Four years after Waymouth’s ship sailed to England with its kidnapped 
cargo, Dutch explorer Henry Hudson arrived off the coast of the Dawnland and 
navigated much the same area as his predecessors.  After the first sight of land, 
Hudson’s men soon “saw two sayles on head off us,” a spectacle that would have 
certainly erased their anticipated sense of discovery and mystery as they drew close to 
shore, though they did not yet know the identity of the sailors.  This changed when a 
few days later the crew traveled into Penobscot Bay to mend their sails, cut a new 
foremast on shore and trap a number of lobsters abundant throughout the bay.  As the 
ship lay at anchor, the men astonishingly “espied two French shallops full of the 
country people” sailing into the harbor after them.  Though “they offered us no wrong, 
seeing we stood upon our guard,” Hudson’s chronicler observed, the authority exuded 
by their command of the waves, and of European nautical equipment, impelled the 
explorers to quickly offer trade.
44
   
The Indian mariners boldly confronted and boarded the Dutch ship with a spirit 
of cautious opportunism, an attitude that when coupled with their tremendous sailing 
skills instilled fear in the European newcomers.  Prepared for trade with “many beaver 
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skinnes and other fine furres,” the Indians confidently expressed their aesthetic 
preferences to Hudson, including a particular attraction to “redde gownes,” and 
indicated their longstanding interaction with French fishermen in the region “who trade 
with them for red cassocks.”  Yet these and other Wabanaki who encountered this 
expedition also kept the exchanges short, fully cognizant of the destructive potential 
bound up in them.  As a result, Hudson’s men felt on more than one occasion that “we 
could not trust them,” and subsequently kept their distance too.  A significant source of 
this anxiety was Indian fluency with European sailing equipment.  One evening, the 
Dutch party made certain that they “kept good watch for fear of being betrayed by the 
people, and perceived where they layd their shallops.”  After later conspiring they 
armed themselves and “tooke one of their shallops” during a larger offensive that drove 
the Indians from their shoreline settlement “and tooke the spoyle of them, as they would 
have done of us.”  In their paranoid attempts to sever Wabanaki from convenient access 
to their ocean and cripple their commanding presence in it afforded by sailing 
technology, these explorers continued a century-long project of rendering an Atlantic 
world amenable to the extension of European markets and empires.
45
   
The ocean’s novel contributions to the Dawnland in the sixteenth century, 
however, also unleashed disruptive and destabilizing effects among its native residents.  
European fishermen and explorers focused much of their missions on the mass 
accumulation of furs from Indian hunters, and in the process subtly reoriented the native 
economy away from the ocean and into the inland forests.  Native people themselves, 
along with their resources, were also confiscated and deposited in a trans-Atlantic 
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network of exchange that valued such goods as both curiosities and commodities.  To 
facilitate their role in this budding network, and to maximize their material acquisition, 
Europeans also began reorganizing the structure of native authority along lines more 
familiar to them.  The Wabanaki vision of their oceanic world that sustained their 
culture for centuries had begun to encounter efforts to render that world compatible 
with an unimaginably different one.   
After the first wave of European strangers made landfall in the northeast, the 
People of the Dawnland were discovering that their ocean possessed a level of 
complexity previously unimagined.  The strange and unpredictable forces washing up 
on their shores revealed the water’s new character, yet Wabanaki situated them in a 
familiar cultural context that normalized the sea’s looming presence in their society and 
incorporated its generative power into their lives.  For countless generations, Indians 
learned that the ocean offered a perpetual supply of resources that demanded a careful 
awareness of this realm to ensure their successful, and secure, utilization.  The sea was 
also the locus of spiritual power from whence Gluskap emerged to quicken the lifeless 
bodies of their first ancestors and to which he afterward departed.  The culture hero 
taught his People that their watery world was rife with amiable and evil creatures alike, 
and therefore necessitated vigilance and apprehension as well as reverence.  The 
Wabanaki’s longstanding Atlantic-orientation thus provided them with an important 








“With all sails set”: Steering the Course of Transition in an Expanding Atlantic World 
 
In the early decades of the seventeenth century, the Wabanaki maritime world 
continued to serve as the gateway for numerous transformative pressures in the native 
northeast.  The myriad economic, material and political processes circulating in the 
Atlantic and penetrating the Dawnland over the previous century now regularly shaped 
the quotidian life of the region’s native communities.  The most destructive effect of 
these transitions was the growth of internecine violence that progressively defined 
relations between Wabanaki ethnic groups along the northeastern seaboard.  Though it 
is difficult to discern the presence of these tensions prior to European contact, it is likely 
that the steadily mounting flow of foreign trade goods in Wabanaki waters exacerbated 
historic enmities that had long characterized Indian society on a local level.  The intra-
native violence spurred by Atlantic pressures was also fueled by the concomitant, albeit 
more gradual, centralization of authority in increasingly powerful headmen.  This shift 
away from a more egalitarian power structure at the band level was also induced by the 
potency of new economic and material networks.  Sagamores such as the Micmac 
Membertou, the Penobscot Bessabez and the Kennebec Sasinou simultaneously 
garnered power from and contributed energy to native tensions in their efforts to 
manipulate exchanges with European settlers and enhance their status and their 
communities’ welfare.   
To suggest that European settlement patterns and economic networks fostered 
considerable change in native socio-political life is, of course, no longer all that 
revelatory.  But this chapter demonstrates that those transformations ought to be 
67 
 
conceived as the extension of quintessentially Atlantic phenomenon.  It argues that the 
Atlantic Ocean functioned as the primary catalyst of these Atlantic processes in 
Wabanakia, and dictated the uneven ways native people experienced them on the 
ground.  This understanding of the sea as an omnipresent natural space introducing a 
profoundly dynamic nexus of foreign power to Indian country forces us to reassess 
assumptions about the fundamentally terrestrial and continentally-oriented character of 
native culture.  To more fully illuminate the Wabanaki experience in the early modern 
world we must indeed focus our gaze east from Indian country.   
By taking up such a vantage, this chapter traces the manifold changes and 
continuities forged through Indians’ engagement with their Atlantic world.  Before the 
mid-seventeenth century, Wabanaki nearly always interacted with the extensive 
complex of material exchange touching their world on or alongside the sea.  Micmac 
communities effectively forged the most prominent role as intermediaries between 
Wabanaki and Europeans in the northeast because of their strategic geo-political 
position at the nexus of this maritime trade and by solidifying a visible and sweeping 
presence on the waters of the northwest Atlantic.  Other native communities under the 
guidance of local sagamores developed a similarly entrenched position around and in 
their saltwater world in order to tap into the same valuable networks and subsequently 
enrich their wellbeing and augment their prestige.  Such maritime jockeying also 
stemmed from a desire to undermine the powerful Micmac monopoly that mediated so 
much of Indians’ economic and material interface with these networks.   
In other ways too, Wabanaki demonstrated that their society would not simply 
be subject to the disruptive and unmanageable effects of a changing Atlantic world.  
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The nautical prowess that had long been critical to this maritime-oriented culture, and 
that functioned as an increasingly-central asset for Indians’ successful participation in 
Atlantic trade, did not go unnoticed by foreign visitors.  Conceding their largely 
inadequate understanding of both the region’s waterways and native cultures, European 
newcomers came to see Indian mariners as a valuable source of epistemic power 
capable of facilitating their designs.  As a result, Wabanakis’ knowledge of the seascape 
and their superior navigational skills became highly-esteemed commodities for many 
European architects of colonization.  Several Indian seamen, for their part, subsequently 
exploited the demand for their coveted skills to further their own interests and secure 
fates that once seemed impossible.  Natives could also marshal their seafaring expertise 
to save the lives of wayward, and economically valuable, European castaways 
desperately lost and utterly inept in the Wabanaki Atlantic.  By the middle of the 
seventeenth century, then, Indians learned to carefully cultivate, strategically promote, 
and shrewdly apply their enviable nautical fluency within a corner of the ocean 
rendered mysterious and perilous by European metropolitans’ limited Atlantic vision.   
The renowned nautical proficiency that Indians exploited in their relations with 
outsiders was neither static nor rigid in character.  Their successful execution of this 
strategy, in fact, derived from an equally-innovative elaboration of their maritime 
strength with new and more efficient marine technology.  As they demonstrated in the 
previous century, Indian mariners secured access to European sailing ships through 
violence.  Yet they also obtained the new equipment by again resorting to the networks 
of material exchange that linked their communities to recently-arrived visitors and 
settlers in the region.  Of escalating worth in these economic relationships were not only 
69 
 
the metal goods conveyed by Euro-American traders, but sailing tackle and vessels 
transported from Europe and anchored in the harbors of Wabanakia.  Indians also 
sensibly aimed to circumvent dependence on violence and trade in their acquisition of 
these foreign modes of mobility.  By mid-century, many were utilizing a variety of 
familiar resources native to northeastern forests to construct sailing craft themselves, 
and subsequently conformed their creations to native culture with recognizably 
Wabanaki material and totemic symbols.  Equipped with both native and European 
manufactured ships, Indians proved time and time again that they were eager to seek out 
new methods of augmenting their longstanding nautical expertise.  Euro-Americans 
who witnessed this dynamic maritime culture, moreover, and who attempted to employ 
it in order to ameliorate the shortcomings of their own, indicated that Wabanaki were 
the indisputable masters of their Atlantic world. 
When native efforts to manipulate economic networks and colonization projects 
were undermined by Euro-American traders and settlers, Indians responded by 
engaging in carefully orchestrated acts of marine violence and shrewd trans-Atlantic 
diplomacy.  Physical abuse combined with the occasionally devious and seemingly 
capricious dealings of foreign traders in Wabanakia frequently elicited retaliatory 
aggression at what Indians perceived to be the font of these threats.  As a result, the 
Euro-American maritime presence, embodied most conspicuously by fishermen, 
became a common target of Wabanaki’s violent reprisals.  Yet Indians also attempted to 
allay certain threats to their interests by invoking the supposedly paternalistic authority 
of European monarchs.  Via the avenue of long-distance diplomacy, natives learned 
they could manipulate Euro-American presumptions of their political loyalty and 
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deference.  By thus consistently resorting to Atlantic solutions to mitigate a variety of 
socio-economic disruptions, Indians indicated their understanding of the fundamentally-
Atlantic dimensions to the myriad phenomena accompanying the early stages of 
European colonization.  As astute negotiators, experienced seafarers, and savvy 
maritime traders, Wabanaki continually grasped for the helm and steered the course of 
change in their corner of the Atlantic.    
 
In May of 1604, Wabanaki began encountering European colonists with more 
sedentary and permanent goals.  Firmly situated in coastal settlements by this time in 
their seasonal cycle, Indians in the northeastern Dawnland now discovered a French 
colonizing expedition in their waters headed by Pierre du Gua, Sieur de Monts.  De 
Monts, along with his associate Samuel de Champlain, received a trading monopoly 
from their monarch earlier in the year, and proceeded to Acadia where they settled at St. 
Croix Island in Passamaquoddy Bay, likely among ancestors of the modern-day 
Passamaquoddy tribe of Wabanaki.  Spending a winter among these people allowed the 
French settlers a glimpse into significant aspects of the native inhabitants’ annual life 
cycle previously unnoticed or unrecorded, most important of which were their hunting 
forays away from the coast that provided communities with moose, beaver and other 
furbearers later processed into clothing by native women.  When not hunting, or when 
unsuccessful at it, the Indians “live on a shellfish called the clam,” Champlain observed, 
a more reliable and less labor-intensive food source.  By early spring they were already 
leaving their small hunting camps and migrating to a more dependable marine 
environment, as Champlain detailed how one of their parties came to the French island 
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colony “in the month of March” and “shared with us their game.”  To the settlers, these 
sparse and “very wretched” people thus appeared at most tangentially involved in the 
material exchange network circulating through much of the region’s waters.  De Monts 
evidently recognized the poor business partners they made, and following the brutal 
winter of 1604-1605, decided to seek a more hospitable location for his settlement 
across the Bay of Fundy.  By the following June it was transferred to a site he named 
Port Royal on the southwestern coast of Nova Scotia.
1
   
 By moving off the water and establishing sustained year-round settlements in 
Wabanakia, de Monts’ colonists were exposed to other subtle characteristics of native 
society that did not find their way into preceding travel accounts.  One in particular 
posed a serious problem to the colony’s longevity.  During their first summer together 
in 1604, Champlain and members of the Wabanaki community near St. Croix Island 
departed on an exploratory mission down the northeastern coast.  Upon arriving at the 
Penobscot River they encountered a large party of Indians who enjoined the crew to 
treat with their regionally-renowned leader, Bessabez.  These Penobscots, Champlain 
noted, possessed a nearly identical culture and language to those Passamaquoddy and 
Micmac to the northeast.  At a formal ceremony, Champlain informed Bessabez that he 
came to build amity with local Indians, and also to “reconcile them with their enemies, 
the Souriquois,” or Micmac.  Bessabez reciprocated by expressing his desire for 
tranquility and the opportunity to establish trade relations with the French.  After this 
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conversation, the two satisfied groups bartered for furs and the French gifted them with 
“rosaries and caps” and other trinkets.
2
   
As Champlain’s remarks indicated, the French were becoming aware of latent 
tensions between Wabanaki groups in the northeast, and subsequently endeavored to 
broker peace in a region they hoped to profitably draw into their network of exchange.  
When Champlain’s fleet pushed on to the southwest, he was alarmed when his 
Passamaquoddy guides suddenly abandoned the crew before they arrived at the 
Kennebec River, because “the Indians of that place are their great enemies.”  On a 
similar voyage along the coast the following summer, the French continued their 
pacifying mission when they met Marchin, a sagamore of the Saco River region in 
southern Maine.  After receiving numerous gifts from Champlain, Marchin returned the 
favor by giving him “a young Etechemin [Penobscot] boy whom he had captured in 
war,” and whom the French subsequently returned to his home to the northeast.  En 
route, Champlain stopped near the Kennebec River to treat with the local headman, 
Sasinou, and to negotiate the release of “a young Etechemin man and girl whom he held 
prisoners.”  The Dawnland was rife with more hostility and factionalism than prior 
European visitors recognized or related.  Such pressure posed serious obstacles for the 
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 Champlain’s men were not the only outsiders witnessing the bitter divisions that 
enveloped the native northeast by the early seventeenth century.  French adventurer 
Marc Lescarbot arrived at the Port Royal settlement in summer of 1606, and sailed 
down the coast with another exploratory party led by Micmac.  Lescarbot noted how the 
Wabanaki in southern Maine were exceedingly “treacherous and thievish” when they 
noticed the French were carrying their Micmac enemies on board, and therefore “one 
must be on one's guard against them.”  A few years later, he pointed out that “there has 
always been war between these two nations,” suggesting that the seeds of such 
animosities long predated the arrival of Europeans but were now exacerbated by 
sustained contact.  One member of George Popham’s English colonial venture in 1607 
reported the ship’s encounter with a Micmac community in Nova Scotia who they 
determined “to be the tarentines and these people as we have learned since do make 
wars with Sasanoa the Chief Commander to the westward” near Kennebec River.  
When Englishman John Smith explored the Maine coastline in spring 1614, he was 
struck by the congruencies in language, fashion and political structure among these 
native groups, while adding that “their mortall enemie” are the Tarrantines.  Shortly 
after Smith’s voyage, Sir Ferdinando Gorges, proprietor of an English colony in Maine, 
described the continuing hostility that plagued relations between Bessabez’s Penobscots 
and their Tarrantine neighbors to the northeast.  English sailor Christopher Levett 
similarly indicated the stubborn persistence of these hostilities as late as 1623 when he 
enjoined Indians near Casco Bay in Maine to “kill all the Tarrantens they should see 
(being enemies to them) and with whom the English have no commerce.”  The Indians 
reportedly showed tremendous enthusiasm at this directive.
4
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The nascent fur trade that was drawing Indians into an extensive trans-Atlantic 
exchange network proved to be the progenitor of this divisive atmosphere in 
Wabanakia.  Bessabez’s receptivity toward Champlain’s peace proposal in 1604 
stemmed from his desire to trade directly with the new French settlers, and thereby 
forge a prime position in this material nexus.  The Penobscot people desired peace, he 
revealed to Champlain, “in order that in the future they might hunt the beaver more than 
they had ever done, and barter these beaver with us.”  Rather than operate through other 
Wabanaki intermediaries, Bessabez envisioned a more prosperous lifestyle for his 
community if the Micmac’s regional monopoly could be circumscribed.  Thus “they 
were well satisfied” with Champlain’s visit and, the French explorer added, “desired us 
to settle in their country.”  When Jesuit missionary Pierre Biard scouted the region for a 
potential mission site a decade later, a still persistent Bessabez “came to persuade us, 
with a thousand promises, to go to his place, having heard that we had some intention of 
making a settlement there.”  De Monts’ Micmac hosts at Port Royal, however, 
encouraged his colony’s current location, and stood to gain much from preserving such 
an arrangement.  By securing their proximity to the gateway of this exchange network, a 
position that also permitted them widespread access to the larger maritime world of the 
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northwest Atlantic and to the goods of other coastal Wabanaki less geographically 
privileged, Micmac aggressively aimed to enhance their lucrative economic position.
5
  
By extending an elaborate material exchange network to the Indian northeast, 
and by facilitating long-distance native mobility to cultivate that network, the Atlantic 
introduced pressures that continued to reshape Wabanaki political structure.  The 
subsequent concentration of greater degrees of power in local sagamores signaled a 
departure from customary political formations.  By the advent of European contact, 
these native northeasterners were organized into small hunter-gatherer bands headed by 
leaders whose status was typically temporary and confined to particular goals such as 
material provision.  Among the Micmac and Penobscot, for example, such an 
arrangement can be termed a “bilocal extended family,” consisting of a headman, his 
married children’s families, and other relatives as well as some non-relatives.  Leaders 
enjoyed a level of prestige through the consent of their extended kin, and sometimes 
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But the socio-political effects of a century progressively punctuated by 
European gift-giving, the influx of trade goods, and colonial settlement all served to 
consolidate and undergird an unprecedented level of authority in Wabanaki community 
leaders.  By the early seventeenth century, Indian polities were gradually coalescing 
around prominent headmen who proved adept at mediating their communities’ 
interaction with European exchange networks and managing the steadily-mounting flow 
of native and European goods.  The successful execution of these critical tasks was 
largely predicated on a leader’s exploitation of his peoples’ geographic proximity to and 
visible presence in the ocean.  Micmac such as those sagamores who with their outfitted 
shallop confronted Bartholomew Gosnold’s party off the Maine coast in 1602 secured a 
prominent role as intermediaries in this network, but other Wabanaki leaders too used 
their privileged status to secure its wealth from more distant locations along 
northeastern coasts.  If they could not deal directly with the suppliers of coveted goods, 
these sagamores’access to Micmac intermediaries also necessitated an unencumbered 
and carefully-sustained access to the ocean.  In sum, while European-native interaction 
began to reorient the economy of many Wabanaki away from the Atlantic and toward 
the interior forests, Indians’ successful cultivation of these exchanges hinged on the 
preservation of their familiar maritime identity.  Those who occupied customary 
leadership roles in native society consequently experienced a new and enhanced source 
of authority. 
These complex and paradoxical Atlantic pressures continued to grab the 
attention of several European travelers and settlers in Wabanakia.  When Samuel de 
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Champlain explored the coast in 1604, he encountered the Penobscot sagamore 
Bessabez by way of the headman’s seaborne hunters who “came alongside our 
pinnace,” and persuaded the French crew to follow them up the Penobscot River to their 
leader.  These Indians, Champlain noted, “had come to hunt beaver, and to catch fish,” 
some of which they shared with the visitors.  In 1612, Jesuit Pierre Biard described his 
journey to the same location where were assembled some three hundred Indians with 
“80 canoes and a boat.”  “The most prominent Sagamore was called Betsabés,” Biard 
related, “a man of great discretion and prudence.”  Two years later, the Penobscot 
leader still retained his regional prestige.  John Smith explained how every riverine 
Indian community along the Maine coast was “Lords of themselves, yet they hold the 
Bashabes of Pennobscot, the chiefe and greatest amongst them.”  This sagamore, he 
continued, was also capable of commanding armed incursions against the 
Massachusetts Indians far to the south.  Ferdinando Gorges also depicted Bessabez as a 
powerful military leader who “had under him many great Subjects,” and was 
consequently capable of orchestrating large-scale raids against the Micmac.
7
 
Authority structures in Wabanaki communities elsewhere in the northeast 
exhibited similar patterns.  In 1605, Champlain accompanied another exploratory party 
to the south that once anchored in sight of a native settlement near the mouth of the 
Saco River.  Soon thereafter Honemechin, their sagamore, confronted them “with two 
canoes, and went circling round and round our pinnace,” attempting to negotiate with 
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the newcomers on his peoples’ behalf.  During the same voyage, the crew gifted 
Marchin, sagamore of the Kennebec River region, who “had the reputation of being one 
of the mighty men of his country.”  Asticou succeeded Bessabez as Penobscot sagamore 
upon his death and, according to Marc Lescarbot, was “a man grave, valorous, and 
feared, who in the twinkling of an eye will gather together a thousand Indians, as would 
also Olmechin and Marchin,” two neighboring leaders.  Lescarbot claimed to witness 
this military authority first hand, when “on a sudden,” at their command, “the whole sea 
was seen covered with their canoes manned with agile warriors, who stood straight up 
therein.”  After George Waymouth’s voyage encountered coastal Maine Indians in 
1605, crewmember James Rosier described how “they show great reverence to their 
King, and are in great subjection to their Governours.”  Upon meeting the sagamore of a 
Micmac community in 1607, the Popham colonists from England determined him to be 
“the Chief Commander of these people” whose adversary was “Sasanoa the Chief 
Commander to the westward.”  European newcomers almost always comprehended 
Indian polities through the lens of their familiar and more rigidly stratified societies, and 
usually overemphasized the degree of centralized power native headmen commanded.  
Yet the prominent mediating position sagamores assumed in these recorded material 
exchanges would indeed have augmented to some degree the prestige they enjoyed in a 
culture that valued collective guardianship via material provision and astute diplomacy.
8
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Wabanaki too recognized parallels between the deferential authority of 
Europeans and the centralizing power in their own communities.  Waymouth colonist 
James Rosier believed that Indians “will show a great respect to any we tell them are 
our Commanders,” so strong was their regard for authoritarian structure.  English 
explorer-settler Christopher Levett similarly observed a crystallizing socio-political 
hierarchy among the southern Wabanaki near Casco Bay in 1623.  “The Sagamores will 
scarce speake to an ordinary man,” he related, “but will point to their men, and say 
Sanops, must speake to Sanop, and Sagamors to Sagamors.”  Among Indians elsewhere 
in the region, Levett noted that “they call all masters of ships sagamores, or any other 
man that they see have a command of men.”  French and English colonists were not 
alone in projecting their social and political norms onto others when perceiving only the 
slightest similarity; Indians also interpreted such congruencies as universal cultural 
traits.
9
    
By the early seventeenth century, Micmac leader Membertou occupied a status 
similar to other Wabanaki sagamores, one that directly rivaled that of his southwestern 
neighbors.  He achieved much of his socio-political standing by carefully exploiting 
both his community’s proximity to French fishermen-traders off the Nova Scotian coast, 
and by 1605, its location adjacent to the French colony at Port Royal.  Few visitors to 
the settlement failed to note, and perhaps slightly overstate, the imposing stature of this 
“great Sagamos,” as Marc Lescarbot titled him.  Lescarbot also related that this “man of 
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great age” claimed to have witnessed Jacques Cartier’s voyage in 1534, though he still 
retained a vigorous and youthful constitution.  “He has been a very great and cruel 
warrior,” Lescarbot added, while Champlain believed he likewise possessed “the 
reputation of being the worst and most treacherous man” in the region.  Membertou had 
“under him a number of families whom he rules, not with so much authority as does our 
King,” Lescarbot recorded on another occasion, “but with sufficient power to harangue, 
advise, and lead them to war.”  Father Pierre Biard understood the influence this “good 
old man” wielded within his community and consequently concentrated his catechizing 
efforts on him, anticipating that if the Micmac sagamore chose baptism, many others 
would follow.
10
   
Membertou’s commanding reputation was not confined to land.  Much of his 
prestige in the eyes of French and Indians alike, in fact, was augmented by his 
tremendous nautical prowess and the subsequent material and diplomatic benefits it 
afforded his community.  After acquiring a European shallop from Basque or Breton 
fishermen off his coast, Membertou assimilated the new technology into his culture and 
marked it as distinctly Micmac by decorating it with totems of animals native to 
Wabanakia.  The marine sagamore subsequently sailed the craft throughout northeastern 
waters, extending his peoples’ monopoly as mediators of the trans-Atlantic trade.  Once 
in 1607, Membertou approached the French garrison at Port Royal and alerted its 
oblivious occupants to “a great ship which was arriving” on the horizon and making its 
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way into the harbor.  The settlers scrambled to ready themselves and secure better 
positions, though eventually “it proved only to be a small merchant vessel.”  
Membertou’s prominent maritime presence allowed him to cultivate and police the 
lucrative French colony at Port Royal, while also permitting him access to the steady 
flow of unfamiliar though potentially valuable European vessels.
11
         
Like their coastal Indian neighbors, Wabanaki sagamores near Casco Bay in 
Maine exploited a strategic geo-political presence in their maritime world in order to 
enhance their own status and their communities’ welfare.  When English sailor and 
trader Christopher Levett arrived in the area to investigate sites for a trading settlement 
in 1623, for example, he claimed to have little problem ingratiating himself with local 
inhabitants.  At the mouth of the Presumpscot River, he encountered “the Sagamore or 
King of that place” accompanied by “two Sagamors more, their wives and children, in 
all about 50” who bid him welcome and expressed interest in forging economic and 
kinship bonds with the stranger.  As a token of their new relationship, “the great 
Sagamore of the East country, whom the rest doe acknowledge to be chiefe amongst 
them, hee gave unto me a Bevers skin” which Levett interpreted as a promising 
endorsement of his commercial venture.  Equipped with his “store of Beaver coats and 
skinnes,” another distant headman communicated through the captain of a passing 
English ship his desire to barter with Levett’s post.  Upon their meeting, Levett noted, 
“they told me I must be their cozen,” and therefore assume an honored kinship position 
in order to legitimate trade and conform its process to Wabanaki protocol.  When Levett 
later attempted to barter with some members of this community, they declined his offer 
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until Somerset, the sagamore, intervened and said “his cozen Levett should have all, and 
then they began to offer me some by way of gift.”  Though the native leaders with 
whom Levett parleyed wielded a level of authority differing considerably from 
contemporary English monarchs, their role as prime mediators in a material exchange 
network indicated to him the emerging, and subtle, parallels between Indian and 
European political organization.  In addition, native efforts to legitimize and familiarize 
these centralizing pressures of Atlantic exchange demanded their grounding in 
Wabanakia and realignment along the lines of its customary practices.
12
  
One southern Wabanaki sagamore aimed to peremptorily manipulate this 
Atlantic exchange before it penetrated the Dawnland.  Upon meeting Christopher 
Levett’s exploratory party off southern Maine, Cogawesco, another of the region’s 
principal headmen, immediately encouraged the Europeans to establish their settlement 
nearby, assuring him that he “should be very welcome” if he decided on a close 
location.  To assist him in scouting the coast for ideal sites, Cogawesco promised Levett 
“that he and his wife would goe along with me in my boate to see them.”  The sagamore 
thus utilized his intimate natural knowledge of the coastal waters to exploit this valuable 
opportunity to benefit himself and his extended kin.  After escorting aboard “the King, 
Queene, and Prince, bowe and arrowes, dogge and kettell in my boate,” Levett’s crew 
navigated the maze of offshore islands and shoals with their native hosts, all the while 
marveling at Cogawesco’s “noble attendance rowing by us in their canoes.”  The mixed 
Wabanaki and English party eventually settled on a site Levett would later call York.  
Though his pride swelled with the belief that he had “obtained the consent of them” for 
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his land claim, Cogawesco’s acquiescence was directed more to the solidification of his 
new exchange relationship.
13
       
Over the next year, several other ascendant Wabanaki leaders forged productive 
relations with Levett’s tiny coastal plantation.  “Sadamoyt, the great sagamore of the 
east country, Manawormet, Opparunwit, Skedraguscett, Cogawesco, Somerset, Conway 
and others” traveled to York to inquire of rumors that Levett was leaving his settlement 
and returning to England.  Such a departure would not only signal Levett’s 
abandonment of his new kinship obligations, but also detrimentally effect native 
leadership and community welfare.  Though confirming the veracity of the rumors, 
Levett reassured the Indian neighbors of his eventual return by evoking imagery 
strikingly congruent with Wabanaki maritime lore.  If “every one at the place where he 
lived would looke to the Sea,” he enjoined, foretelling his return, “and when they did 
see a Ship they wold send to all the Sagamores in the Countrey, and tell them that poore 
Levett was come againe.”  Thus mirroring Gluskap’s leave-taking from the earliest 
Wabanaki ancestors, Levett’s departure to the eastward was to be comprehended as 
impermanent, and therefore demanded an ongoing anticipation of his return.
14
   
When attempts by increasingly-empowered Wabanaki sagamores to manipulate 
Atlantic exchanges compromised those of their counterparts elsewhere in the 
Dawnland, the results could be explosive.  In 1606, the warrior-sagamore Iouaniscou 
led a Micmac war party against Wabanaki in southeastern Maine, likely to retaliate for 
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threats to his peoples’ economic power in the region.  Iouaniscou’s warriors captured a 
number of men and women in their raid and, after a seaborne retreat to Mount Desert 
Island, executed them.  Southern Wabanaki launched their own retributive assault that 
also aimed to cripple the Micmac trade monopoly.  Their raid targeted and killed a 
prominent Micmac fur trade middleman named Panonias, who was also the son-in-law 
of Membertou.  Panonias’ lifeless body was sailed back to Port Royal from the Maine 
coast in “a shallop in which were some Indians,” according to Champlain.  “The Indian 
in command of the boat was called Ouagimou,” a Passamaquoddy sagamore, who 
related to Membertou the events surrounding his kinsman’s death.  The maritime trader 
had been killed in Bessabez’s Penobscot territory, thus prompting a plea of innocence 
and a promise of cooperation from the Penobscot leader.  Ouagimou, now a mediator in 
a maritime network of diplomacy, was charged with conveying Bessabez’s olive branch 




The Atlantic’s processes and potentialities thus were not only fostering 
economic and political metamorphoses in the Indian northeast, but also facilitating 
native violence that stemmed from those changes.  Membertou’s response to the death 
of his son-in-law and chief trader sought to reassert his command of the region’s waves 
by harnessing the sea to exact the retaliatory justice that had long been customary in 
Wabanaki culture.  During the period of ritual mourning, Membertou negotiated with 
the French for a “red coverlet…handsome and large” for the burial ceremony.  This he 
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presented to Panonias’ relatives who shrouded his body and decorated it with ornaments 
and paint.  Membertou thus reaffirmed his social status by way of European goods and 
the violent animosities the Atlantic exchange of that material engendered.  All warriors 
in attendance, many from surrounding Micmac, Passamaquoddy and Maliseet 
communities, subsequently vowed to join the leader in war against the perpetrators the 
following spring.  In June of 1607, Marc Lescarbot watched as a three to four hundred 
marine-warriors launched a tremendous seaborne assault from their base at Port Royal 
in a fleet of “canoes and shallops.”  Under the direction of Membertou, the Indian navy 
eventually made landfall and disembarked in southern Maine near the Saco River.  The 
entire operation took over a month to execute, and when Membertou’s party returned to 
Port Royal in August, the French learned that a number of southern Wabanaki had been 
killed, including their most prominent headmen.
16
  
The exploits of Wabanaki sea raiders in the war of 1607, and in other related 
native conflicts over ensuing decades, demonstrated that the Atlantic did not simply 
function as a catalyst for destructive and uncontrollable change in the Dawnland.  It 
instead operated as a generative and recognizable resource that could be manipulated in 
order to rationalize and manage the changes it was unleashing in native society.  By the 
early seventeenth century, this strategic cultivation of the sea’s material and martial 
advantages was largely an elaboration of Wabanaki’s previous experiences in a 
maritime-centered world.  The composition of the Micmac navy spearheaded by 
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Membertou embodied their innovative synthesis of the ocean’s familiar and foreign 
qualities.  By setting forth from the shores of Nova Scotia with a brigade of birch bark 
canoes on an extensive seaborne expedition “of about eighty leagues” across the Bay of 
Fundy and through the Gulf of Maine, the Wabanaki proved to be quite competent 
maritime navigators with their traditional medium of transportation alone.  The ocean’s 
corridors, they long knew, could assist their extension of violence and preservation of 
authority.  Neither their wide ranging geo-political scope nor their long-range 
mobilization of warriors was entirely predicated on the new opportunities that attended 
their changing world.  But when Indians enhanced that nautical aptitude with European 
sailing technology, introduced and incorporated into Wabanakia over the course of the 
preceding century, they expressed a dynamic capacity to develop their command of the 
sea by way of the foreign equipment it offered up to them.  Wabanaki maritime identity 
was not simply acted upon by Atlantic processes, but continued to be enriched and 
enlivened by Indians’ exploitation of Atlantic possibilities.
17
   
Wabanaki’s navagational acquaintance with the seascape served as another 
valuable asset.  Already by the early seventeenth century, Indians’ sophisticated 
nautical expertise was so impressive that several European newcomers endeavored to 
extract and appropriate it for their own colonial projects.  Gabriel Archer, crewman 
aboard Bartholomew Gosnold’s exploratory voyage in 1602, was among the first to 
marvel at this geographical knowledge.  After encountering eight Indian mariners at the 
helm of a “Biscay shallop with saile and Oares,” Archer explained how they on the deck 
of their vessel “with a piece of Chalke described the Coast thereabouts,” and even 
“could name Placentia of New-found-land.”  It was quickly apparent that the native 
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sailors “seemed to understand much more than we.”  Not long thereafter such abilities 
began affording Indians a central role in colonial explorations of the region.  After the 
Sieur de Mont’s French expedition reached land at Port Mouton on the east coast of 
Nova Scotia in May of 1604, he immediately “dispatched a shallop, wherein, with some 
Indians as guides, he sent one of our men carrying letters,” Champlain recalled.  The 
native-led reconnaissance mission was instructed “to search along the coast of Acadia” 
for a French trade ship loaded with supplies for de Mont’s crew.  As they sailed further 
west to scout a suitable place for their colony, the French commander ordered 
Champlain to investigate rumors of a rich native copper mine nearby.  “To this end he 
sent me with an Indian named Messamouet,” Champlain related, “who said he knew the 
site well.”  Messamoet was a Micmac sagamore and Atlantic traveler who had returned 
to the Dawnland in 1570 from a two-year stay in France.  Guided by the Indian 
headman, Champlain “set out in a small pinnace of five or six tons’ burden” outfitted 
with nine sailors, and eventually discovered the copper mine.  Later that fall, the French 
navigator received similar instructions for a more extended exploration of the Maine 
coast.  Commanding “a small vessel of seventeen to eighteen tons” with twelve sailors, 
Champlain procured the services of “two Indians to serve us as guides to the places with 
which they were acquainted.”  Such native navigators not only familiarized the 
European crews with the hazards and advantages of travel in the northwest Atlantic, but 
also acted as indispensable translators among Wabanaki settlements along the 
seaboard.
18
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Over the course of subsequent years, the tiny French colony and its successors 
continued to rely directly on Wabanaki’s superior maritime skills in the northeast.  De 
Monts and Champlain set out from their settlement at St. Croix Island in June 1605 to 
learn more about their native neighbors’ enemies far to the southwest.  The exploratory 
crew consisted of “some gentlemen, twenty sailors, and an Indian named Panonias,” the 
prominent Micmac trader later killed in the south, as well as Panonias’ wife, “whom the 
Indian was unwilling to leave behind.”  The French, as was by now customary, “took 
along these Indians to serve as guides…in the hope of discovering and learning more 
exactly by their aid what kind of a country it was.”  Panonias’ wife was a particularly 
indispensible asset since “she was a native thereof,” likely captured in a former conflict 
and assimilated into Panonias’ northern Wabanaki community.  Nearing the mouth of 
the Kennebec River, they anchored and encountered a native party hunting seafowl in 
their canoes.  De Monts and Champlain “made friends with them and with the Indians 
of that river who acted as our guides,” and navigated them to their sagamore who came 
out to the pinnace and expressed his desire to establish trade relations.  After Isaac de 
Razilly was commissioned to succeed de Monts and Champlain at the head of a new 
Acadian colony in 1632, crewman Nicolas Denys related how the expedition managed 
to navigate the waters off Nova Scotia only with “some Indians who were guiding us.”
19
  
While Wabanaki mariners actively and quite literally steered the course of early 
European ventures around the northwest Atlantic, those who endured captivity in the 
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ocean were also relied upon for their exceptional nautical knowledge.  The five coastal 
Indians captured by Englishman George Waymouth during his colonizing expedition in 
1605 were taken to England where their valuable potential for future colonial projects 
could be carefully cultivated.  These native captives became the first known Wabanaki 
in England, and their presence did not go unappreciated.  Three of them, Sassacomoit, 
Maneddo and Skidwarres were taken into custody by Sir Ferdinando Gorges at 
Plymouth, while the other two were transported to London.  Gorges believed them to be 
“all of one Nation, but of several parts, and several families,” and thus possessing an 
extensive and diversified knowledge of the area.  As a shareholder in the Plymouth 
Company and a financer of Waymouth’s failed voyage, Gorges knew a lucrative 
investment opportunity when he saw one.  Over the next two years, he and fellow 
speculator George Popham pressed the Indians into the service of their latest business 
scheme, a colony near the mouth of the Kennebec River in the heart of the Dawnland, 
for which they would secure a royal charter in 1606.
20
   
From its earliest inception, Ferdinando Gorges’ proposed settlement of 
Wabanakia was shaped by Indian knowledge of its waters.  “The longer I conversed 
with them,” the colonial booster noted of his Indian informants, “the better hope they 
gave me of those parts where they did inhabit, as proper for our uses, especially when I 
found what goodly Rivers, stately Islands, and safe harbours those parts abounded 
with.”  While Sassacomoit, Maneddo and Skidwarres likely played to the economic 
fantasies of their captors, their familiarity with the region was deferred to as 
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authoritative.  Perhaps sensing an opportunity to return home or assist their community 
in the establishment of a nearby trade partner, the three exploited their perceived 
expertise in these coastal waters and obtained a level of power despite their unfree 
status.
21
   
By 1606, such a strategy began to pay dividends, as English colonial architects 
continued to trust in the Indians’ carefully-crafted knowledge.  In that year Gorges 
turned over Sassacomoit and Maneddo to Captain Henry Challoons, who was given 
command of the ship Richard to transport the colony’s first settlers to the Kennebec 
River.  Based on native information, Gorges instructed Challoons to “keep the northerly 
gage, as high as Cape Britton,” until they learned “by the Natives they were near the 
place they were assigned unto.”  This highly unconventional route, Gorges 
acknowledged, contradicted the navigational orthodoxy of the best seamen of his age, 
yet “I understood the Natives themselves to be exact Pilots.”  Their aptitude had been 
developed over countless generations of sustained use, Gorges trusted, “both as 
Fishermen and in passing along the shore to seek their enemies, that dwelt to the 
Northward of them.”  Through firsthand conversations with his native captives, Gorges 
recognized what many explorers, settlers, and fishermen witnessed before him: the 
Wabanaki possessed a unique and dynamic command of their oceanic world that existed 
outside the purview of emerging European empires.  And by deferring to Indians’ 
nautical authority, even if it meant disregarding Europe’s most experienced and 
sophisticated Atlantic seafarers, Gorges revealed a striking reality.  The productive and 
accessible Atlantic world that England envisioned faded into that of the Wabanaki 
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somewhere in the sea’s northwestern reaches.  Native fluency in this alien maritime 
world could serve to illuminate its recesses and thereby facilitate the extension of 
England’s colonial ambitions.
22
   
The Richard and its crew were ultimately captured by Spanish privateers in the 
West Indies while en route to the northeast, but unwavering supporters of the 
colonization project continued to rely on Wabanaki knowledge in England.  A year after 
its first failed attempt, two more ships carrying George Popham and about one hundred 
settlers arrived safely near the Kennebec River, owing much to the skill of Skidwarres, 
one of the Wabanaki captives who had remained in England.  Like his kin the year 
before, Skidwarres was employed to navigate this Atlantic journey.  After their safe 
landfall in Maine, Raleigh Gilbert, another of the colony’s leaders, explored local 
waters “by skidwarres Direction.”  Skidwarres also mediated the colony’s contact with 
Wabanaki neighbors.  Later the English “sailed towards the river of Pemaquid and 
Carried with us the Indian Skidwarres” in order to establish relations with an unfamiliar 
native community there.  While interceding at one of the many parleys between the 
Popham colonists and nearby Wabanaki, Skidwarres carefully made his escape with the 
assistance of his kin who recognized his intentions.
23
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Sassacomoit achieved his own homecoming seven years after Skidwarres’ return 
to Wabanakia.  Following his time in a Seville prison alongside the English settlers 
captured by Spanish forces in the West Indies in 1607, Sassacomoit either escaped or 
was returned to Ferdinando Gorges in England by 1611.  Three years later Gorges 
pressed him into the service of Captain Nicholas Hobson, along with two other Indians 
captured from southern New England, where he assisted Hobson’s voyage to the 
northeast.  During the journey, the crew “were Pilotted from place to place, by the 
Natives themselves, as well as their hearts could desire.”  Somewhere along the way, 
Sassacomoit left Hobson’s expedition and rejoined the Wabanaki.  Incredibly, his 
tumultuous and far-flung experience in bondage – from Wabanakia, to England, to the 
West Indies, to Spain, to England – landed him back in the native northeast where he 
continued to serve as an intermediary between Wabanaki and the struggling Popham 
colonists.  By shrewdly manipulating the demand for their coveted knowledge of the 
northwest Atlantic’s waterways and people, and by exploiting the geo-cultural blindness 
of England’s most prominent colonial architects in this maritime world, Sassacomoit 
and Skidwarres secured their trans-Atlantic return home.
24
      
Europeans depended on Wabanaki nautical expertise for more than its 
navigational utility.  In the case of Marc Lescarbot’s misfortune in 1606, it likely 
proved the difference between life and death.  On a journey to Port Royal, Lescarbot’s 
crew became lost at sea in several days of severe weather, drifting about “four leagues 
off shore,” according to his estimations.  One day they noticed two boats “with all sails 
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set” on the horizon, at whom they proceeded to wave and shout for assistance.  The lost 
adventurers were soon astonished to see “one manned with savages, who had a moose 
painted on their sail.”  The other was filled with French fishermen.  “The savages 
showed the greater diligence,” however, “for they arrived first” and immediately 
relieved the distressed settlers.  The native rescue team was compensated generously 
“for coming with such good courage to tell us where we were, for thereafter we sailed 
with constant assurance,” an appreciative Lescarbot described.  Though Wabanaki 
mariners and their nautical aptitude provided an indispensible means to Europeans’ 
accumulation of local knowledge, it could also ameliorate the treacherous ineptitude of 
European mariners in a native maritime world.
25
 
While Wabanaki labored as navigators for European exploratory and settlement 
projects, they also possessed highly-esteemed seafaring skills.  Dawnland travelers 
evidently did not anticipate these proficiencies, and often deemed them unparalleled 
among native societies.  One member of George Waymouth’s colonial expedition in 
1605, for example, found it remarkable when a contingent of Wabanaki confronted and 
proceeded to outpace an English shallop in their canoe.  With only three paddles to 
propel them, the Indians “would at their will go ahead of us and about us, when we 
rowed with eight oars strong; such was their swiftness.”  English sailor John Josselyn 
first encountered Wabanaki mariners in 1638 when visiting his brother’s settlement in 
Maine, and later described (incorrectly) that while they did not possess ships, they “do 
prettily imitate ours in their Birchen-pinnaces” constructed from native materials.  In 
these canoes, which could transport upwards of six people in addition to a “considerable 
fraight,” the Indians often “swim to sea twenty, nay forty miles, keeping from the shore 
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a league or two.”  When traveling, trading, fishing or making war, “they will indure an 
incredible great Sea,” Josselyn maintained, their canoes “mounting upon the working 
billows like a piece of corke.”  The range and agility of Indians’ oceangoing watercraft 
was so extensive as to seem natural and effortless, “but they require skilful hands to 
guide them in rough weather, none but the Indians scarce dare to undertake it.”  The 
sheer courage of Wabanaki mariners, and the nautical skill that stemmed from it, 
Josselyn contended, were simply unsurpassed by other seafaring peoples in the waters 
of the northwest Atlantic.
26
  
That Wabanaki were the unassailable masters of their maritime world was 
becoming axiomatic by the middle decades of the seventeenth century.  English 
adventurer and settler William Wood returned to London after living four years in New 
England, and while promoting the region’s perceived bounty to Old World audiences, 
also issued a synopsis of Indian nautical prowess.  Wabanaki bravery combined with the 
dexterity of their watercraft contributed to a powerful command of the high seas that 
exceeded even the capacities of English sailors.  “In these cockling fly-boats, wherein 
an English can scarce sit without a fearful tottering,” Wood marveled, “they will 
venture to sea when an English shallop dare not bear a knot of sail.”  Indian mariners 
also commanded their vessels at tremendously high speeds, and could be seen 
“scudding over the overgrown waves as fast as a wind-driven ship, being driven by their 
paddles.”  “If a cross wave (as is seldom) turn her keel upside down,” Wood noted, 
“they by swimming free her and scramble into her again.”  The ocean’s periodically 
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treacherous and unpredictable power, like the disruptive and destabilizing rigors it 
increasingly introduced to Wabanaki society, was effectively mitigated by a people long 
accustomed to life in and around this saltwater world.
27
    
As Marc Lescarbot’s nearly disastrous experience at sea in 1606 indicated, 
Wabanaki were also continuing a now familiar strategy of supplementing and 
enhancing their nautical acumen with sailing technology.  With the appearance of non-
Indian vessels and colonists growing more and more frequent on the Dawnland’s 
waterways by the early seventeenth century, sailing craft permitted Wabanaki a 
valuable means of reinforcing and extending their presence on these salty waterways, 
thereby ensuring that their maritime world retained some semblance of its recognizable 
character.  That is to say, the incorporation and appropriation of foreign modes of transit 
stemmed not only from Indians’ longstanding mobility in and intimate relationship with 
the ocean, but also from a desire to dictate to some degree the changes that were 
enveloping it and consequently compromising its quintessentially Wabanaki character. 
Thus while European visitors like Bartholomew Gosnold, Henry Hudson, and 
Marc Lescarbot expressed astonishment at the spectacle of Indian-commanded sailing 
ships, what they witnessed was not so much an aberration of Wabanaki culture but an 
increasingly typical component of their dynamic maritime identity.  By 1605, for 
instance, Indian sailors had evidently become commonplace in the waters adjacent to 
Port Royal.  As soon as its French settlers one day noticed “a shallop coming from Cape 
Sable,” Samuel de Champlain noted, they instinctively “thought it contained Indians 
who were leaving Cape Breton or the island of Canso,” though it eventually proved to 
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be a French supply vessel.  Later that summer, however, the settlers’ presuppositions 
were affirmed when they “caught sight of a shallop in which were some Indians” who 
related the troublesome news of the murder of Micmac trader Panonias.  In July of 
1607, the Gift of God and the Mary and John carrying George Popham, Raleigh Gilbert, 
and a large contingent of English colonists arrived at the steep cliffs of Cape Le Heve in 
Nova Scotia.  One surprised crewmember related how they “had not been at an anchor 
past two hours before we spied a bisken [Biscayan] shallop Coming towards us having 
in her eight Savages and a Little savage boy” who, after inspecting the ships and 
colonists, “came near unto us and spoke unto us in their Language.”  The English 
immediately showcased their supply of trade goods, but the Indian seafarers were 
hardly impressed.  “The next day,” though, “the Same Savages with three Savage 
women…returned unto us bringing with them Some few skins of beaver in an other 
bisken shallop.”  Curiosity and conspicuous self-presentation were the priorities of these 
Wabanaki mariners, for when the Popham colonists attempted to drive a better bargain 
for their goods, the Indians simply “went into the shallop and so they departed.”
28
   
Wabanaki also honed their command of sailing technology by continually 
employing it in campaigns of violence against native enemies.  As the organization of 
Membertou’s navy in 1607 indicated, European-style watercraft could enhance 
Wabanaki nautical prowess and aggressively extend it against longtime Indian 
adversaries.  The Micmac “of these coasts were at war with the Esquimaux” during the 
1650s, one missionary recorded, and sailed as far as “the extreme Northeastern end of 
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New France, at about 52 degrees of latitude and 330 of longitude” to execute their 
amphibious assaults.  Another observer detailed how “two Shallops were prepared” for 
Wabanaki warriors who were concluding the ritual feasting and council talks that 
preceded warfare.  This particular coastal community also constructed docks for their 
warships consisting of a “Bridge of wood to enable them to embark dry-shod in these 
Shallops, which were held for them ready-launched.”  As these marine-warriors 
concluded their preparatory customs, they emerged “well armed after their fashion, 
singing, dancing, and then running quickly to their Shallops,” which subsequently 
embarked for the Gulf of St. Lawrence.  Once a foreign mechanism of transport in the 
Wabanaki maritime world but now a successfully consolidated addition to the native 
technological lexicon, the sailing vessel had become a powerful medium through which 
Wabanaki pursued their economic and political interests in the northwest Atlantic.
29
 
Native northeasterners not only obtained and operated sailing vessels with 
increasing regularity in the early decades of the seventeenth century, but also developed 
a commanding proficiency with them.  French colonists who witnessed Wabanaki 
marine-warriors marshal seaborne assaults against their native neighbors frequently 
lauded their sailing skills and naval strength.  So effortless did this nautical acumen 
appear, in fact, that by 1659 Jesuit missionaries believed native seafarers were simply 
“trusting to instinct for guidance” while “crossing vast seas without compass, and often 
without sight of the Sun.”  “It is wonderful how these Savage mariners navigate so far 
in little shallops,” the priests marveled.  French settler Nicolas Denys similarly noted 
the remarkable efficiency with which Wabanaki sailors plied their waters.  If aided only 
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by “a favourable wind,” he maintained, “they went as swiftly as the throw of a stone.”  
Jesuit Pierre Biard indicated that Wabanaki’s admirable sailing proficiencies even 
rivaled those of Europeans.  Expressing awe at their adroit command of the deep-sea 
with shallops, Biard asserted that “they handle them as skillfully as our most 
courageous and active Sailors of France.”  When such observers described Wabanaki’s 
oceangoing aptitude as simply instinctive and organic, they hinted at the intimate and 
life-sustaining connection these people long maintained with their marine world.  This 
maritime heritage fostered the growth of their dynamic, adaptive and imposing nautical 
power.
30
     
Native northeasterners strategically pursued a number of avenues to acquire 
sailing ships from Europeans, each of which could be aided by their rich corpus of 
knowledge about the ocean itself.  As the disastrous fate of French explorer Étienne 
Bellenger in 1583 clearly proved, Wabanaki were quite adept at hijacking foreign 
watercraft considerably larger than their traditional birch-bark canoes, a tactic they 
would come to perfect throughout the colonial period.  But violence was not their only 
method of acquisition, and until the latter half of the seventeenth century was seldom 
even mentioned by European seamen.  Instead, Indians again resorted to an exploitation 
of the very exchange networks that transmitted ships and their crews to Dawnland 
waters, utilizing their kinship bonds and trading relationships with fishermen and 
settlers to enrich their own supply of sailboats and enhance their visible maritime 
presence.    
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The European traders who linked this Atlantic network to the native northeast 
thus found themselves increasingly engaged in a local market that valued far more than 
trinkets, metal and cloth.  Indeed, the very vehicles relied on to extend this material 
network from Europe were becoming highly esteemed in the Wabanaki maritime world.  
When French adventurer Nicolas Denys settled among the Micmac in the 1630s, he 
noted that while the Indians possessed canoes for navigating the maze of inland rivers, 
streams and lakes, they “all have boats for the sea” that supplemented canoes ill-suited 
for deeper and rougher sea waters.  These they oftentimes “buy from the Captains who 
are about to leave after having completed their fishery.”  With his supervisor looking 
the other way, a single fisherman also “trades or bargains with the Indians using biscuit, 
lead, quite new lines, sails, and many other things at the expense of the said owners,” 
Denys continued.  Father Pierre Biard also described the ordinary presence of shallops 
in the coastal Wabanaki communities of Acadia by the mid-seventeenth century, “which 
they buy of the French who frequent their shores for the sake of fishing.”  These ships, 
Biard marveled, the Indians cruise “with incredible celerity.”
31
 
 Native conceptions of the fluidity and adaptability of material ownership also 
permeated this quintessentially Atlantic merchandise, and in the process conformed it to 
customary Wabanaki economic practices.  When they could not or chose not to 
exchange native material for French sailing technology, Indian mariners often furtively 
seized those boats left behind by the same fishermen who “had them hidden on the 
coast…in order to make use of them on another voyage.”  If they returned in subsequent 
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years and recognized their boats under native command, the fishermen “make no more 
ceremony of taking them back than the Indians do in making use of them.”  The 
possession or custody of shallops was thus not always clearly definable, and their 
utilization on an as-needed basis became at least tacitly accepted in the region.  Unlike 
the furs, ornaments, iron kettles and other trade goods increasingly valued by European 
measurements of worth, and whose ownership was arbitrated by similar standards, 
sailing technology assumed an ambiguous economic status when native and French 
societies converged in the Wabanaki maritime world.
32
     
 Yet Indian efforts to procure sailing craft did not always depend on the presence 
of European traders.  By the early seventeenth century, and perhaps before, many began 
manufacturing it themselves.  Traditional watercraft construction techniques were 
modified to create larger-scale sailing vessels that allowed Wabanaki to not only 
solidify a more active presence in and around their ocean, but also avoid dependence on 
the network of material exchange that threatened to disorder their relationship with the 
Atlantic.  Through their creative pursuit of still another method to meet the evolving 
demands of their maritime world, Wabanaki turned to the natural resources of their 
interior woodlands.  Ironically, then, just as the Atlantic process of material exchange 
began to reorient Indian patterns of production and consumption away from the ocean, 
so too did Wabanaki efforts to preserve and enhance their commanding maritime 
presence necessitate a more intensive and diversified reliance on terrestrial resources.     
The familiar mixed hardwood forests of northeastern New England supplied 
Indians with valuable raw material necessary to synthesize native and European 
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oceangoing watercraft designs and construct vessels suitable for their own needs.  Bark 
from the paper birch tree, long a key ingredient for Wabanaki canoes, dishes, and even 
moose calls, combined with parts of other trees and the skins of inland mammals were 
innovatively recast for the manufacture of sailing craft.  John Josselyn encountered the 
tremendous range of one such specimen tacking off the coast as far south as southern 
New England in 1638.  “We had the sight of an Indian-Pinnace sailing by us made of 
Birch-bark,” he detailed, “sewed together with the roots of spruse and white Cedar 
(drawn out into threads) with a deck, and trimmed with sails top and top gallant very 
sumptuously.”  Around the same time, Nicolas Denys described the increasingly-
ordinary presence of native-hewn birch bark boats that “also went with a sail” formerly 
comprised of bark but “oftener of a well-dressed skin of a young Moose.”  Wabanaki 
thus possessed suitable natural resources to construct sailing technology long before the 
arrival of Europeans.  If such craftsmanship was not part of their pre-contact culture, its 
development in the seventeenth century indicates that Wabanaki aimed to circumvent 




Through symbols and skins, moose occupied a peculiarly prominent position 
onboard Wabanaki sailing ships.  The conspicuous presence of these woodland 
megafauna on the ocean’s waves is at first glance unbefitting, but actually offers a 
telling insight into the creative ways Wabanaki understood and managed their changing 
Atlantic world.  Moose skins could function as sails for Indian boats, as Nicolas Denys’ 
observed.  Totemic representations of the terrestrial mammal, by far the largest and 
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most prized, could also serve a more immaterial purpose and symbolize its spiritual 
importance in native societies.  The Wabanaki shallop that rescued Marc Lescarbot’s 
wayward crew in 1607 “had a moose painted on their sail,” and Micmac sagamore 
Membertou commanded a similarly adorned sailboat along the coasts of Acadia.  When 
corroborated with more recent ethnographic evidence, such patterns reflect Wabanaki’s 
deeply held understandings about their terrestrial and aquatic worlds.  Twentieth-
century anthropologists in the Dawnland recorded a common native belief in the dual 
character of moose who, they noted, always limped into the sea in their advanced age 
and subsequently transformed into whales.  This marine metamorphosis thus 
symbolized the fungible nature of both the moose’s habitats and Wabanaki’s maritime 
and terrestrial worlds.  When Indian mariners wielded sailing technology on their ocean 
beneath the symbols and skins of moose, they indicated the longstanding heritage of 
these convictions.  By grafting onto foreign devices representations of their own 
cosmology – of the intimate interdependence of the Dawnland and its sea – Wabanaki 




The conjugation of sea and land, however, was not an intangible notion confined 
to the abstract realms of native cosmology; it permeated the quotidian life of Wabanaki 
society.  As a result, Indians could harness the productive potential of this relationship 
to enhance their material welfare.  In 1622, English colonial proprietor Sir Ferdinando 
Gorges described the amphibious moose hunting tactics of Indians on Mount Desert 
Island off the central Maine coast.  First, “by making of several fires, and setting the 
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country with people,” the hunters were able to “force them into the sea, to which they 
are naturally addicted,” Gorges detailed.  “Then there are others that attend them in their 
boats with bows and weapons of several kinds, wherewith they slay and take at their 
pleasure.”  By exploiting these animals’ natural addiction to the ocean, as Gorges 
understood, or their ultimate destiny as aquatic creatures, as Wabanaki envisioned, 
Indians positioned the ocean at the center of their production and consumption of even 
terrestrial mammals.  The fruits of these labors were subsequently appropriated for the 
construction of sailing craft or for the manipulation of material exchange networks.  
Each pursuit aimed to extend and augment native command of their maritime world.
35
  
Wabanaki were also beginning to associate the sailing ships that increasingly 
frequented their waters with the extensive economic networks those vessels conveyed.  
As the population of foreign fishermen, settlers and traders increased along the northern 
and southern limits of Wabanakia in the early decades of the seventeenth century, 
Indians recognized the Euro-American maritime presence as the operative vehicle of 
trans-Atlantic trade.  This cognizance was most glaring when Euro-American and 
Wabanaki attempts to manipulate these Atlantic networks collided.  When Indians 
identified the periodic misconduct of Euro-American traders, they sought retribution by 
invariably targeting what they perceived to be the progenitor of this coercion: the 
growing Europeanization of their maritime world.  As a result of these developments, 
native northeasterners grew more conscious of the quintessentially Atlantic dimensions 
of material exchange. 
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Indians orchestrated their retributive acts of violence against the Euro-American 
maritime presence when their strategies for manipulating trade relationships were 
undermined by traders’ perceived deception, greed, or unfair practices.  Nicolas Denys 
noted the savvy bartering tactics of Micmac traders who emerged from the woods in the 
spring and immediately secreted away their best furs from the sight of undesirable 
French traders.  By only dealing their second-rate stores, the Indians were able to 
acquire quantities of food, liquor and tobacco from the desperate traders.  But “as soon 
as they have departed,” Denys continued, “they go to recover the skins which they have 
hidden in the woods, and go to the routes of the fishing ships and keep watch.”  After 
sighting these more lucrative opportunities, Indians proceeded in their fur-laden canoes 
to meet the passers-by, “where they are well received.”  With their coveted and 
handcrafted decorative pouches, Wabanaki women too learned to play the system, and 
“fix the price to the fishermen according to the kind of skin and its fantastic 
ornamentation.”  Both Indian men and women also regularly solicited fishing vessels en 
route to their anchoring places whose crews showered them with goods in attempts to 
entice the Indians to later meet them at sea with their furs.  “But they do not go there at 
once, but remain still on shore, waiting for other ships to come past” in order to receive 
each of their bountiful offers of food and brandy.  The native traders were careful not to 
over-consume the alcohol, “for they would not then be able to preserve the judgment 
which is necessary for making dupes of the sailors and captains.”  But upon discovering 
a decreasing demand for their material and traders stringently unwilling to supply goods 
with which Wabanaki were growing accustomed, Indians were not timid about using 
their power in the region to secure an advantage.  In response to traders’ intransigence, 
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“they have plundered boats which were at the distant fishery,” Denys recorded, 
including “a little ship, which they found alone in a harbor.”
36
   
Micmac power on the seas likewise had its way with the uncooperative, and 
perhaps deceitful, French fisherman Captain Savalet in 1606.  In the midst of a 
tremendously fruitful harvest “worth 1,000 pounds” with his ship of “80 tons, which 
could carry 100,000 dry fishes,” Indian mariners “boldly and impudently went into his 
ship and carried away from him” whatever they pleased.  Through their extensive 
experience with the ocean’s rich resource base, Wabanaki had evidently developed 
highly selective tastes, and their authority on the waves permitted them to satisfy such 
predilections with the goods they routinely confiscated.  Whenever “the fishermen came 
with their shallops full of fish, they did choose what seemed good unto them and they 
did not care for cod,” Marc Lescarbot reported after his encounter with Savalet, but 
instead preferred “a kind of very great turbots, which might be worth here in Paris 
above four crowns a-piece…for it is a marvellous good meat.”  Reaping the fruits of 
Euro-American maritime labor allowed Indians to not only even scores with dishonest 
traders and fishing crews, but also assert their presence on the ocean while redirecting 
Atlantic economic processes to serve native interests.
37
  
                                                 
36
 Nicolas Denys, The Description and Natural History of the Coasts of North America (Acadia), ed. and 
trans. William F. Ganong, 446-451; Bruce J. Bourque, Twelve Thousand Years: American Indians in 
Maine, 124-126; Kenneth M. Morrison, The Embattled Northeast: the Elusive Ideal of Alliance in 
Abenaki-Euramerican Relations, 38-39.  
 
37
 Marc Lescarbot, Nova Francia: A Description of Acadia, 1606 (1609), trans. P. Erondelle, ed. H.P. 
Biggar (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1928), 137-138; Marc Lescarbot, The History of New France 
(1609), ed. and trans., W.L. Grant, II: 362-363; Ralph Pastore, “The Sixteenth Century: Aboriginal 
Peoples and European Contact,” in Phillip A. Buckner and John G. Reid, eds., The Atlantic Region to 




The tremendous success of these aggressive strategies, and the shear force of 
Indian maritime prowess, could evidently foster an air of impunity among Wabanaki 
mariners.  Father Pierre Biard complained of Micmac’s incessant and “exceedingly 
vainglorious” boasts about their superior strength, ingenuity and bravery compared to 
European sailors and colonists.  Many bragged that “they have killed Basques and 
Malouins, and that they do a great deal of harm to the ships,” Biard noted, since “no one 
has ever resented it…from a lack of courage.”  Little doubt existed in both native and 
Euro-American minds that Indians continued to retain a considerable degree of 
authority over the processes of their maritime world, and were accordingly capable of 
dictating the terms of engagement with its foreign visitors.
38
   
Further to the southwest, Wabanaki similarly resorted to maritime aggression in 
order to better manage trade operations and ensure the welfare of their communities.  
From his small settlement at York on the Maine coast, Christopher Levett reported in 
1624 that a deceptive English trader had abused local Indians by stealing a large 
quantity of their furs.  The Indians traveled in canoes to the harbor where the trader’s 
ship was anchored and first attempted to peacefully negotiate the return of their goods.  
After the trader refused them outright, the Indians reportedly “told him againe that he 
was a Roague, with some other speeches,” at which the seaman and his crew attacked 
and beat the Indians.  Though they retreated to Levett’s settlement “in a great rage,” the 
Indians remained confident that justice would ultimately be served since “they would be 
revenged on his Fishermen at sea.”  Wabanaki in southern Maine similarly targeted 
Dorchester fisherman Henry Way who went missing at sea in the summer of 1631.  
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After the following winter, his shallop was discovered “bulged against the rocks…in the 




Englishmen who attempted to colonize offshore islands, long utilized as 
valuable staging grounds for Wabanaki sea hunting expeditions, were also objects of 
native suspicion if their dealings undermined Indian interests.  Under Ferdinando 
Gorges’ royal patent from King James I, the Trelawny family of Plymouth obtained 
ownership of Richmond Island off southern Maine in 1620 and subsequently 
established there a small trading post and fishing operation.  John Winter, a local agent 
for the family and settler on the island, complained repeatedly to the Trelawnys in 
England during the summer of 1634 of local Indians’ skillful manipulation of trade, 
much to the detriment of the colony’s economic interests.  In response to the trade 
goods being shipped to him from England, Winter explained to suppliers that “the coats 
are good, but somewhat of the shortest, for the Indians make choice of the longest.”  In 
addition, “the coverlets are not for this country” as the Indians will not accept them “for 
they must have them soft and warm.”  And if “the hats are sent without bands, or lined 
in the brows,” the Indians will refuse them too.  Even other local traders were 
experiencing adverse trade relations in which natives held the upper hand.  “They put 
away their goods at so low rates to the Indians,” Winter reported, “that they get but little 
by it.”  Relations grew considerably hostile over the next two years, however, when 
fierce competition from Mr. Cleeves, a rival trader and settler, encouraged deception 
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and fostered suspicion among native and English alike.  Indians were now coming to 
view Richmond’s Island as more invasive and threatening to their economic interests, 
and as a result targeted the site for retaliation.  By June 1636, island settlers were 
decrying “a great loss” sustained by Indian attacks on their livestock.  Narias Hawkins 
complained of his “sustained loss of a great many hogs,” while Robert Trelawny 
similarly described how he “lost above 200 hogs, & some goats.”
40
 
Aside from securing a far-ranging and aggressive command of their ocean and 
carefully manipulating material exchange networks, Wabanaki also learned to shrewdly 
exploit trans-Atlantic power structures to more effectively manage the disruptive 
pressures emanating from their eastern horizons.  Recourse to royal authority, and its 
capacity to allay even the most distant grievances of royal subjects, was not an option 
exclusive to French or English colonials, Indians realized.  When Euro-Americans 
lauded the beneficence and paternalism inherent in their monarchs, they also forged 
congruencies with the affective values dwelling within the most esteemed native 
sagamores.  From his Maine colony in 1607, George Popham thus echoed the 
sentiments of other proprietors and settlers when he extolled James I’s “admirable 
justice and incredible constancy, which gives no small pleasure to the natives of these 
regions.”  These loyal inhabitants, Popham waxed on, profess “that there is no God to 
be truly worshipped but the God of King James, under whose rule and reign they would 
gladly fight.”  Out of this wistful optimism, Wabanaki came to realize that they could 
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invoke the charity of distant royalty and exploit a dutiful and loyal posture in order to 
advance native interests.  Natives’ carefully-crafted Atlantic diplomacy would be 
refined and perfected throughout the colonial period.
41
   
Wabanaki’s astute engineering of imperial fidelity assumed a myriad of 
expressions, each adapted to local circumstances.  When Sieur de Monts’ and Samuel 
de Champlain’s men abandoned their Port Royal colony in 1607, much to the dismay of 
Micmac neighbors, local Indians made certain to cement stronger bonds with the 
colony’s successors a few years later and thereby avoid the same misfortune.  A ship 
bearing news of the death of King Henry IV to the Sieur de Poutrincourt’s settlement in 
1610 offered Indians an opportune moment to forge such relationships.  Upon hearing 
the reports, the Indians reportedly “all began to weep, even the Savages joining in after 
they had heard about the catastrophe.”  The expressions of anguish were not 
perfunctory, according to the French, as “they continued to mourn for a long time, just 
as they would have done for one of their greatest Sagamores.”  By deploying their 
mourning rituals, Micmac cultivated an emotional solidarity with their grief-stricken 
European neighbors in order to claim a position alongside colonial subjects in a trans-
Atlantic network of power and deference.  This status, Indians hoped, would endow 
them with the social capital and economic advantages needed to augment Micmac 
prestige in the region.
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Other Wabanaki believed they could appeal to the paternal guardianship of 
monarchs to ameliorate injustices sustained at the hands of malevolent royal subjects.  
The Indians near Christopher Levett’s post in southern Maine who were robbed of their 
furs and beaten by English sailors in 1624 not only vowed revenge on English fishing 
boats at sea, but also promised that they were “going into England to tell King James of 
it.”  Such a strategy blended customary native notions of retributive justice with 
European methods of imploring an adjudicative authority.  Both correctives demanded a 
mastery of Atlantic opportunities.  Upon another occasion, Levett questioned what he 
saw as the grueling servitude of women in Wabanaki society as well as the polygamy of 
a respected sagamore.  The native leader defended himself and his community’s 
customs by demanding to know “how many wives King James had.”  When Levett 
responded that “he never had but one, and shee was dead,” the reportedly incredulous 
sagamore “wondred, and asked mee who then did all the Kings worke.”  If English 
colonists proved hostile to Wabanaki customs, the sympathetic consideration of their 
monarch could still be trusted.  By thus invoking supposedly universal gender norms 
and marriage practices that united both native and English figures of authority in 
common cultural bonds, the Indian leader aimed to trap and defuse this challenge to his 
prestigious stature.
43
   
The initial stages of Euro-American colonization in the northeast precipitated 
considerable socio-political change in Wabanaki society, and conditioned the quotidian 
life of its people.  Structures of authority and understandings of power were undergoing 
gradual transformation along the lines of newly-arrived Europeans.  Patterns of 
                                                 
43
 Christopher Levett, A Voyage into New England, Begun in 1623, and Ended in 1624 (1628), in George 
Parker Winship, ed., Sailors Narratives of Voyages along the New England Coast, 1524-1624, 277, 285.  
111 
 
production and consumption too were being refashioned by the Atlantic’s repulsive and 
attractive forces.  The material life of the native northeast was also being reshaped by 
valuable European goods, the most conspicuous of which were foreign vehicles of 
transportation.  Yet Wabanaki actively and continually sought out means to manage the 
seemingly unpredictable and destabilizing effects of their changing world.  That the 
most favorable and efficacious of these avenues were believed to demand an 
exploitation of Atlantic opportunities testified to the strength and resilience of 
Wabanaki’s maritime identity.  As it had for generations, the ocean afforded native 
people countless opportunities to remake themselves and forge some semblance of 
cultural continuity.   
When Indians utilized their proximity to the ocean to secure access to and 
maximize the value of European networks of exchange they typified a culture long 
acquainted with the generative power of the Atlantic.  When native mariners 
manipulated the demand for their coveted nautical skills and intimate knowledge of 
their ocean’s waterways and peoples, or developed that acumen with new sailing 
technology, they demonstrated a sophisticated command of their maritime world and an 
earnest desire to augment and enhance it.  And when Indian warriors aggressively 
targeted the Euro-American presence in their ocean, or when native diplomats 
beseeched the names of socio-political powers residing somewhere in the distant 
reaches of the ocean, they illustrated their dynamic conception of an expansive Atlantic 
world and its ever-new possibilities.  If the Wabanaki ocean brought forth instability 
and swift change, it could also be trusted to supply the tools necessary to placate its 




“To go to all the fishing ilandes and so to drive all the contre before them”: Contesting 
Atlantic Colonialism and Regenerating Atlantic Autonomy 
 
In much the same way as their ancestors before them, early-seventeenth century 
Wabanaki continued to depend on the productive power of their pelagic world to 
mitigate the quotidian rigors of a coastal hunter-gatherer society.  By utilizing the ocean 
as an avenue for mobility, a conduit for the extension of power and violence, and a 
source of life-sustaining food and material, native northeasterners sustained a maritime 
identity  marked largely by continuity through the sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries.  Yet this cultural persistence was predicated on a dynamic understanding of 
the Atlantic world.  It demanded, in other words, that Wabanaki learn to cultivate the 
prolific and uniquely new opportunities conferred by their saltwater world to carefully 
manage its novel, transformative and occasionally disruptive pressures.  By way of new 
material exchange networks, captivity voyages, nautical technology and paternal 
authority, Indians also began to expand their conception of both the geographic scope 
and generative potential of their Atlantic world.  The notion of the sea as a dynamic and 
expansive locus of power had always been a hallmark of Wabanaki’s longstanding 
maritime-oriented culture, but the particular permutations of that dynamism were 
always in flux.  The Atlantic was, and always had been, saturated with an ever-new 
potentiality.   
 The ancient binary conception of the ocean as bountifully nurturing and 
dangerously disrupting also endured into the mid-seventeenth century.  After the first 
wave of European colonization efforts in the northeast, Dawnlanders continued to 
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confront new pressures that demanded ongoing socio-cultural adjustment.  As they had 
for over a century, the most significant and transformative of these forces extended 
from impulses touched off by European involvement in and around the Wabanaki’s 
eastern horizons, impulses that were becoming quintessentially Atlantic phenomenon.  
As Indians themselves were discovering, their recognizable ocean, its relationship to 
their communities, and their struggle to maintain both were constantly susceptible to the 
tumultuous effects of these saltwater pressures.  The Great Migration of religious non-
conformists to New England in the 1620s and 1630s and the proprietary settlement of 
the Maine coast as well as other Europeans’ perpetual quest for northeastern North 
America’s natural resources, for example, unleashed a profound demographic change in 
Wabanaki homelands and waters throughout the middle decades of the seventeenth 
century.  Small French and English settlements, situated primarily along the coast and 
on offshore islands, now dotted land- and seascapes with increasing regularity.  From 
these points of access, Euro-Americans began an unprecedented exploitation of the 
region’s economic potential through an extension and implementation of pastoral 
agriculture and the creation of countless fishing stations, sawmills, and fur trade posts.  
Spatially, environmentally and economically, then, colonial intrusions into Wabanakia 
continually threatened to disorder and reconfigure the native maritime world into one 
more amenable to Euro-American Atlantic visions. 
 The precise expressions of these new pressures in the terrestrial and aquatic 
worlds of Wabanakia, and the ways its native inhabitants effectively managed them, is 
the focus of this chapter.  It argues that, through the middle decades of the seventeenth 
century, Wabanaki increasingly confronted an array of demographic, environmental and 
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economic stresses that were fundamentally Atlantic-centered.  These processes, 
moreover, were both an outgrowth of colonials’ mobility in and around Indians’ eastern 
horizons and an indispensible contributor to the project of consolidating and 
augmenting a Euro-American Atlantic.  Such developments thus possessed implications 
extending far beyond northeastern forests and coastlines.  Indian people themselves 
gradually came to understand as much as they experienced and made sense of these 
pressures alongside more direct assaults against their own Atlantic vision.  When 
traders attempted to fraudulently manipulate material exchange networks, for example, 
or when seamen assaulted, murdered and enslaved native families, or when colonial 
government policies aimed to undermine and police the Wabanaki maritime presence, 
an unmistakable pattern emerged.  Native grievances over this Atlantic colonialism, and 
their periodic acts of retributive aggression against it, eventually erupted in war in 1676 
and 1677, and both Indian and English alike recognized that nothing short of the 
Wabanaki Atlantic world was at stake.  This reality was so palpable in Indian society 
that its marine-warriors orchestrated the most destructive naval campaign the northwest 
Atlantic had hitherto seen.  
 Yet as Atlantic tensions mounted in the Dawnland by mid-century, Wabanaki 
society underwent significant internal transformations.  This chapter also traces these 
adjustments, and asserts that they were critical native responses to the most disruptive 
and disorderly elements of Atlantic colonization encroaching on their communities.  
Just as an English Atlantic world was coalescing from and gradually defined by the 
long- distance migration of Europeans in search of economic and religious opportunity, 
so too did this phenomenon induce similar mobility among Wabanaki.  To meet the 
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ever-changing needs of trans-Atlantic exchange networks, Indians broadened their 
geographic range on sea and on land in order to cultivate and integrate new sources of 
material and spiritual wealth into their economy.   And just as Atlantic colonization and 
imperialism were central instruments in the nation-building efforts of European states 
during the seventeenth century, so too did they encourage Wabanaki ethnic groups to 
coordinate and centralize their interests and actions in the face of colonialism’s 
aggressive forces.  Indians continued to explore new ways of positioning the sea at the 
core of these strategic adjustments, and consequently employed its navigational, 
material, martial and diplomatic advantages in their struggle to retain a recognizable 
vision of their Atlantic world.   
 
 That the northeast’s tremendous supply of natural resources could stand at the 
center of extensive imperial economies was long recognized by Atlantic explorers and 
adventurers.  After initial periods of settlement, the common refrain continued to spring 
from the pens of Euro-American opportunists who extolled the region’s abundant 
aquatic and terrestrial flora and fauna, as well as their accessibility from the ocean.  
Englishman John Smith marveled at the fruitful shoreline between Penobscot and 
Sagadahoc in Maine, for example, a coast “overgrowen with all sorts of excellent good 
woodes for building houses, boats, barks or shippes.”  By the 1630s, Sir Ferdinando 
Gorges wholeheartedly concurred.  Enjoining his deputies and commissioners “to make 
Trade the Common Interest of the whole Province,” the colonial proprietor eagerly 
anticipated the possibilities awaiting industrious settlers in Maine.  This enterprise 
would be spurred on to enhance the Atlantic economy with abundant stores of “Fish & 
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other Food as also Tymber for Barbadoes & those other hot Places.”  “Boards for 
Spayne,” Gorges further explained, “are the most considerable Trade” fostering 
prosperity in his trans-Atlantic colonial project.  Indians had long since grown 
accustomed to the networks of material exchange that prized chiefly the furs of 
terrestrial mammals, but were now confronted by a troubling reality.  The economic 
complex that linked distant stretches of the Atlantic ascribed tremendous value to ever 
more resources native to their lands and waters, and, most alarmingly, Wabanaki 
guardianship of that material base grew increasingly precarious.
1
  
 The growth of seventeenth-century English settlement on the Maine frontier 
proceeded sporadically along a line stretching from the Piscataqua River in the south to 
the Penobscot River to the northeast.  Most hamlets and farms were confined to the 
coastal region or to major rivers not far from the head of tide, thus facilitating the 
region’s contributions to Atlantic markets and maritime industry.  Some settlers were 
transient employees for Ferdinando Gorges’ royal land grant and arrived directly from 
England in the 1620s.  Many more migrated from southern New England after the 
founding of Plymouth Colony in 1620.  Regardless of their point of origin, colonists 
were engaged in a number of recently-established fishing enterprises at Damariscove, 
Piscataqua, Cape Newagen, and Monhegan Island, the latter a long favored jumping-off 
point for Wabanaki sea-hunting expeditions.  Among the largest and most successful of 
these operations was that at Pemaquid between the Kennebec and Penobscot rivers,  
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Figure 3 – Seventeenth-Century Wabanaki, French and English Settlements –  
From Bruce J. Bourque, Twelve Thousand Years: American Indians in Maine (Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2001), 130 
 
founded by fishermen in the late 1620s.  Though their population is difficult to 
ascertain, Maine’s early fishing settlements were dominated by seasonal male laborers 
and consequently lacked the conditions necessary for stable growth as communities in 
the mold of Puritan-dominated southern New England.
2
    
 Other outposts of English colonization established on the heels of fishing 
operations were fur trade stations.  Similar to the population employed in the nearby 
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fisheries, traders working out of these locations were often single men whose 
occupational tasks necessarily conformed to the seasonal hunting patterns of their 
Wabanaki counterparts.  Posts opened in the late 1620s and early 1630s at Machias, 
Pejepscot, Penobscot and Richmond’s Island.  Among the region’s more successful 
traders was Thomas Purchase, who by 1630 had a well-established trading house on the 
lower Androscoggin River.  The commercial firm of Clark and Lake likewise settled 
Arrowsic Island and planted a truckhouse near the mouth of the Kennebec River.  
Plymouth Colony in southern New England obtained a land grant to erect the Cushnoc 
trading post on the Kennebec River in 1629, and began bartering corn to the Kennebec 
Wabanaki for beaver pelts shortly thereafter.  The foothold secured in this region by 
Plymouth Colony traders to the south facilitated the introduction and proliferation of 
wampum in the Dawnland.  These strings of coastal shells from southern New England 
and beyond became greatly esteemed by Kennebec Indian communities, and assisted 
the local growth of English material exchange networks.  The ascendant “wampum 
revolution” thus reverberated throughout the northeast via underlying Atlantic 




Despite the growing presence of colonial fishermen and traders along the Maine 
coast, achieving stability and longevity in an orderly northeastern settlement demanded 
substantial environmental manipulation.  Not long after their arrival, settlers began the 
long process of reconstituting the Wabanaki landscape according to familiar English 
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modes of production and consumption.  The successful implementation of pastoralism 
and other agrarian practices historically central to rural English society became a key 
component of sustainable colonial communities in the region.  English breeds of cattle, 
swine and sheep increasingly accompanied colonial men and women off ships and into 
cleared coastal hamlets southwest of the Penobscot River, and by the 1640s livestock of 
this sort were commonly exported with wheat and corn into Atlantic markets.  In locales 
where one commercial pursuit was insufficient to sustain the community, a diversified 
economy developed that mixed small-scale trading, fishing and farming.  The 
settlement at Pemaquid, for example, established as a fishing stage in the late 1620s, 
soon after became a prominent exporter of English livestock.  The coastal inhabitants of 
southern Maine, traveler John Josselyn remarked in the 1660s, could be classified as 
“Husbandmen, or Planters, and fishermen…of which some be planters and fishers both, 
others meer fishers.”  From Pemaquid to the northeast, the offshore islands and rocky 
promontories are “all fill’d with dwelling houses and stages for fishermen, and have 
plenty of Cattle, arable land and marshes.”
4
   
The steady emergence of sawmills in English settlements by the mid-
seventeenth century signaled the further environmental restructuring of the Dawnland 
and its adjacent waterways.  The northeast’s seemingly limitless stands of virgin white 
pine captivated the attention of nearly all European explorers, and figured prominently 
in the economic prospects of colonial projects.  Not until the dizzying array of 
competing jurisdictions in Maine was disentangled later in the century would the 
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English Crown attempt to exert domain over these lucrative “king’s woods,” reserving 
them for the production of masts for the Royal Navy.  Royal subjects arrived first, 
however, and by the 1650s were processing significant swaths of forests into boards and 
ship stores for local and foreign consumption.  Numerous land transactions typified this 
growing trend, such as settler Henry Sayward’s petition to the General Court of 
Massachusetts in 1669 for “a quantity of land & meadow with liberty of Tymber” near 
the Cape Porpoise River in Maine.  The legislature acquiesced and granted him “liberty 
for the Cutting of Tymber upon the said River above mentioned for the Improvement of 
his Saw mill.”  John Wadleigh and son Robert deeded land in the same area to Daniel 
Eyres of Ipswich that included “free use & right to use whole River, for a Saw Mill, or 
Mills.”  It was not long, then, before portions of coastal Wabanakia mirrored the heavily 
deforested regions of southern New England.  Already by 1676, summer lumbering 
operations on Arrowsick Island off southern Maine alone stored one hundred thousand 
board feet for export.
5
   
 The expansion of the French colonial presence in mid-seventeenth century 
Wabanakia both paralleled and diverged from its English counterpart.  The two 
burgeoning developments demonstrated similar geographic patterns of settlement 
insofar as each confined their plantation activities to coastal regions or rivers as far as 
the head of the tide.  Immediate proximity to the larger Atlantic networks of 
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communication, exchange and transportation were vital requirements for the successful 
exploitation and extraction of local resources.  Such positioning was particularly critical 
for French settlement which, unlike its English rival to the south, relied almost 
exclusively on a fur trade economy.  Because of the relatively sparse and 
overwhelmingly male French colonial population, their establishment of sustainable 
communities based on mixed economic pursuits such as farming, timbering, fishing, 
and trading was virtually impossible during this period.  Instead, the French presence 




French traders covered an area stretching from the shores of southern Nova 
Scotia, around the Bay of Fundy and south to the Penobscot River, a natural landmark 
that would eventually serve as the unofficial and contested border separating French and 
English imperial jurisdictions.  After their monopoly was dissolved by French royal 
officials in 1607, Sieur de Monts and Samuel de Champlain abandoned their settlement 
at Port Royal and returned to Europe.  Nearly three years later, however, the Crown’s 
policies again changed and Jean de Poutrincourt received royal permission to 
reestablish the trading colony at Port Royal.  His successor, Charles de Biencourt, 
traveled southwest and constructed a similar fort at the mouth of the Penobscot River.  
Numerous other French traders followed close behind these early leaders and took up 
residence in Acadia.  Among the most prominent were Claude de Saint-Étienne de La 
Tour and his son Charles who managed successful operations throughout the region, 
including Fort Lomeron at Cape Sable in 1624.  The miniscule French population, 
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combined with its nearly complete economic dependence on local Wabanaki generally 
precluded distrust and aggression and fostered equitable relationships between French 
and native communities.  Charles de Biencourt and Charles La Tour each boasted of 
their status as a “grand Sagamo” of the Micmac and Penobscot.  Biencourt, in addition, 
was believed to have spent the end of his life living with the Micmac, and La Tour was 
married into a Micmac community by the 1620s.
7
 
The dearth of French colonists, combined with the proximity of their trade 
interests to New England, also encouraged competition from English colonists to the 
south.  This, in turn, ushered in a more belligerent and adversarial atmosphere to 
Wabanaki lands.  Three years after Poutrincourt resuscitated the French presence at Port 
Royal, Virginia seaman Samuel Argall raided the Acadian coasts and destroyed most 
French trading settlements, including those at Port Royal and Saint Croix Island.  The 
Plymouth Colony similarly backed the English confiscation of Biencourt’s lucrative 
trading station at the mouth of the Penobscot River.  The tensions of Europe’s Thirty 
Years War also reverberated in a progressively-belligerent Wabanakia.  Scotland used 
the occasion to assert a claim to French Acadia and subsequently occupied Port Royal 
for five years.  From this strategic location, Scottish settlers raided the trading post 
recently established by Charles La Tour at the St. Johns River in 1631, prompting La 
Tour’s swift counterattack against nearby Machias, a new English settlement erected 
earlier that year.  After Acadia was officially returned to French possession the 
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following year, officials at Versailles concentrated a renewed level of attention on the 
colony’s future and appointed Isaac de Razilly its governor.  After first ousting the 
Scottish settlers, Razilly ordered his officer, Charles de Menou d’Aulnay to drive out 
the Plymouth traders from Penobscot and reoccupy the post, a directive which he 
accomplished with minimal opposition in 1635.
8
   
The relentless Anglo-French antagonism over access to land and resources 
introduced an unpredecented degree of imperial contention to Wabanakia.  Indians were 
now exposed to volatile and periodically violent European enmities that often 
accompanied wide-ranging economic networks into their world.  Just as it had for 
generations of their ancestors, native participation in the Atlantic’s unpredictable and 
disruptive complexes would continue to necessitate caution, careful management, and 
shrewd manipulation.  Wabanaki accordingly pursued a variety of avenues to rationalize 
and manage the extensive demographic and environmental transformations spreading 
along their coasts.  That these permutations were the direct extension of Atlantic 
processes was readily apparent to Indian communities by the early 1600s, as they 
orchestrated acts of maritime aggression, adapted to new marine technologies and 
cultivated a peculiar trans-Atlantic diplomacy to mitigate their most threatening effects.   
But the accelerated development of these forces in subsequent decades 
necessitated further measures.  One such response involved a development and 
integration of other more remote Algonquian economies beyond the familiar limits of 
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Wabanakia.  The proliferation of year-round Euro-American settlements and trading 
posts in close proximity to native seasonal encampments ensured greater numbers of 
Indian communities more convenient access to coveted trade goods.  Yet a wider 
accessibility to European exchange relationships also eroded the longstanding trade 
monopoly enjoyed by many native mariners, including the Micmac.  These northeastern 
Wabanaki subsequently aimed to reinforce their prominent position in exchange 
networks by extending the geographic reach of their maritime prowess.
9
   
Beginning in the 1630s, seaborne Indians were exploring and soon consistently 
exploiting with impunity new reserves of Euro-American trade goods and foodstuffs as 
far away as southern New England.  To facilitate their long-range mobility, these 
marine-warriors continued to depend on “the conveniency and opportunity of the Rivers 
and Sea, which afforded a speedy passage” across northwest Atlantic waters, as Sir 
Ferdinando Gorges described native naval aggression by mid-century.  By way of these 
salty corridors, Wabanaki frequently stormed the shores and plundered the communities 
of Massachusetts Indians and other Algonquians to the south.  Such economically-
driven amphibious assaults also had historical antecedents in the period before English 
colonization.  During the earliest years of Plymouth Colony, for example, Governor 
William Bradford’s colonists were quickly learning from native accounts that the 
Massachusetts “were much afraid of the Tarentines, a people to the eastward which 
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used to come in harvest time and take away their corn, and many times kill their 
persons.”
10
   
These Vikings of the early modern northeast had since become quite proficient 
at exploiting valuable extractive economies.  And not only did their nautical command 
and extensive seafaring range facilitate these economic and martial enterprises, but the 
legendary status they achieved among the broader native northeast also worked to their 
advantage.  This maritime power was so conspicuous that it had long garnered the 
respect of European explorers and settlers seeking assistance on Wabanaki waves, but 
its reputation had also grown to mythical proportions among other Algonquians to the 
south.  The notion that this destructive armada resided somewhere in the nether regions 
of the northwest Atlantic, yet was capable of frequently surmounting this distance and 
exacting such effective violence by harnessing the sea, only served to amplify the terror 
spreading throughout southern New England.  Even English settlers, Massachusetts Bay 
puritan Edward Johnson noted in 1650, were “being kept in awe” by their native 
neighbors’ horrifying “report of a cruell people, not far of[f] called the Tarrantines.”  
Upon one occasion the fretful Indians “came quaking and complaining of a barbarous 
and cruell people called the Tarratines who they said would eat such Men as they 
caught alive, tying them to a Tree, and gnawing their flesh by peece-meales off their 
Bones.”  William Wood of Massachusetts Bay similarly detailed the impending doom 
that the looming specter of “the Tarrenteens” struck in the hearts of local Indians, who 
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subsequently “do fear them as their deadly enemies.”  As such this seafaring Wabanaki 
enemy was reputed to be “little less savage and cruel than…cannibals.”
11
   
So damaging were Wabanaki maritime raids in southern New England, and so 
vulnerable were the region’s Algonquian inhabitants, that native victims consistently 
depended on the nascent English settlements for protection.  As early as 1621, 
Plymouth governor William Bradford noted, nine Massachusetts sachems led by 
Chikataubut signed a submission to King James for his paternal protection against the 
Tarrentines.  Such fears of the predatory Wabanaki had not abated by 1634, when 
William Wood related a disconcerting occasion when “our Indians being busy about 
their accustomed huntings, not suspecting them so near their own liberties, were on the 
sudden surprised by them, some being slain, the rest escaping to their English asylum.”  
Their esteemed sachem was among those gravely wounded in the assault, though he 
was later “cured by English surgery.”   The Indians who “came quaking and 
complaining” about approaching Wabanaki warriors to colonist Edward Johnson in 
Massachusetts likewise described them as “a strong and numerous people, and now 
coming, which made them flee to the English.”  The colonists, “who were but very few 
in number at this time, and could make but little resistance, being much dispersed,” 
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 The lucrative trading partnership that southern New England Algonquians 
enjoyed with their English neighbors was, in fact becoming an extremely fruitful font of 
wealth for Wabanaki communities far to the northeast.  It was precisely this new 
material exchange network that Micmac aimed to exploit and integrate into their own 
economic nexus.  English fishermen-traders and Massachusetts Indians were 
cohabitating in native settlements near Ipswich by 1631, which in turn functioned as a 
vulnerable warehouse for Micmac raiders.  In August of that year, Governor John 
Winthrop reported, “the Tarentines, to the number of one hundred, came in three 
canoes, and in the night assaulted the wigwam of the sagamore of Agawam.”   After the 
headman’s possessions were pillaged, the marine-warriors then “rifled a wigwam where 
Mr. Cradock’s men kept to catch sturgeon” and “took away their nets and biscuit, etc.”  
Seven men were killed, several others wounded including Indians “John Sagamore, and 
James,” and many later died of wounds incurred in the raid.  William Bradford’s 
Plymouth colonists frequently relied on the trade and good will of local native 
agriculturalists for much of their sustenance in the earliest years of settlement.  When 
these Indian suppliers were raided “in harvest time” by Wabanaki aiming to “take away 




The amphibious assault of Agawam in 1631 provides certain telling insights into 
the assailants’ dynamic understanding of the Atlantic and its capacity to enrich and 
sustain their maritime world.  Most notably, Indians continually enhanced their marine 
technology to facilitate the extension of economic and martial authority in the northeast.  
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Winthrop’s peculiar estimation of one hundred warriors storming the Massachusetts 
shore in only three canoes points to the likelihood that Wabanaki were constructing 
large-scale warring vessels that resembled smaller traditional canoes in material 
composition and structural design.  English sailor John Josselyn encountered a similar 
specimen tacking off the southern New England coast in 1638, replete with “a deck, and 
trimmed with sails” atop the birchbark hull, and perhaps conveying another raiding 
party.  The watercraft that landed at Agawam thus further typified Wabanaki’s ability 
and desire to manufacture large-scale oceangoing vessels outside the context of Euro-
American trade, and utilize such technological advances to augment their command of 
Atlantic waters.  Similarly indicative was their booty.  Nearly a century and a half of 
contact with European fishermen acquainted Micmac seafarers with common deep-sea 
tackle, and their plundering of English fishing nets from Mr. Cradock’s wigwam 
reflected that familiarity.  Such technology presumably returned with the Indian raiders 
to their communities where it was put to use in the Indians’ own maritime economy.  
The Wabanaki exploitation of increasingly distant material exchange networks, in sum, 
was directly sustained by their evolving nautical proficiencies, and in turn could enrich 
their longstanding harvest of the ocean’s natural resources.
14
 
 Yet Indians also pursued fundamentally terrestrial solutions in their response to 
the northeast’s demographic permutations and the economic reorientation that followed 
in their wake.  The increasing Euro-American population in Wabanaki homelands 
presented native communities with wider access to the material advantages of Atlantic 
exchange networks.  But successful participation in those complexes also demanded a 
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native economy centered on a more intensive harvest of inland furbearing mammals.  
This paradox of the Wabanaki Atlantic – an Atlantic that encouraged spatial and 
productive disconnection from it in order to successfully exploit its new economic 
opportunities – placed tremendous ecological pressure on the region’s natural resource 
base.  Already by the 1650s and 1660s, the population of furbearers most valued in 
European markets began to dwindle in the Wabanaki interior.  The escalating pace of 
colonial settlement and development of woodland habitats only exacerbated the 
emergent ecological and economic dilemma facing Indian communities, particularly in 
southern Maine where the English presence was most heavily concentrated.  Wabanaki 
hunters and traders subsequently embarked on long-distance migrations to exploit 
newer and more reliable fur sources.   
The English Atlantic world was at this time cohering from and chiefly 
characterized by the extensive mobility of Europeans, many of whom were motivated 
by economic and material opportunity.  As one historian asserts, the experience of 
migration “secured, created, and ultimately defined the English Atlantic world.”  The 
demographic transformations unleashed by this phenomenon in the native northeast, 
however, also functioned as the impetus driving Wabanaki migration to distant locales 
seldom if ever before experienced.  This very process would ironically facilitate 
Indians’ manipulation, exploitation and contestation of that same English Atlantic 
world.
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 The nascent French settlements dotting the St. Lawrence River, entrepôt for the 
rich fur trade of the northern hinterlands, began attracting Wabanaki traders from 
Acadia and Maine shortly after their establishment.  Enjoying a royal monopoly on the 
trade at the time, the Company of One Hundred Associates oversaw all operations 
related to the exchange of beaver with such partners as the Montagnais and Algonquins.  
The company was both curious and suspicious, then, when in 1637 twelve newcomers 
from an obscure Indian group appeared in Quebec inquiring of trade opportunities.  The 
travelers were Wabanaki from the Kennebec River region, interested in cultivating new 
relationships with local Algonquians and French in order to divert their surplus of furs 
to Wabanaki traders far to the southeast.  This more reliable, albeit distant, supply line 
would compensate for the deficiencies in fur production throughout the Dawnland, 
allowing native communities there to continue their now longstanding trade with New 
England.  The Wabanaki visitors at Quebec instead encountered an entirely 
uncooperative and obstinate opposition.  Both Governor Montmagny and Associates 
officials immediately feared that these people would “carry off the Beavers of these 
countries, to take them elsewhere.”  The governor was visibly “displeased that these 
peddlers should come trafficking in the footsteps of the French,” and was not shy about 
conveying these sentiments to a local Montagnais sagamore and the leader of the 
Wabanaki delegation.  The Indian newcomers, however, ignored the disobliging official 
and proceeded to Three Rivers where they hoped to enjoy more success with Algonquin 
traders.  The exasperated governor accordingly informed the French commander at 
Three Rivers, who confiscated the Wabanaki’s firearms and ordered them to return 
home.
16
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 Despite the unfavorable outcome of this initial exploratory mission, the 
prospects for future success were enough to encourage several more Wabanaki journeys 
over ensuing decades.  In 1640, twenty more Kennebec Indians arrived by canoe in 
Sillery, this time transporting an Englishman from southern Maine in search of “some 
route through these countries to the sea of the North.”  As ostensible guides for a 
vainglorious New England colonist, the large Kennebec party successfully forged ties 
with the Algonquian residents settled in this growing Jesuit reserve community.  
Governor Montmagny, however, prohibited the explorer’s journey of discovery, again 
complicating Wabanaki efforts.  Not long after the Englishman was commanded to 
return to New England, several of the Indian guides had suddenly “fallen sick” and 
proved incapable of the long arduous journey back to the southeast.  The governor was 
subsequently forced to procure the adventurer’s “return to England by way of France” 
while the Kennebecs lingered in Sillery.
17
   
During the 1640s, Wabanaki travelers in New France modified their approach to 
this economic pursuit and soon expressed their desire for a resident Jesuit priest in their 
homelands.  By clarifying their interest in establishing non-material bonds between their 
people and the French colony, the Wabanaki believed that dependable economic 
relationships would necessarily accompany them.  In addition to this material 
pragmatism seemingly driving the desire for religious instruction, Indian faith in their 
own traditional spiritual and healing practices possibly began eroding in the wake of 
earlier epidemics that swept through northeastern communities with deadly force.  The 
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Kennebecs succeeded in acquiring a missionary by August, 1646 to assuage these 
multifaceted needs.  Father Gabriel Druillettes, “the only frenchman with two canoes of 
Savages,” departed from Quebec for Wabanakia where he proceeded to learn the native 
language, establish a mission on the Kennebec River, and accompany Indian hunting 
parties on their strenuous winter forays.  Druillettes consequently won the favor of 
many Kennebecs, who also trusted him to negotiate with Massachusetts authorities in 
Boston from 1650 to 1652 for protection against Iroquois incursions.  The priest’s 
diplomatic efforts were in open violation of Massachusetts statutes which, beginning in 
May 1647, strictly outlawed the presence of any “Jesuite or spirituall or ecclesiasticall 
person, (as they are tearmed,) ordained by ye authority of ye pope or sea of Rome.”  
The Kennebec Wabanaki thus solidified religious ties to New France by exploiting the 
Jesuit order’s proselytizing fervor, itself born out of Europe’s post-Reformation 




The strategy of synthesizing material and non-material relationships with New 
France met with a level of success in the 1640s.  Wabanaki visits to the St. Lawrence 
River settlements became commonplace throughout the decade, and not only resulted in 
regular kinship ties with other Algonquian peoples but also in the redirection of furs to 
the southeast.  In July 1649, a contingent of thirty Indian traders from the Kennebec 
region again disembarked at Quebec.  Though initially “notified that they are not to 
come again, and that their goods will be plundered if they return,” the Wabanaki 
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remained for nearly a week and upon their eventual departure managed to “carry away 
20 bundles of Beaver.”  By 1672, this native presence about the French colony had 
hardly abated.  In autumn of that year, “several Wabanaki” gathered near Quebec to 
observe Governor Frontenac administer an oath of fidelity and obedience to a crowd of 
colonial traders and merchants.  The native onlookers were “so touched” by the 
ceremony, and the opportunity to further cement reciprocal socio-economic bonds, that 
they demanded the governor administer the same oath to them, a request which he 
obliged.
19
   
Just as Micmac tapped into the rich trade partnership among Algonquians and 
English in southern New England, so too did southern Wabanaki aim to cultivate 
another access point to Atlantic exchange networks along the St. Lawrence.  Supplies of 
European goods and native agricultural products pillaged from Massachusett and 
Narragansett settlements were regularly shipped far to the northeast where they 
sustained and enhanced Micmac communities.  By the middle decades of the century, 
Wabanaki were also ameliorating their increasingly-depleted terrestrial economy by 
carefully cultivating vital economic and spiritual relationships with the French, all of 
which allowed them to divert greater quantities of furs to their homelands near the sea.  
Here these stores could be utilized to secure more favorable terms among English 
merchants in another exchange network.   
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While some Indians coped with the Dawnland’s changing demographics by 
expanding their terrestrial and seafaring range to exploit more distant sources of 
material wealth, others opted to ameliorate challenges closer to home.  English settlers 
and fishermen who increasingly occupied Maine’s coastline and offshore islands not 
only disrupted native peoples’ economic relationship with their maritime world, but also 
undermined their terrestrial patterns of production and consumption through deceitful 
and belligerent trade practices.  By aggressively confronting such disorder and 
dishonesty in their homelands and waters, Wabanaki could effectively retain their 
spatial and cultural proximity to the ocean while simultaneously redirecting material 
exchange networks to benefit native interests.  This management strategy in large part 
marked a continuation of earlier efforts to maintain economic and cultural autonomy 
under new Atlantic pressures.  Throughout the remainder of the seventeenth century, 
however, such goals were aggressively countered by colonial ambitions to dictate an 
exclusively Euro-American Atlantic world.  Indians who targeted the detrimental 
effects of demographic and environmental transformations increasingly struggled to 
exert a degree of control over the changing character of their maritime world.   
 Wabanaki plans to mediate Euro-American coastal colonization necessitated a 
direct involvement in the initial settlement of English farmers, traders, and fishermen.  
Just as they had actively steered the course of Europe’s exploratory and colonizing 
ventures in the northeast, so too did they exploit opportunities to control the influx of 
English migrants in the 1620s.  As early as 1625, Kennebec sagamores Samoset and 
Unongoit coordinated the settlement of English colonist John Brown from New Harbor, 
granting him permission to establish a homestead near Pemaquid that extended out to 
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“Muscongus Island, taking in the island.”  In recompense for this tract of land, Brown 
paid the headmen “fifty skins,” reportedly to the full satisfaction of all parties involved.  
Incongruent conceptions of land ownership and the legitimacy of authority deeding 
such titles of course troubled relations between Euro and Native Americans throughout 
the colonial period.  Despite confusion over technical understandings of property and 
usage, Samoset and Unongoit’s grant served as a means of managing demographic 
change in their country and directing the tangible benefits of trade that would likely 
stem from Brown’s proximity to native communities.  This opportunity was 
immediately affirmed in their reception of the English settler’s furs.
20
 
Positioning themselves at the center of these demographic developments also 
permitted Wabanaki to enhance the material welfare of their communities in the midst 
of their changing economic culture.  By 1628, Indians were traveling as far as the Isles 
of Shoals ten miles off southern Maine to investigate and trade with the burgeoning 
fishing settlements now occupying the familiar archipelago.  The eagerness of these 
southern Wabanaki to traverse such significant expanses to establish economic 
relationships with Euro-Americans indicated both the sophistication of their nautical 
aptitude and their successful cultivation of direct access points to trans-Atlantic material 
networks.  Such trends further undermined the once impenetrable monopoly enjoyed by 
their northeastern Wabanaki neighbors.
21
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 When Euro-American colonization of the Dawnland’s seaboard proceeded 
outside the purview of native inhabitants, circumventing Indian efforts to mediate its 
course and harness its potential, Wabanaki pursued measures to ensure equitable 
relations along the coast.  Notorious English traders such as Walter Bagnall, who 
frequently cheated Indians from his post on Richmond’s Island off Cape Elizabeth in 
Maine, were eventually subject to the retaliatory aggression of Wabanaki warriors.  
After three years of dishonest dealing and “many abuses,” Bagnall and his family were 
killed in a raid on his island truckhouse in 1631.  Massachusetts governor John 
Winthrop evidently believed that native justice had been properly served, as he chose 
not to pursue, or exacerbate, the matter any further.  Not long thereafter, English 
colonists responded with their own method of justice, and an Indian named Black Will 
was found hanged on the island.  Unsurprisingly, Richmond’s Island continued to be a 
bloody and contested site over ensuing years.  When the fiercely competitive Cleeves 
and Trelawney factions embroiled native traders here in 1636, Wabanaki responded 
with further armed incursions that destroyed significant quantities of settlers’ 
property.
22
   
 The influx of colonial settlement elsewhere along the Maine coast, accompanied 
by further incidents of English trading fraud, encouraged Wabanaki to continually adopt 
a more forceful defense of their economic and cultural interests.  Sir Ferdinando Gorges 
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complained repeatedly in the 1620s of the corrupting influence of English fishermen on 
native relations.  In 1632, trader Nicholas Frost of Damariscove off Cape Newagen 
faced the ire of Massachusetts authorities for stealing furs from nearby Indians.  Five 
years later, John Cosens was similarly ordered to make amends for his dishonest ways, 
and “give full satisfaction to an Indian for wrongs don to him.”  It was little wonder, 
then, that by 1642 Sir Ferdinando Gorges’ nephew Thomas Gorges dreaded the collapse 
of his tenuous settlement in the same region.  The “money is quite gone,” Gorges 
lamented, with “the trade of beaver utterly lost,” a predicament caused by “the Indians 
understanding the valew of things as well as the Inglish” and refusing to settle for any 
terms failing to meet their demands.  Not helping matters was one local merchant’s 
“great loss” a few months prior “in a barke that was cast away at that time in a harbor in 
the bay” loaded with “the Trade commodityes for the Indians.”  By September of 1642, 
local English traders experienced more urgent problems from “divers Insolencies” 
exacted by cheated Wabanaki warriors.  “Mr. Purchase house they broke up” near the 
mouth of the Pejepscot River, whence they “came and toke his goods before his wifes 
face,” Gorges reported.  From other settlements they “stole a quantity of fish.”  
Colonists’ inequitable manipulation of exchange networks not only worked to entrench 
the English presence between Wabanaki communities and their sea, but also threatened 
native interests now being served by new Atlantic opportunities.  Indians’ responses to 
these unsettling pressures aimed to counter the disorder that they unleashed.
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 Despite the aggressive course of action forged by Wabanaki to correct the 
injustices of trade, circumstances largely failed to improve through the middle decades 
of the century.  Rather, the extensive web of material exchange that long served as a 
valuable opportunity emanating from the Atlantic increasingly functioned as a wedge 
with which English settlers penetrated Wabanakia, colonized its coasts, and undermined 
native power.  Kennebec Indians, in particular, bore the brunt of these invasive 
pressures as trading posts gradually spread northeastward after epidemics and a 
deteriorating resource base displaced Indians from the southern Maine coast.  From 
their distant seat of governance, concerned authorities from Plymouth Colony were 
aiming by 1659 to rein in their traders in the region.  After receiving “good information 
that things are in such a posture att Kennebecke” as to foster both a total collapse of the 
industry and widespread native hostility, leaders were demanding answers.  Such 
“troubles amongst the Indians” were caused by “some of them being slayne, some 
carried away, and therby alsoe discurraged,” consequently resulting in “a present 
desisting from theire hunting, and soe a sessacion of the trad.”  Compounding the 
problems were the plethora of settlers “trading wine and other strong liquors with the 
Indians,” who “in theire drunkenes committ much horred wickednes.”  Other anxious 
provincial authorities whose jurisdiction included Casco Bay extended the reach of 
previous laws forbidding “the trayding of any liquors to the Indeans” to encompass “all 
the lymitts of this Province” in 1666.
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Wabanaki’s relationship with their maritime world faced mounting pressure not 
only from traders’ illicit manipulation of Atlantic economic networks, but also from the 
same governmental agencies that occasionally endeavored to curb them.  Indeed by the 
1650s, New England authorities were growing quite cognizant of a profoundly 
dangerous combination; troublesome English-Indian relations plaguing the northeastern 
frontier, coupled with Wabanaki’s seafaring presence, was a calamity in the making for 
the budding colonial projects.  This striking nautical prowess, in fact, was fresh in the 
minds of Massachusetts leaders after one Indian mariner from distant Cape Sable 
arrived in Boston in 1646 having “received & pylated our men home after they were left 
on shore” by French settlers in Acadia.  Legislators promptly voted to compensate the 
native seaman generously for his efforts.  Shortly after laying claim to coastal Maine 
settlements in 1653, Massachusetts likewise passed a statute forbidding the cross-
cultural exchange of valuable English marine technology.  After “takeinge into 
consideration the necessitie of restrayninge from the Indians whatsoever may be a 
means to disturbe our peace & quiet,” the colony declared, no one shall “in any way 
give Sell barter or Dispose of any boate Skiff or any greater vessel unto any Indian or 
Indians…upon penalty of fifty pounds.”  A similar law was jointly passed by colonies 
enjoying trading rights along the Kennebec River, ordering that “noe boates barques or 
any tackling…bee sould to any Indian.”
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New England’s early statutory attempts to police the potentially catastrophic 
dissemination of European nautical equipment testified at once to Wabanaki’s maritime 
reputation as well as to English anxieties over its dire potential.  But in the eyes of 
native northeasterners, a troubling pattern continued to unfold.  The implementation of 
such colonial policies, concurrent with the increasing saturation of southern coastal 
Maine with Euro-American fishermen, farmers, lumberers, and traders who exploited or 
displaced Indian communities, signaled a confluence of threatening pressures.  Now, 
more than any time in their past, Wabanaki faced concerted efforts to disorder and 
reorient their longstanding relationship with their Atlantic world.     
By the 1670s, mistrust and misunderstanding had come to define native-colonial 
relations throughout the wider region.  Many Algonquians to the south of Wabanakia, 
motivated by grievances nearly identical to their northeastern native neighbors, joined 
Wampanoag leader Metacom in armed incursions against English colonialism in 1675.  
More was required, however, to incite open war in the Dawnland.  Most historians now 
understand the conflagration that would engulf northeastern New England from 1676 to 
1677 as an entirely separate incident from King Philip’s War.  Indeed while congruent 
pressures related to land dispossession and fraudulent colonial trade practices plagued 
nearly all northeastern Algonquian communities at the time, these injustices elicited 
divergent responses in the north and south.
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A series of renewed and unmistakable assaults against the Wabanaki’s Atlantic 
relationship served as the impetus finally compelling them to pursue a strategy similar 
to Metacom’s.  Among the most intolerable of these violations was a colonial policy 
that prohibited Wabanaki from possessing firearms.  Massachusetts hoped to contain the 
conflagration of King Philip’s War in southern New England, and orchestrated a 
concerted campaign to disarm all northeastern Indians shortly after the war’s 
commencement.  By 1675, firearms had become critical to Wabanaki’s changing 
economy that now functioned as a component of larger trans-Atlantic networks of 
material exchange.  This Atlantic economy valued the resources of the interior forests 
above those of the ocean, and thereby encouraged native adaptation to European guns to 
facilitate their participation in new exchange complexes.  When Massachusetts banned 
Indian ownership of firearms, the results were thus devastating.  Shortly after its 
implementation, Pemaquid trader Thomas Gardner foresaw the disastrous consequences 
of this policy for colonists and Indians alike, warning Governor Leverett in September 
1675 that “these Indians Amongst us live most by Hunting” and questioning “how we 
Can Take Away their Armes whose livelihood depends of it.”  “These Indians in these 
parts did never Appear dissatisfied until their Arms were Taken Away,” he further 
stressed.  By the following year, Gardner’s suspicions were confirmed after a 
particularly severe winter hunting season.  “Divers the last winter for want of Powder 
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died in the Country,” he and other concerned Pemaquid residents explained to Boston 
officials, “having nothing to kill.”
28
   
Wabanaki, too, issued stern warnings to colonial leaders about the injustice of 
their arms control policy.  In a letter to the “Govanaur of boston” written on behalf of 
his people in 1677, Kennebec sagamore Moxes informed the colony that “we are 
willing to trad with you” but “we want powder.”  “Because there was war at naragans 
[Narragansett],” Moxes protested, “you com here when we were quiet & took away our 
gons” and “for want of our gons there was severall starved” over the preceding winters.  
Despite these distressing setbacks, the headman still wished to dictate Indian terms from 
a position of power, and reminded the governor that “we are owners of the country & it 
is wide and full of engons & we can drive you out.”  Moxes’ ultimatum thus struck to 
the heart of the Wabanaki economic quandary by the 1670s; English colonization 
reoriented Indians’ productive efforts away from the Atlantic to conform with exchange 
networks in it, but now destabilized that new economy by outlawing its chief mode of 
production.
29
    
If any Wabanaki as yet remained skeptical that the disturbing trends coalescing 
throughout the seventeenth century were fundamentally Atlantic-centered or that they 
represented a grave and irrevocable danger to their pelagic autonomy, their doubts were 
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allayed by further colonial acts of maritime aggression.  In July 1676, a crew of English 
seamen led by Captain Laughton approached a coastal Wabanaki community near 
Machias under pretence of trade.  Several of the Indians, many of whom were Micmac 
visiting with one of their sagamores, came aboard the ship to exchange goods with 
Laughton’s men when suddenly they were “most perfidiously and wickedly” captured 
and taken out to sea.  As they had multiple times in the past, those Wabanaki left on 
shore watched as several of their kin were enslaved and forced to endure another 
Atlantic voyage at the hands of Euro-American sailors.  Laughton’s vessel disappeared 
into the eastern horizon “to lands beyond the Sea,” eventually sailing to the Azores 
Islands where his native cargo was unloaded and sold into slavery.  Two Indians 
somehow managed to procure their freedom and return home.  These fortunate few 
certainly proceeded to relate stories of their experiences to kin, contributing once again 
to Wabanaki’s ever-expanding understanding of their boundless and mysterious 
Atlantic world.  Years later, colonial authorities in Boston would acknowledge the 
calamitous fallout from the deceit, “which the Indians in those Parts look upon as an 
Injury done to themselves.”  This “perfidious & unjust dealing of som English,” 
inhabitants of Pemaquid in Maine likewise wrote to colonial officials, was the chief 
“Cause of the Indians Rising.”
30
   
The slave raid along coastal Wabanakia was not an isolated incident of English 
maritime hostility.  While the northwest Atlantic was periodically the locus of tension 
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and violence since the earliest days of native-European contact in the sixteenth century, 
it also served Indians with valuable exchange opportunities linking disparate worlds.  
Native participants in these economic complexes understood their benefits as 
outweighing the cultural threats occasionally accompanying them.  Indeed this dual and 
ambivalent perception of the Atlantic had long been present in native northeastern 
society.  But by the middle of the seventeenth century, the risks began to overshadow 
the rewards.  As early as the 1620s, colonial proprietor Ferdinando Gorges was 
regularly decrying the detrimental effects of Euro-American seamen on Wabanaki 
communities, and foretelling the impending doom such relations would spell for the 
future stability of colonial ventures.  By 1675, Indians were now retreating from their 
coastal settlements at the first sight of Anglo-American seafarers.  Thomas Gardner of 
Pemaquid informed Massachusetts governor John Leverett in that year that the 
Wabanaki so strongly associated the English maritime presence with violence and 
disorder that they “only fly for fear from Any boats or English they see & good Reason 
for they well Know it may Cost them their Lives if the wild fishermen meet with them.”  
When Massachusetts Captain Sylvanus Davis shortly thereafter ordered a community of 
Kennebec Indians to remain encamped within sight of the English garrison at Casco 
Bay, the Indians responded by sending messengers “abroad to Johns River and to the 
Sea Side to get all the Indians they could together to come up Penobscot River.”  
Despite its longstanding status in the Wabanaki cosmology as a progenitor of life-
sustaining opportunity, the ocean had become an unmistakably dangerous stage of 
foreign aggression and violence.
31
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Within a few months of the amphibious assault at Machias, Saco River 
Wabanaki down the coast suffered an equally egregious attack from the east.  Like their 
neighbors, these Saco Indians were one day surprised and assailed by a “rude and 
indiscreet Act of some English Seamen.”  The sudden hostility involved a number of 
sailors who accosted a native party traveling on the sea.  Reportedly curious to 
determine “whether the Children of the Indians as they had heard, could swim as 
naturally as any other Creatures,” the English singled out a mother in one of the canoes 
and “wittingly cast her Child in the Water.”  Nearby Indians struggled desperately to 
save the drowning boy, but to no avail.  Retribution for the murder would not go 
unheeded according to Wabanaki justice, particularly since the native woman and her 
dead child were, unbeknownst to the English seamen, the wife and son of Squando, 
principal sagamore of the Saco River.  The aggrieved headman consequently assumed a 
prominent role in the ensuing war with New England.  As one Kennebec sagamore 
indicated to the Massachusetts government two years later, it was “Squando Ingons that 
did all the hurt.”  The same menacing forces that once afflicted Gluskap’s seaborne 
journeys, it seemed, still lurked among the salty waves, retaining their malevolent 
power.
32
   
 To avenge these maritime assaults, and ensure the protection of their 
communities from similar threats, Indian marine-warriors targeted what they perceived 
to be the locus of this danger.  From 1676 to 1677, Wabanaki launched repeated attacks 
against New England’s Atlantic presence in the northeast, transforming the waters of a 
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lucrative colonial fishery into an extraordinarily perilous and occasionally bloody 
maelstrom.  In the immediate wake of King Philip’s War, this strategic violence also 
exposed the costly frailties and precarious existence of colonial and imperial regimes in 
this corner of the ocean, and the continuing authority of Wabanaki maritime culture and 
nautical force.   
Campaigns of native seaborne violence against the English Atlantic were 
carefully coordinated and skillfully executed by Indian leaders and experienced Indian 
marines.  Mogg Heigon, sagamore from the Saco River region, accumulated a 
formidable Wabanaki navy and spearheaded multiple amphibious assaults in fall of 
1676, boldly declaring to one English captive “how they do in tend to take veseles and 
so to go to all the fishing ilandes and so to drive all the contre before them.”   With their 
vision of a native Atlantic world then fully restored, Mogg believed that his Wabanaki 
forces “hath found the way to burn boston” and deal the coup d'état to English maritime 
colonialism in the Dawnland.  The native headman’s confidence in his nautical prowess 
and naval strategy likely stemmed from his earlier upbringing in close proximity to 
colonial fishing settlements and intimate interactions with coastal traders and fishermen.  
In their histories of colonial Massachusetts, chronicler William Hubbard and royal 
governor Thomas Hutchinson both asserted that Mogg “had from a Child been well 
acquainted with the English” since “He had lived, from a child, in English families.”  
By melding his culture’s rich maritime heritage with a sophisticated knowledge of 
European seafaring technology, the Saco River sagamore enhanced southern Wabanaki 
culture with the proficiencies to enforce and augment their Atlantic vision.
33
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The conspicuous though militarily vulnerable colonial presence in northeastern 
waters offered Mogg Heigon’s warriors a lucrative opportunity to both rectify past 
English misdeeds and confiscate valuable sailing ships.  “Captain Mog,” as colonial 
officials soon titled him, accordingly split his force of one hundred Indian marines into 
two companies, sending one to attack Jewels Island in Casco Bay, while he proceeded 
with the other to the mouth of the Kennebec River where they attacked and seized an 
English fishing shallop.  His crew then sailed to nearby Damaras Cove, “for they had 
intelegence of a catch and a sloop” also anchored there.  The Indians succeeded in 
defeating the English crews, though they were only able to hijack the sloop.  On 
October 12, a month after these initial victories, Mogg’s quickly growing fleet 
succeeded in laying siege to the English garrison at Black Point, the strongest colonial 
fortification on the northeastern frontier.  Later that day, in the campaign’s culminating 
victory, they commandeered a hefty thirty-ton ketch docked at Richmond’s Island to 
load the supplies of fleeing settler, Walter Gendal.  This island, once a valuable sea-
hunting and fishing stage for Wabanaki, had since become a bloody and contested site 
between Indian traders and dishonest and competitive colonial settlers such as Bagnall, 
Cleeves and Trelawney.
34
   
Far from a haphazard ambush, the successful apprehension of Gendal’s large 
cargo ship required a considerable degree of forethought and coordination with the 
ocean’s natural rhythms.  Waiting until they observed “the Wind blowing in hard upon” 
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the English so that “they could not get out of the Harbour,” the Indians commenced 
their attack by pouring heavy gunfire at the ship’s crew.  Meanwhile, some “manned out 
a Canoo with several Hands to cut their Cable” while others continued their 
bombardment of the vessel.  The boat drifted ashore where waiting Indians boarded it 
and procured the surrender of the English.  They then sailed their latest prize up the 
coast.  By enhancing their nautical culture with the acquisition of powerful sailing 
vessels, the Wabanaki force continued an increasingly customary strategy of staving off 
the most invasive aspects of colonialism with Euro-American marine technology.  “I 
know not the cause of your so cruel Irruption upon our people,” an alarmed 
Massachusetts government wrote, pleading with the Indian leader to call off his 
warriors.  Mogg was unwavering, English captive Francis Card later testified, and “doth 
make his brag and laf at the english and saith that he hath found the way to burn 
boston.”  Though his plans for the destruction of Massachusetts never reached 
completion – he was persuaded to sail to Boston to make peace with colonial authorities 
– the tenacity of Mogg’s seafaring exploits further demonstrated the resiliency of this 
maritime power along what was nominally New England’s coast.
35
 
By the following year, Micmac Wabanaki with ambitions congruent to Mogg’s 
Saco River warriors were similarly targeting the English maritime presence.  This 
retributive violence was launched in the immediate wake of the troubling events at 
Machias, where dozens of Indian men, women and children were captured and sold into 
overseas slavery.  Robert Roules, crewman on board the Salem fishing ketch William 
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and Sarah, experienced this retaliatory aggression firsthand, realizing too the utter 
ineptitude of his colony’s authority beyond the shores of southern Massachusetts.  Off 
the coast of southern Nova Scotia, a canoe of ten Micmac quietly approached Roules’ 
ship laying at anchor laden with fish and “came suddenly on board of us” in the early 
morning hours of one July day in 1677.  “With their arms ready fixed, loaded and 
cocked,” the Indians took the entire crew prisoner and bound them together on the deck 
of the ketch, informing them that “they intended to kill all of us, and all the Englishmen, 
being in number twenty six, including boys.”  After rendezvousing the next day with 
four vessels taken by another native naval force, the warriors “commanded us and the 
other ketches to sail together for Penobscot,” Roules related.  Adroitly orchestrating the 
operation was a regional sagamore who ordered his marines – “there being seventy or 
eighty of them” – to disperse themselves evenly throughout the vessels to more 
effectively implement their strategy.  After spotting another English fishing vessel the 
pressed colonial seamen were ordered to come up alongside her, while an oblivious Mr. 
Watts, its captain, noticed nothing alarming about the English crews.  At the right 
moment, the Indians in Roules’ boat suddenly “rose up and told Capt. Watts if he did 
not strike they were all dead men.”  The captain did not hesitate to comply, and his 
ketch was then boarded by a number of Indians who quickly “divided and mixed the 
Englishmen in the different vessels with themselves,” weakening the numerical strength 
of each crew and allowing themselves to more easily maintain control over their 
growing navy.  In this position, Roules recounted, the captive sailors were again 
“commanded to give chase” to another unsuspecting fishing boat passing on the 
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horizon.  Such skillful tactics indicate that Wabanaki continued to resort to a militaristic 
management of their maritime world through properly executed naval strategies.
36
   
Similar native efforts toward a reclamation of the Atlantic had become 
commonplace in New England waters during the summer of 1677.  Wabanaki seafarers 
took “no less than thirteen Ketches of Salem” alone in this season, captivating and 
pressing the crews into their navy’s service, and subsequently striking “great 
consternation into all people” in the colonial port.  Another chronicler lamented the 
surprise of “near twenty of those fishing Ketches” away on voyages to the eastward.  
Once hardy and rugged fishermen now returned to Salem reduced to broken and 
battered casualties clinging to life, like Captain Ephraim How of New Haven, “the only 
survivor of his crew” taken by Micmac warriors, or the “19 wounded men” teetering on 
the brink of death who arrived at the docks one day.  So devastated had the regional 
economy become this summer that John Higginson, Jr. and other residents of Salem 
petitioned the Governor’s Council that “a Vessell with forty or fifty men well-fitted” be 
sent to “recapture their fishing vessels taken by the Indians and to prevent further loss.”  
This plea was hastened by rumors that the “Indians purposed to pursue four more of our 
Ketches.”  In addition to the government’s acquiescence, another “Ketch with 40 men 
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Wabanaki marines went to great lengths to preserve their prize ships seized 
during this war for the Atlantic, and continued to utilize them to enhance mobility and 
maintain a commanding maritime presence.  Commandeering, acculturating and 
conserving foreign sailing technology, furthermore, was often aided by Indians’ 
intimate knowledge of their natural marine environment, including the region’s rugged 
coastal landscape.  In their siege of Richmond’s Island in 1676, for example, Captain 
Mogg’s squadron harnessed an oceanic weather system to successfully coordinate the 
attack.  Such sophisticated nautical skills permitted another crew of Wabanaki seamen 
to elude an English reconnaissance mission prowling the waters around Mount Desert 
Island in summer, 1677.  This force of Salem men – likely defeated fishermen aiming to 
recover their boats and employment – one day “spied a saile coming downe ye river” 
and “made her to be a Ketch” commanded by Indians.  But when the colonists “bore up 
upon her…she claped close upon a wind & shott into a Cruell & most formidable place” 
where the English sailors dared not venture in their larger craft.  Thomas Cobbit and 
John Abbot, English prisoners pressed into service aboard one of Captain Mogg’s 
warships, likewise described how “the Indians made them to sayl for them” up the coast 
and into the mouth of the Sheepscot River, where the vessel “was moored for all the 
Winter” and thus hidden for future use.  Sailing vessels were not incidental spoils of 
war to Wabanaki warriors more focused on terrestrial motives and tactics, but rather 
assets of tremendous importance for maintaining and augmenting a native maritime 
world.  Technology of such significance not only demanded strategic targeting but also 
careful protection after its acquisition.
38
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Indians also valued the maritime labor that often accompanied their prize ships 
during the war, and took steps to guarantee the long-term retention of both.  After 
forcing Thomas Cobbit and John Abbot to anchor Mogg’s newly acquired ship in the 
Sheepscot River for the winter, their Indian captors later “caused the said Abbot to fit 
up the Vessel (being a Pinnace of about thirty Tun)” in preparation for their next 
expedition.  With their English prisoner providing the manpower, the Wabanaki force 
intended to travel back out to sea and up to the Penobscot River, making Abbot “to sayl 
up that River as far as they could and then leaving their Vessel to proceed on with their 
Canooes” to Canada.  Robert Roules’ men were similarly “commanded” by Micmac 
marines “to sail our vessel towards Penobscot” in the summer of 1676.  After they first 
rendezvoused with four other Indian-captured vessels, the native seamen again 
“commanded us and the other ketches to sail together for Penobscot.”  Later, Roules 
was “compelled…to haile” another English ship on the horizon.  Indian mariners had by 
this time not only developed a routine practice of confiscating English ships and 
appropriating their labor, but also sought measures to ensure the longevity and 
productivity of both.
39
   
The intensive efforts of Wabanaki mariners to retain their confiscated ships were 
often so successful that they confounded English authorities, settlers and fishermen 
reconnoitering Atlantic waters in search of them.  Gravely concerned with their 
colony’s deteriorating fishing economy in an increasingly turbulent native Atlantic, 
Boston leaders in early 1677 organized a scouting mission to coastal Maine in hopes of 
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recouping the staggering number of lost fishing boats.  The authorities also assured one 
distraught fisherman that they were “sensibly Affected with the Losse of your sonne, 
together with the takeing of your Ketch” by Indian mariners, and promised to determine 
precisely “what they doe with your Vessels.”  During winter of the same year, Major 
Richard Waldron received vague directives from clueless superiors ordering him to root 
out “the enemy at Kinnebeck or elsewhere,” who were likely residing at inland hunting 
camps during this season, and “with all silence & secresy” secure the “delivery of all 
the Captives & Vessels in their hands.”
40
 
To Wabanaki, sailing ships were also coveted as lucrative bargaining chips able 
to advance native interests during the formulation of peace agreements.  At a conference 
in Maine in 1677, Indian delegates led by the Saco River sagamore Squando willingly 
acquiesced to certain minor concessions regarding English land usage, but grew irritated 
and intransigent when the Massachusetts commissioners repeatedly insisted on the 
return of their watercraft.  Revealing just how indispensible sailing ships had become to 
their native counterparts, the English officials subsequently complained to their 
superiors in Boston that “the greatest difficult[y]” they ran up against with Squando’s 
diplomats concerned “the Restoration of the Ketches.”  It was “contrary to our 
Expectation,” the astonished commissioners announced, when the boats were eventually 
released by Penobscot sagamore Madockawando, but only after tenacious negotiations.  
Seaborne acts of native violence were thus neither chance encounters nor frivolous 
diversions from land-based aggression in 1676 and 1677, but rather calculated and 
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sustained conflicts with unambiguous objectives.  To Wabanaki, nothing short of their 
maritime world was at stake.
41
      
 Colonial authorities and settlers understood as much, and continued ramping up 
their efforts to sever Wabanaki relationships to their ocean.  While native proximity to 
landed sites of English habitation such as farms and lumbering operations also posed a 
tremendous threat to the future security of New England, an Indian command of the 
adjacent saltwater world proved a more pressing problem.  Indeed a successful 
incorporation of the northeastern frontier into larger imperial networks was directly 
contingent on its secure and unimpeded access to the Atlantic and sustained protection 
of the fishery.  Military officers stationed in Maine were thus persuading the 
Massachusetts government by January, 1676, to fortify the coast against Wabanaki 
settlement.  “If the shoare were in some places garrisoned,” Captain Silvanus Davis 
argued, “the fishery (which is the staple comoditie of the country) may be continued.”  
Even long after the quelling of land-based hostilities in early 1678, Salem fishermen 
continued to implore the government to stabilize their threatened fishery.  John Price 
along with “Several other owners of fishing Ketches,” were alerting the Massachusetts 
legislature as late as 1681 that “ye Indians designe to Surprize said Ketches fishing neer 
Cape Sables” in Nova Scotia.  The alarmed mariners, perhaps still reeling from the 
destruction of their trade a few years prior, asked the General Court to direct “ye 
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Comitty of militia of Salem…to press both vessells [and] men to send Into those parts” 
to scour the waters for Indians.
42
 
 The official course of action mandated by colonial leadership during the war 
also took direct aim at the Wabanaki Atlantic.  Just as the statutory patterns of the 1650s 
endeavored to immobilize and police the native maritime presence, so too did New 
York governor Edmund Andros now pursue a strategy to displace Wabanaki from the 
sea and confine them to land.  Andros was granted jurisdiction over much of the Maine 
frontier on behalf of James, Duke of York, to whom a patent to the region had been 
granted in 1665.  When Massachusetts proved unable to effectively manage the 
spreading conflagration by 1677, Andros intervened and quickly implemented a marine 
stratagem.  His chief officer, Lieutenant Anthony Brockholtz, was ordered in September 
to first “secure the Open Sea Coasts and Islands,” carefully ensuring that “no Coasters 
or Interlopers” be allowed on the seas.  Those discovered were to be made prize, 
Andros declared.  “The Indians,” furthermore, were “not to go to ye fishing Islands,” 
nor were any of Brockholtz’s sailors “to trust any Indians.”  Two weeks later, the 
commanding officer at Pemaquid garrison was similarly instructed to allow “no Indians 
to go to the fishing Islands” so as to “prevent all Inconveniencies or occasions of 
difference.”  While Wabanaki relied on the network of offshore islands as stages for 
fishing and hunting expeditions at this time in their seasonal cycle, Mogg Heigon and 
other marine-warriors throughout the region’s waters had also incorporated them in 
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By the war’s conclusion in 1678, then, a distinctive pattern of government action 
had coalesced, and its ominous design was not going unnoticed in Wabanaki circles.  
Buttressed with both state-sponsored and extralegal acts of aggression by colonial 
settlers, sailors, and soldiers, this scheme aimed to cleanse the northwest Atlantic of its 
longstanding native presence.  Only then could the seas be rendered hospitable to New 
England’s vision of the Atlantic world, one more amenable to regional and imperial 
networks of communication and trade.   
 When the conflagration of land and seaborne violence erupted in northern New 
England in late 1675, the previously localized interests of Wabanaki communities 
underwent a process of reorientation.  The disorderly pressures of English colonialism, 
which chiefly included the struggle to contain and redefine the native Atlantic, 
increasingly confronted distinct Indian groups and fostered the transformation  of 
Wabanaki concerns into a more widespread and unified response.  Kennebec warriors 
elected to abandon their settlement on the Kennebec River “and went Eastward” in 
September, 1675 to garner support and unite their efforts with the Penobscots, a group 
that had thus far been tangentially effected by Euro-American settlement.  Kennebec 
envoys were accordingly “sent abroad to [St.] Johns River,” the residence for Maliseet 
Wabanaki far up the Acadian coast, “and to the Sea Side to get all the Indians they 
could together to come up Penobscot River.”  An ancient epicenter of native cultures, 
                                                 
43




 of July read,” August 
2, 1677, in Collections of the Maine Historical Society, V: 17; Council Orders, 11 September 11, 1677, in 
Collections of the Maine Historical Society, V: 18-19; “Orders and Directions for the Commander at 




the Penobscot region was emerging as both a refuge for southern Wabanaki groups 
exposed more directly to the ambit of colonial English power, and a diplomatic center 




 The Atlantic Ocean itself, coupled with Euro-American sailing ships co-opted 
by Indians in it, also facilitated the centralization of Wabanaki interests during wartime.  
As they had for generations, Indians continually adapted their use of the sea as an 
avenue of mobility and a conduit for extending authority beyond the confines of their 
shores.  In so doing, they retained a dynamic, though familiar, connection to the ocean 
by modifying its function to meet new challenges confronting their society.  Before 
launching their naval campaign in fall of 1676, for example, the Indians in Captain 
Mogg’s squadron initially “cam down cenebeck reuer [river],” but after securing a 
number of victories at sea retreated up the coast to the Sheepscot River.  From there, 
one contingent of native seamen sailed back out to sea, ultimately “intending for 
Penobscot,” and “from thence to sayl up that River as far as they could.”  Another party 
proceeded via land and rivers “in a Canoo about fifty five Miles farther to Penobscot.”  
Farther out to the northeast, Micmac mariners also aimed to transport their prize ships 
and captive maritime labor up the Penobscot for a rendezvous with Indians there.  After 
commandeering a Marblehead fishing ketch in summer of 1677, Indian warriors ordered 
the pressed English crew “to sail our vessel towards Penobscot,” though plans were 
later amended in order to join other Micmac ships encountered en route.  The following 
day the newly-mustered convoy was “commanded…to sail together for Penobscot.”  
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Perhaps because of its near equidistance to far removed Kennebec and Micmac centers 
of power, the Penobscot was emerging not simply as a place of refuge for disaffected 
southern Wabanaki, but also as an isolated waterway ideal for secreting away large 
oceangoing vessels.
45
       
 The ascendant political leader of this coalescing conglomeration was himself 
somewhat of a cosmopolitan traveler throughout Wabanakia.  Madockawando was 
originally born along the far northeastern coast of Maine near Machias, likely to 
Maliseet parents.  Machias was also the location of the egregious violation of trust 
during the summer of 1676, when English seamen captured thirty-two native men, 
women and children and sold them into slavery in the Azores.  Madockawando 
achieved his prominent position as sagamore, however, not among a community there 
but far to the southwest as an adopted son of Assiminisqua, sagamore of the Kennebec 
Wabanaki.  When the pressures of English colonization in southern Maine turned 
violent, Madockawando migrated with several Kennebecs to the northeast, where he 
was believed by the English to be “chief Commander of the Indians Eastward about 
Penobscot.”  Indeed the sagamore acquired tremendous respect in the region, and 
earned the allegiance of other Kennebecs who had remained in the south with Squando, 
their headman.  “The cheife Sachems name of kennebeck with whom wee have made 
the peace,” Massachusetts commissioners believed by the end of the war, “is head of all 
the Indians from Piscataqua to Ponobscutt.  Squandos men & all ye Rest having put 
themselves under him.”  The Penobscot sagamore also successfully exercised influence 
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over the Wabanaki navy in 1676, persuading Captain Mogg to travel to Boston to 
secure a favorable peace “in the Name of Madockawando, the Chief of all the Indians in 
the Eastern Parts about Penobscot.”
46
 
Madockawando’s authority among the diversifying community at Penobscot 
also extended to the quickly growing cache of prize sailing ships, an asset of invaluable 
worth to native mariners.  After losing several schooners and sloops to Indians in 1676, 
one fisherman was promised by Massachusetts officials in January 1677 that they would 
get to the bottom of the matter by “goeing to penobscott” to determine exactly “what 
they doe with your Vessells.”  “Wherefore at the said penobscott,” the bewildered 
authorities hoped, “wee shall have full Intelligence of said matters.”  The cocksure 
reconnaissance mission evidently failed, since later that summer English officials were 
still baffled as to the whereabouts of the boats.  When a persistent Lieutenant Anthony 
Brockholtz attempted to secure the return of the vessels at a peace conference in 
August, he was stonewalled by an intransigent Squando.  Days later, however, 
Madockawando arrived and acquiesced to “a Surrender of the Ketches &c. which hee 
with his Indyans assented unto, almost contrary to our Expectation, Wee having but 
slender hopes thereof, & no great Grounds.”  Brockholtz remained so dubious that he 
promised the Andros government “to give notice of the Ketches at their Arrival.”
47
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This transformation of Wabanaki socio-political structure, however, did not 
suddenly emerge during wartime without historical antecedents.  It was instead the 
latest expression of a trend developing for decades.  As early as the 1640s, the 
confluence of native ambitions in the northeast, and the subsequent collaboration of 
distinct Wabanaki ethnic groups, targeted the ever more frequent and increasingly 
insufferable inequities of exchange.  Those Indians who launched retributive raids 
against colonial traders along the southern Maine coast in 1642 were, according to 
trader Thomas Gorges, “noe other…but Kinnebecke Indians” who were joining their 
efforts with other native communities as distant as the Penobscots.  “They have all 
combined themselves together from Penobscot to the [South] to cut off the English,” an 
anxiety-ridden Gorges complained to colonial proprietors in England.  “These meetings 
are often, dangerous words have they vented,” he continued, resulting in “divers 
Insolencies” including the theft of “a quantity of fish” from another trader’s home.  By 
coordinating acts of aggressive resistance in southern Maine with diffuse native 
communities throughout the northeast, Kennebec Indians aimed to ameliorate colonists’ 
unjust manipulations of exchange networks and reassert their longstanding claim to 
coastal Wabanakia.  Such interests were assuming a universal salience among 
Wabanaki people.
48
    
While Indians themselves worked past former animosities in order to augment 
their security and sovereignty, colonial leaders at times reinforced this centralizing 
tendency in Wabanaki society.  Rawandagon, principal headman of the Kennebec 
Indians by the 1650s, enjoyed his authority in part from his geographic proximity to the 
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ocean near the mouth of the Kennebec River, and consequently to English traders, 
fishermen and settlers.  Robin Hood, as he became known to local colonists and distant 
officials, not only enhanced his prestige with the economic fruits of these valuable 
relationships, but was also endowed with a privileged authority from a colonial 
government striving to enforce its own agenda.  After receiving complaints from several 
frontier settlers concerning the destruction of their livestock in the summer of 1667, the 
Massachusetts General Court directed their efforts to exact restitution to “Robin Hood 
Chief Sachem of the Indians about Kenibeck.”  Numerous settlers observed “Some of 
your men,” the legislators pointed out, “ Shooting, wounding, and killing sundry of their 
Swine and Cattle, and in Cutting the flesh from the bones and carrying away the flesh of 
their Catle so killed.”  To rectify these misdeeds, Rawandagon was ordered to make 
“Speedy Satisfaction” and ensure that “his subjects” committed nothing of the sort 
again.  If any English colonist were to act unjustly in the future, the General Court 
further added, the sagamore was to “be assured of Our justice” instead of pursuing 
customarily Wabanaki methods of preserving equity.  By regarding Rawandagon as 
chiefly culpable for the violent actions of nearby warriors, colonial authorities 




Both French and English colonists also employed European material goods, 
including sumptuous gifts, to promote favored sagamores into prominent and stable 
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leadership positions benefiting colonial designs.  Though well over a century old by the 
1670s, the struggle to Europeanize Wabanaki political structures via European material 
culture now assumed a greater urgency.  The expansion of colonial settlement, the 
emergence of competing imperial claims to the northeast, and a growing recognition of 
the need for tranquil Indian relations in this borderland region encouraged Euro-
Americans to centralize native authority.  “The leader and chiefs” of the northern 
Micmac of Gaspé, for example, were regularly invited by French officials “for a meal in 
order to show to all the Indians of the nation that they are esteemed and honoured,” 
according to Catholic missionary Chrestien LeClercq.  At other times, sagamores were 
gifted with “something like a fine coat, in order to distinguish them from the 
commonalty.”  To Wabanaki headmen, such prestige goods originating from exotic 
sources were imbued with tremendous power, “especially if the article has been in use 
by the commander of the French.”  Before authorizing the release of an English captive 
aboard Mogg’s fleet in 1676, Penobscot sagamore Madockawando demanded “a fine 
Coat, which they had for him aboard the Vessel” and which he subsequently insisted on 
inspecting.  “Upon sight of the said Coat” the headman “seemed very well satisfied” 
and offered the prisoner in exchange.
50
  
Yet the exchange of mundane material objects esteemed as prestigious or 
aesthetically appealing in the moral economy of the recipient was not a unilateral 
phenomenon.  As various native producers would continue to demonstrate over the next 
century, the practice could also extend from the Indian communities of Wabanakia to 
Europe, bonding the cultures of each via non-pecuniary channels.  Not long after his 
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arrival among the Micmacs in 1675, Father LeClercq marveled at the Indians’ 
utilization of various plant dyes to stain “their quills of porcupine a beautiful brilliant 
red.”  With these tools the Indian artisans “ornament their canoes, their snowshoes, and 
their other works which are sent into France as curiosities.”  Native-manufactured 
maple syrup, too, achieved a coveted status in the metropole.  LeClercq detailed its 
“very remarkable” genesis in the hardwood forests and camps of the northeast, thereby 
accentuating its fundamentally primitive and native development, before noting that “it 
is formed into little loaves which are sent to France as a curiosity.”  By way of their 
customary cultivation of natural resources unique to the Dawnland, Wabanaki thus 
procured for themselves a level of diplomatic and social prestige in an imperial network 
of aesthetic taste and material culture.
51
    
 Native responses to the colonial forces of Atlantic dispossession and 
disorientation thus cohered into a discrete pattern by 1678.  Over the course of the 
seventeenth century, as the disruptive pressures of Euro-American traders, fishermen, 
settlers and governing authorities threatened to realign the Indian maritime world, 
Wabanaki communities increasingly coordinated their adaptive – and sometimes 
resistant – strategies in order to mitigate the disorder and disarray that accompanied 
these developments.  This centralizing trend in the native northeast, furthermore, 
emerged and developed as a direct response to a native maritime identity progressively 
imperiled by colonial efforts to disconnect and distance Indians from their Atlantic.  
When Indians realigned their communities’ local interests to augment a more 
widespread collective response to Atlantic colonialism, furthermore, they marked a 
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significant disjuncture from the ways Atlantic processes were hitherto functioning in the 
Dawnland.  Whereas the economic competition engendered by new material exchange 
networks once wrought division and antagonism between Wabanaki sagamores intent 
on securing access to and maximizing the benefits of these systems, the fraudulence, 
expansionism, and belligerence that oftentimes accompanied these opportunities now 
encouraged cohesion and a common collective course of action.  Formerly a source of 
factionalism, by the end of the war in early 1678 the Atlantic had become the powerful 
impetus for centralizing Wabanaki interests. 
 The truce brokered by Madockawando and the Andros and Massachusetts 
commissioners in August, 1677 was confirmed at a formal treaty conference the 
following spring in Casco Bay.  By that time, Wabanaki’s wartime strategy culminated 
in success; the English colonial presence on the lands and waters of Maine had been 
essentially eradicated, its settlers expelled and driven far to the south.  Yet the striking 
native concessions in the peace-making process revealed a more complex and prescient 
Wabanaki vision for their post-bellum world.  Indians’ “Surrender of the Ketches” 
coupled with their permission of colonial resettlement in southern Maine, for example, 
would afford them once again a more equitable, secure and profitable role in Atlantic 
exchange networks.  Equally vital to native interests was an additional stipulation 
requiring all returning English families to give in tribute one peck of corn each year to 
local sagamores.  This customary symbol of subjection would accordingly mark 
colonial resettlement as a process fundamentally dictated and managed by Indians.  The 
peace, in sum, signaled Wabanaki’s quest not for a northeast purged of English 
occupation, or even an Atlantic world purified of foreign influence, but a Dawnland and 
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ocean that would once again serve to sustain, enhance and enliven its People.  Ashore 
and afloat, the regeneration of Wabanakia would be the prerogative of Wabanaki.
52
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“His Majesty’s livery,” “the King’s presents,” and a “Sea of trouble”: Manipulating 
Power and Prestige in an Imperial World 
 
The Wabanaki and English signatures on the Casco Bay peace treaty in 1678 did 
not simply mark the formal cessation of hostilities.  In the minds of native delegates, the 
agreement laid forth their vision of a post-war world where the Atlantic would once 
again serve as a locus of spiritual and material nourishment for their communities.  
Expunged from Wabanakia’s terrestrial and saltwater worlds was the disorder unleashed 
by English colonial encroachment on native resources, violence against native coastal 
and inland communities, and restricted native access to the sea.  These cumulative 
pressures threatened to redefine and reconfigure a Wabanaki maritime identity forged 
over generations of contact with the ocean and its generative power.  When native 
sagamores sketched their marks on the parchment along the wave-swept shores of 
Casco Bay in spring of 1678, they did so knowing that they themselves successfully 
dictated the terms of that longstanding identity.  In the future, the treaty stipulated, 
English settlers would be allowed to return to southwestern Wabanakia, but only if they 
paid an annual tribute to the region’s sagamores. 
But this new postbellum status quo proved ephemeral.  Renewed pressures of 
English colonialism in the Dawnland after 1680 reintroduced many of the same 
problems that Indians confronted earlier in the century.  This chapter explores the brief 
regeneration of a native Atlantic amenable to Wabanaki interests in the wake of warfare 
in 1678, a development that was soon endangered by revived English efforts to disrupt 
and realign this world’s structure.  It argues that Indians once again looked to both 
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familiar and novel Atlantic opportunities to mitigate these disruptions, this time by 
embarking on long-distance migrations, elaborating a trans-Atlantic diplomatic strategy, 
exploiting an escalating imperial conflict, and orchestrating another campaign of 
maritime violence.   
Native refugees fleeing their war-ravaged homelands in southern Wabanakia 
before and after the peace settlement in 1678 sought out another conduit to Atlantic 
processes along the St. Lawrence River.  Through their newly-forged relationships with 
French settlers and colonial authorities, Indians participated in more equitable material 
exchange networks while preserving connections with their kin who chose to remain 
near the sea.  These bonds, along with older ones maintained with New England, also 
provided the structure through which Wabanaki cultivated an affinity with European 
monarchs that they hoped would extend royal benevolence to their communities.  By 
invoking the paternal affection of English and French royalty, Indians hoped to achieve 
a measure of socio-economic capital in a growing imperial system.  When their 
affective ties to England’s Stuart dynasty were severed by the Glorious Revolution, 
Wabanaki compensated for the loss by developing kinship bonds to France’s King 
Louis XIV.  Indians also shrewdly manipulated the imperial conflagration touched off 
by the Glorious Revolution to strike at the English maritime presence and plunder its 
ships, sailors and wealth.  This campaign of aggression, often augmented with Louis 
XIV’s material and emotional support, wreaked havoc on the English fishing economy 
and the Royal Navy’s dependency on Dawnland forests for ship stores.  Wabanaki 
power ashore and afloat threatened to undermine the English imperial system that 
stretched throughout the Atlantic.   
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These developments once again pointed to the ingenuity and dynamism that lay 
at the heart of the Wabanaki Atlantic vision.  Their understanding of the sea and its 
manifold opportunities was neither static nor rigid.  This native maritime world was not 
resistant to changing pressures unleashed by Euro-American movement around the 
ocean and in their homelands.  Like that of their ancestors, Indians at the turn of the 
eighteenth century possessed an evolving perception of a materially-, geographically- 
and culturally-expansive Atlantic.  Only by maintaining such a dynamic conception of 
their eastern world could Wabanaki hope to manage the disruptive forces that emerged 
from it and that threatened to disorient their longstanding relationship to it.  Indians thus 
engaged in an ongoing struggle to control the pressures redefining their maritime 
identity and refashioning the ocean’s significance for them.  
 
 The Wabanaki signatures on the Casco Bay treaty in 1678 revealed a striking 
native strategy to circumscribe the forces threatening their Atlantic vision.  The vast 
majority of signatories represented Indian communities far to the northeast of Kennebec 
River, in locales tangentially disrupted by English settlement far to their southwest and 
the fierce hostilities that decimated several neighboring native groups.  This 
concentration of political authority away from the colonial presence and around the 
Penobscot River region under the sagamore Madockawando had begun in the years 
leading up to war in 1675, and would exert a commanding influence over subsequent 
peace talks throughout the next century.  The emerging regional primacy of the 
Penobscots was also strengthened by their growing immigrant population.  Fearing a 
reoccurrence of colonial violence and disorder that would inevitably accompany 
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returning New Englanders, southern Wabanaki refugees fled their shattered homeland 
to join the increasingly-powerful Penobscot communities to the northeast.  Here they 
could sustain their longstanding relationship to the ocean further removed from colonial 
pressures to the south.  Yet they also embarked on a long-distant exodus to establish 
more permanent relations within another trans-Atlantic nexus along the St. Lawrence 
River.  To these native communities, insulation from the stresses of colonial aggression 
and a deteriorating land and maritime resource base necessitated movement away from 
the ocean itself, but also a cultivation of more favorable Atlantic opportunities.  
Wabanakia’s shifting demography by 1678 thus explains the generous terms offered to 
recent enemies who wished to reoccupy lands up to their former line of settlement.
1
   
 Like the Wabanaki peregrinations from the northeast to New France earlier in 
the century, these migrations to the St. Lawrence Valley were prompted by a desire to 
widen and diversify their access to trans-Atlantic exchange networks.  Native 
communities who determined that the risks associated with English neighbors 
outweighed their rewards found a viable and more secure alternative.  Beginning in 
1677, Indians from southern Maine were regularly settling in the village of Sillery 
outside the city walls of Quebec.  The pioneers were certain to bring with them “great 
quantities of furs” with which they immediately assessed the benefits of this foreign 
exchange network, while also fostering stable and long-term socio-economic 
relationships in a new society.  These transactions and diplomatic maneuvers, however, 
were likely also intended to paper over the ambivalence native newcomers felt about 
severing their ties to English trade networks and native kin who remained behind in 
their ancestral homelands close to the sea.  French colonial leaders were evidently 
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attuned to this by 1679, and expressed apprehension over engaging too closely with 
people who also enjoyed a “great market” and a “very advantageous” postwar treaty 
with New England.  Exacerbating these worries was the abject poverty and meager 
agricultural conditions that were coming to define Sillery, a reality officials feared 
could quickly drive fickle Wabanaki refugees back to the southeast.
2
  
Despite the anxieties of French authorities, the embarkations of war-ravaged 
refugees from the Dawnland resulted in a more permanent demographic transformation 
of the region.  Southern Wabanaki who in increasing numbers took up residence in 
mission villages along the St. Lawrence River after 1675 did not simply seek to divert 
locally-abundant resources to English markets in southern New England, as did their 
speculating predecessors in the 1630s and 1640s.  Their migrations instead culminated 
in a more lasting, albeit oftentimes tenuous, settlement that regularized relations with 
civil and religious powers in the French colony.  Much of this association was 
precipitated by Quebec’s changing attitude toward Dawnland immigrants.  In the early 
1680s, Jesuits invested more resources to improve and expand the growing mission at 
Sillery, a decision that coincided with Governor La Barre’s diplomatic policy of 
sending Wabanaki dispatches to their southeastern kin “to carry thither his gifts, and to 
Invite all the abnaquis who remain in Acadia to come to Join those whom we have 
Here.”  Displaced native communities in southern Maine consistently took advantage of 
the favorable environment emerging from these developments, and by 1685 the number 
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of migrants to the St. Lawrence River hamlets exceeded fifteen hundred.  “Still others 
are expected every Day, who are to arrive from Acadia,” a buoyant Father Jacques 
Bigot wrote, “and they themselves say that soon all the rest who are in acadia will 
come.”
3
     
When Indians felt that their new colonial neighbors were neglecting their 
kinship obligations to them, they creatively sought to rekindle French hospitality and 
remind colonists of the indispensability of their native alliances.  By 1685, many of the 
same problems involving liquor and fraudulent trading that plagued Wabanaki-English 
relations to the southeast were beginning to jeopardize relations in New France.  
Disaffected Indians subsequently voiced their anger to a familiar arbiter.  Black Robes, 
they by now understood, could be marshaled to advocate for their interests as was 
Gabriel Druilletes with New England authorities in the 1650s.  Wabanaki accordingly 
warned Father Bigot of their intentions to depart Sillery for the Dawnland in the early 
1680s, explaining that they left “the English solely because they tormented us too 
much” but now the French “get drunk here” and “are as wicked as the English.”  The 
nervous Jesuit quickly reassured them of their earlier decision to settle in New France, 
and implored them to consider the spiritual and physical danger of returning to the 
neighborhood of the English in the southeast.  “Thou are more miserable here than in 
Acadia, I know,” Bigot pleaded, “but here thou prayest.”  “Every one there will try to 
make thee intoxicated…thou wilt die, without being able to return hither; thou wilt cast 
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thyself into the underground fire.”  To Bigot, such crafty persuasion successfully 
quelled native concerns when they decided to stay put.  Yet the disaffected Indians 
cleverly elicited the affirmation they desired.  In a similar way they also played on the 
spiritual fears of the religious leader to maintain an unfettered mobility in the region 
without severing ties to either their new French hosts or their relatives in the Dawnland.  
When a native contingent approached Bigot desiring to restore kinship bonds with those 
remaining in their former communities, the missionary “consented to their return to 
Acadia” only after they vowed to “seek out the rest of their kinsmen, – in order, as they 
say, to pray for their return.”
4
    
Religious sectarianism emanating from Europe thus functioned as an important 
avenue by which Wabanaki cultivated new imperial relationships and accessed more 
equitable Atlantic exchange networks.  By learning to navigate the post-Reformation 
marketplace for souls that had been superimposed on their homeland, Indians carefully 
manipulated European anxieties to secure a more stable, fruitful and unfettered presence 
in the French colony, one that conformed to their own interests yet was valued by the 
colonial regime’s civic and religious leadership.  This status subsequently afforded 
Indians a more extensive and diversified access to Atlantic opportunities than was 
available in the Dawnland.     
 Through extensive networks of communication established by native travelers, 
Indians along the St. Lawrence were simultaneously discovering what they already 
feared to be true concerning their ancient homelands.  The opportunities for more stable 
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kinship bonds with Euro-Americans were increasingly impossible for relatives and 
neighbors who remained near the sea in the southeast, a declining population that now 
numbered roughly fifteen hundred in the 1680s.  This reality cut to the very heart of 
southern Wabanaki’s cultural identity, forcing them to make a stark choice about their 
future.  The outlook of their longstanding Atlantic vision – their relational 
understanding of the ocean and its processes in the Dawnland – appeared entirely 
different when cast alongside English colonialism in northern New England and French 
colonialism along the St. Lawrence River Valley.
5
  
The great postwar migration of southern Wabanaki into the 1680s was 
precipitated not only by their efforts to exploit lucrative socio-economic networks via 
New France, but also by pressing concerns over the revival of English Atlantic 
colonialism in their devastated homelands near the sea.  Not long after the ink was dry 
on the peace treaty at Casco Bay in 1678, colonial authorities in Boston embarked on a 
joint economic and military strategy to secure once again the waters of the northwest 
Atlantic and reintegrate their productivity into a larger imperial economy.  This 
enterprise necessarily entailed renewed efforts to dislocate natives’ maritime presence 
and prevent their convenient access to the ocean and its resources.  After Governor 
Andros’ commissioners first obtained “a promise of returning several vessels the 
Indians had surprised,” the Massachusetts General Court ordered “that a Small fort be 
erected about Casco bay” along with military barracks for its defense.  The impetus for 
this security measure was news in Boston that “several fishermen settled and returned to 
inhabit there.”  In order to avoid the debacles at sea that plagued New England during 
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the 1670s, fishermen were now “forced to have Arms & Ammunition” by direct order 
of the colony’s governing leaders.  New England’s resettlement of the southern Maine 
coast provided colonial officials with a precious opportunity to reassert their claim to 
regional waters, and fortify the seamless transference of its productivity into England’s 
imperial economy.
6
   
Andros’ scheme to forge a sudden and sturdy coastal presence in Maine 
eventually paid dividends.  Into the mid-1680s, settlers cautiously trickled in from the 
sea  and returned to their former farms and estates.  The governor responded to this 
encouraging news by ordering a further line of coastal garrisons to extend northeast 
beyond Casco Bay.  Several “Good Forts” accordingly sprung up at “several 
Convenient places” like Pemaquid and Pejepscot Falls, and were “Garrison’d with Stout 
Hearts…[so] the Indians might be kept from their usual Retreats, both for Planting, and 
for Fishing, and lye open also to perpetual Incursions from the English.”  By ensuring 
the “well governing and protection of the people there & prevention of trouble by 
Indians,” the new fortifications from Casco Bay to Pemaquid thus breathed new life into 
a former strategy doomed by native campaigns of violence ashore and afloat in the 
1670s.
7
   
When New England colonists began to reoccupy their former settlements 
elsewhere in the ashes of southern Wabanakia in the 1680s, they gradually resumed 
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their environmental transformation of the region to meet the economic demands of 
growing communities.  This exploitation of Dawnland resources involved a 
reintroduction of familiar English modes of production and consumption, and impinged 
directly on Wabanaki communities’ economic relationship with the ocean.  English 
fishermen did not confine their work-related tasks to the open sea or even to the coast, 
but often ascended the river systems into the Maine interior to harvest alewives, a staple 
bait fish used in Atlantic fisheries.  From these rivers fishermen also consumed 
sturgeon, salmon and other anadromous fish migrating up the region’s countless rivers 
from the ocean.  Riverine estuaries were also harnessed for renewed timbering 
operations in southern Maine.  When colonists’ began constructing nets and seines in 
the Saco River in the 1680s, Wabanaki communities upriver were subsequently 
deprived of vital Atlantic resources upon which they had relied for generations.  Indians 
were soon quite vocal in maintaining that absolutely no fishing rights had been granted 
to returning settlers in the Casco Bay treaty of 1678.  Resentment and suspicion began 
saturating the post-war northeastern borderlands.
8
  
So too did English pastoralism.  The same quadruped agents of empire that 
frequently represented the avant-garde of colonial settlement to nearby native 
communities again reappeared with their owners.  As southern Wabanaki learned during 
the preceding decades, English livestock not only embodied the spirit of boundless and 
intrusive persistence that lay at the heart of their owners’ imperial designs, but also 
reinforced that imperialism by ensuring physical sustenance and cultural entrenchment.  
Domestic creatures assuaged colonists’ hunger pangs as well as their anxieties over the 
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successful replication of English husbandry in Wabanakia.  By the 1680s, cattle were 
also allaying their own appetites on offshore islands inhabited by Indians communities 
who long valued them for their convenient access to deepwater maritime resources.  To 
livestock owners, the same islands provided ideal enclosures for grazing their 
meandering property.  Angered by this threat to their economy by the end of the decade, 
as well as by the perpetual colonial neglect of their grievances, Wabanaki would strike 
back at “the English, in Suffering, if not Turning, their Cattel over to a certain Island,” 
as one English observer noted.
9
   
The renewed environmental exploitation of Indian land in southern Maine thus 
further signaled the troubling return of problems purged in the war of 1675.  Native 
maritime culture in the region now confronted another coastal line of English 
settlements, livestock and fortifications that collectively structured a renewed campaign 
to displace Indians from their saltwater world and confine them to a less threatening 
presence in the landlocked interior.  To Indians long dependent on the sea as a critical 
environmental resource, the revival of these problems continued to strain their marine 
economy and restrict their seafaring mobility.  The Wabanaki maritime identity in 
southern Maine was, of course, already undergoing modification as new economic 
pressures focused native productive capacities away from the ocean by encouraging the 
mass harvest of terrestrial furbearing mammals.  Yet the sea’s longstanding, albeit now 
attenuated, centrality to native culture was too powerful to simply dissolve under the 
buffeting of these waves.  It instead found ways to endure.  Indians struggled evermore 
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diligently to sustain their seasonal harvest of the sea and their visible presence on its 
waves, both of which could maintain their maritime identity.  The troubling colonial 
developments since 1675 thus represented an ongoing threat to reorient adjacent waters 
away from the Wabanaki Atlantic and into the English.  
The native Atlantic vision secured in the violence and peacemaking of the mid-
1670s, whereby the sea and its productive capacity sustained and enriched Indian 
culture, continued to unravel over the course of the following decade.  Just as colonial 
resettlement quickly obstructed the flow of maritime resources to native communities in 
southern Maine, so too did it reintroduce trade relationships fraught with violence, 
liquor and fraud and designed to manipulate networks of economic exchange to serve 
English colonial interests.  Throughout the 1680s, settlers increasingly amplified their 
complaints about the pervasiveness of alcohol among neighboring Indians, who now 
regularly visited their homesteads and committed drunken acts of violence.  With the 
luxury of hindsight, Massachusetts leaders came to understand the troubling effects of 
thes interactions.  Even Puritan minister Cotton Mather lamented the “Common Abuses, 
in Trading; viz. Drunkenness, Cheating, &c. which such as Trade much with them are 
seldom innocent of,” and whose devastating effects increasingly elicited aggressive 
Wabanaki responses.  Thus, the threats that imperiled the restored native Atlantic world 
stemmed from the very same pressures that soured English-Wabanaki relations earlier 
in the century.
10
       
Settler abuse of material exchange networks, systems that by now functioned as 
longstanding catalysts integrating Wabanaki into a larger Euro-American Atlantic 
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world, revived as early as the summer of 1678, just months after the signing of the 
Casco Bay peace treaty.  In July, Nathaniel Maisters presented trader Benjamin 
Trustrum to authorities at Wells, at which point it was determined that Trustrum “sould 
8 gallons of wine at one tyme to the Indeans” in addition to profiting from “a great 
deale of Trade” with them.  Similar tactics became increasingly common over the next 
three years.  By 1681, the Duke of York’s new government in the Province of Maine 
was troubled to learn “that severall persons do let the Indeans have lyquors and other 
strong drinkes.”  Their response to this escalating problem was to strengthen previous 
statutes prohibiting the trade of alcohol by requiring violators to “forfitt their whole 
Estate.”  Such legal muscle-flexing failed to deter Richard Seacomb, who in May 1682 
was “Convicted for selling of Lyquors to the Indeans” by a Court of Pleas at Wells.
11
   
Such contaminating beverages emerged quite literally in the Dawnland from 
Atlantic waters.  English ships docking at the region’s tiny port hamlets were frequently 
loaded with alcohol, and their seamen were among the most egregious transgressors of 
local laws.  The General Assembly at York accordingly targeted in June 1682 “any 
vessell Comeing into any harbour, Cricke or port that shall bring in her any strong 
water, wine, or any other kind of strong drinke.”  If “any person Comeing in her or 
belonging to the vessel…shall presume to sell or give from aboard said vessel…any 
kind of strong drinke to any Indean or Indeans whatsoever,” the legislators declared, 
“the vessel, appurtenances & all her Cargoe shall bee forfeited.”  Despite such efforts, 
the situation at Wells continued to deteriorate by 1685.  Court officials there were 
informed that cheated Wabanaki “have beene seene to ly Drunke almost at every doore, 
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& that there hath beene frequent abuses that way.”  Fearing the tremendous threat this 
posed to the security of their weak and sparsely populated communities, beleaguered 
authorities decreed that “it shall bee taken for granted that those houses nearest 
Adjaycent to any Indeans lying in any such drunken Capacity, shall be Accounted the 
very places where those Indeans have received there Lyquors.”  The extralegal 
exploitation of Indian trade through alcohol trafficking had again become commonplace 
in the coastal towns and forests of southern Maine, and the inability of New England 




 The disturbing confluence of these Atlantic colonial pressures in the Dawnland 
was amplified by English settlers’ increasing disregard of a symbolic gesture mandated 
by the Casco Bay treaty.  Returning families were permitted to reoccupy their former 
settlements only if they made an annual tribute payment of a peck of corn to local 
sagamores.  The Indian victors of 1678 intended this yearly ritual to reorder Wabanaki-
English relations in a way that permitted a colonial presence yet facilitated the 
maintenance of a distinctly native Atlantic vision, one in which the ocean and its 
variegated processes were put to the service of Indian interests.  John Boden of Black 
Point, for example, described how Penobscot sagamore “Madokawando made it his 
Practice for many years to demand a Peck of Corn yearly of the English Planters there,” 
and that Boden’s family along with “many of the said English Planters used to give him 
a Peck of Corn accordingly.”  Richard Webber, another compliant resident of that town, 
similarly noted “that several of the English Planters there used to pay the said 
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Madokawando a Peck of Indian Corn yearly by Way of Acknowledgment, That he was 
the Sachem of the said Tribe.”  Yet with the influx of English men, women and 
livestock and the mass construction of coastal fortifications to re-secure their fishery, 
the attitude of the Bodens and Webbers of postwar Maine was gradually replaced by 
that of colonials who “refused to pay that yearly Tribute of Corn.”  When the same 
settlers further violated the treaty by pushing beyond the former line of settlement, the 
disregard of their symbolic obligations represented an even more egregious defiance.
13
   
These troubling developments affected most acutely the diverse Wabanaki 
community beginning to cohere under Madockawando at Penobscot in the 1670s.  
Representatives of these communities including Madockawando himself, largely 
removed from the ambit of New England’s presence in southern Maine, dictated most 
of the treaty’s terms.  When resettlement proceeded in open violation of these terms and 
encroached ever closer to their nexus of authority, the Penobscot communities 
unsurprisingly assumed the mantle to enforce these promises.  Significant support for an 
aggressive and meaningful response to a revived Atlantic colonialism came also from a 
recently-adopted kinsman who provided a direct link to French imperial interests.  
Baron Jean-Vincent d’Abbadie de Saint-Castin, a young French military officer from 
the landed aristocracy in France, was sent as second-in-command of a mission to the 
Penobscot region in 1670.  His decision to remain behind and settle there after his 
regiment departed for Quebec would produce a long lineage of Métis and contributed to 
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solidifying local French-Wabanaki bonds.  Madockawando adopted Saint-Castin into 
his community through the marriage of the sagamore’s daughter, and the resultant 
kinship ties channeled French goods, including weapons, from Port Royal and other 
Acadian fortifications into the Penobscot River communities.  The singular figure of 
Saint-Castin thus joined Wabanaki immigrants as valuable liaisons to French exchange 
networks and diplomatic alliances.
14
   
 The Penobscots’ regional ascendancy in the social and political life of 
Wabanakia positioned their warriors to play a critical role in fortifying its interests.  As 
a rendezvous for native marines and their ships throughout northeastern waters during 
the 1670s, and as the burgeoning center for displaced Wabanaki peoples and their 
adopted kin, the extensively-networked Penobscot community now orchestrated an 
aggressive response to the reemerging threats again endangering their maritime vision.  
Madockawando’s guidance was central to this corrective campaign.  When Moxes, 
principal sagamore of the Kennebec River in 1684, reluctantly acknowledged that “all 
his men have left him, and that he has no control over them,” he testified to the local 
renown of Madockawando’s leadership and its enduring attraction to native refugees 
from southwestern Maine.  Through his recent diplomatic overtures with Saint-Castin, 
Madockawando solidified his prestige in the Penobscot River valley, and subsequently 
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wielded this authority to allay the disorder expanding northeastward from New 
England’s resettlement.
15
   
With the support of his communities, the Penobscot sagamore executed this goal 
by appropriating a proven strategy of verbal harassment accompanied, if necessary, by 
violence against intrusive symbols of English Atlantic colonialism.  Indians who 
vocalized their threats to nearby colonists in the winter of 1683-1684, for example, 
emphasized their intentions “to attack Pemaquid Fort first,” one of Governor Andros 
maritime defense projects aimed at protecting the colonial presence on the northwest 
Atlantic.  Casco Bay, also fortified to augment the fishery, was similarly threatened by 
Indians to the point where “the inhabitants have laid aside all business to strengthen 
their defences.”  One prominent farmer in the same region was likewise unnerved to 
discover “a token left at his house by an Indian, warning him to fly with all speed.”  
Near the coastal town of Wells, colonists were shocked by certain “bould Attempts of 
the Indeans in killing & wounding of severall Cattle,” a tactic that proved effective 
when authorities there suspected “that they intend some further Mischeefe.”  These 
threats, colonial authorities came to believe, were “instigated by one Casteen, a 
Frenchman, by whom they have been promised a shipload of goods,” while 
“Medockawanda, a great Sagamore…is said to be the chief person” spearheading the 
operations and “again raising insurrection.”  In desperation and anger, authorities made 
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repeated attempts in spring of 1684 to summon the Penobscot sagamore and his French 
kinsman, a plea to which the Penobscot leaders were in no hurry to acquiesce.
16
 
Wabanaki themselves were becoming aware of their new ethnic identity under 
Penobscot leaders like Madockawando.  This consciousness was also heightened in 
verbal and physical acts of violence.  Though Atlantic socio-economic pressures 
initially engendered competition and hostility between Wabanaki communities in the 
earliest years of their encounters with European seafarers, the violence and aggression 
that often accompanied those processes gradually fostered a common identity among 
these formerly divided communities.  The interests of disparate Micmac, 
Passamaquoddy, Penobscot and Kennebec Wabanaki around the maritime northeast 
cohered around a loose idea of Indianness in the face of English efforts to redefine these 
peoples’ relationship to the ocean.  When native warriors congregated by sea and land 
at Madockawando’s ascendant Penobscot River headquarters during the belligerent 
1670s, and used it as a strategic staging ground for naval raids against English ships, 
they revealed just how potent this racial identity was becoming.  After warfare returned 
to the native northeast in 1688, this emergent identity again united regional Wabanaki 
forces.  When Indians near Pemaquid ignored the summons of an officer at the garrison 
in September 1688, it was because “they are all to be sure gathered together att 
Penobscott,” a place where they enjoy “Encouragement from all ye rest of ye Indians of 
these parts.”  Two years later, a redeemed English captive reported to Major Benjamin 
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Church that most Indian warriors around Androscoggin River “were gone to Winter-
harbour, to provide provisions for the Bay of Fundy Indians, who were to come and join 
with them to fight the English.”  Their best beaver furs accompanied the warriors, the 
captive also noted, and were “carried away to make a present to the Bay of Fundy 
Indians, who were coming to their assistance.”  The notion of a coherent Wabanaki 
interest, defined principally in opposition to colonial Englishness, thus continued to 
frame Indians’ increasingly binary outlook when confronted with the same forces that 
threatened their security in decades past.
17
 
The power of Wabanakis’ crystallizing ethnic outlook to shape and animate 
native responses to renewed colonial incursions was evident in the verbal harassment of 
New England colonists throughout the 1680s.  In brief and disturbing meetings with 
Indian messengers heralding their violent intentions, farmers, traders and other settlers 
who believed themselves innocent of native accusations realized that they were deemed 
complicit in the larger transgressions of Atlantic colonialism because of their 
Englishness.  In early spring of 1684, Indians near Casco Bay and Cape Porpoise in 
Maine robbed a settler’s house before ominously voicing their “intention of killing all 
the English.”  Near his house on the Kennebec River a month earlier, James Dennes 
was notified by Indians that their sagamore’s “hart would never Be well tell he had killd 
some of the English againe.”  The native envoys continued “threatening that he would 
Burne the English houses and make the English Slaves to them as they ware Before.”  
John Hornibroke was likewise visited by four Indians, one of whom informed him that 
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they “will have wars againe” and “that he would Stab a English man with his knive and 
Run away when he had dun it.”  Another of the four “did threaten to burne English 
houses and make them Slaves as they ware Before,” while another warned “that the 
hachet hung over our heads and he did not know how sonne it might fall.”  One familiar 
Wabanaki neighbor alerted John Voanny and Will Bacon to the disquieting news that 
“ye Indones was Minded to Rise in Rebellyon againe & Cutt of ye English but how 
sone hee could not yett tell.”  A more aggressive stance was taken against John Molton, 
perhaps because he was encountered while clearing timber from a field near his 
homestead.  “[W]ithout speaking one word,” an Indian came toward the busy settler 
“with his knife in his hand and profered to stab” him, prompting Molton to quickly 
reach for his axe while “threatining ye said Indon to Cut out his braynes.”  The standoff 
ended without bloodshed when the Indian departed “towards Mr Samuell Boles his 
house.”  Though such encounters stopped short of physical violence, their intended 
message was made painfully clear: all colonials, regardless of their direct participation 
in the widespread offenses against the Wabanaki vision secured in the treaty of 1678, 
were collectively culpable for violations to that peace by virtue of their English 
identity.
18
   
Yet Indians also supplemented their oral and corporal threats by manipulating 
trans-Atlantic bonds of affinity in a now-familiar diplomatic strategy.  When anxious 
New England officials summoned to a conference “all the Sagamores for nearly a 
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hundred miles around” the southern Maine coast in late 1684 to address the recent 
turmoil, they proved to native leaders that their aggressive harassment had indeed been 
effective.  Accompanied by men and women from the communities they represented, 
Indian diplomats at the subsequent conference appropriated the paternal affection of the 
English King as their forebears had learned to do in years past.  Now Wabanaki aimed 
to secure a measure of socio-political status within the colonial system, while 
simultaneously assuring colonial administrators that the native vision for the Dawnland 
did not necessarily preclude a properly ordered English presence.  Several of the Indians 
present accordingly “expressed the great honour in which their ancestors had always 
held the Kings of England,” and judiciously recited specific “instances of their kindness 
to them.”  This reverence of royal benevolence, the Indians promised the inquisitive 
commissioner, would also be enshrined in posterity as they would “charge their children 
to yield cheerful subjection to the King of England…and to endeavour to make his 
name great among the remoter Indians.”  Wabanaki’s carefully crafted rhetoric 
accentuated the timeless regard of monarchical prestige in their communities, thereby 
quickly dispelling any doubts that this was merely an opportunistic or politically-
expedient gesture.  By casting royal authority as profoundly effectual and intensely 
revered in the Dawnland, and by situating that esteem outside the present moment, 
Indians carefully mimicked the filiopietism of imperial English subjects, thereby 
staking claim to a measure of socio-political capital that necessarily accompanied this 
status in an extensive power network spanning the Atlantic.  So powerfully effective 
was this self-posturing that after cloaking themselves in their new gifts of English 
clothing, the sagamores appeared utterly transformed – as if they had indeed put on 
187 
 
“His Majesty’s livery.”  The gleeful colonial official hoped that this remarkable native 
comportment signaled political submission to the King and to English colonialism, but 
Wabanaki knew that their men like Madockawando wielded far greater authority on 
their shores.  This recognition, however, did not prevent them from exploring and 
exploiting other fonts of power.
19
      
The heady optimism of English officials was an unintended consequence of this 
brand of native diplomacy.  Wabanaki delegates did not wish to leave their striking 
words and actions open to misinterpretation, but were rather quite clear about their 
implications.  Rather than granting license to imperious colonial authority in the region, 
their affective bonds with English royalty functioned to safeguard native sovereignty 
and enhance its interests.  Only “when the King should send persons of worth” to treat 
with us, the Wabanaki spokesmen informed the official, would their communities then 
“submit all differences to his determination.”  Spoken from a posture of certitude and 
strength, these words at once derided the New England commissioner and the interests 
he represented, while also displaying native faith in the King’s trustworthiness and 
benevolence.  To his superiors the official noted how he subsequently assured the 
Indians of his intention to “procure some of King Charles his men, as their phrase is” 
before any further settlement would occur in Indian country.  Such a pledge, fashioned 
according to Wabanaki’s choice reference to English royal authority, revealed not only 
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the salience of royal paternalism in these native communities but also their effective 
manipulation of it.
20
   
 Notwithstanding the wishful thinking of New England commissioners, 
Wabanaki did not consider their affective bonds with “King Charles” exclusive.  Native 
regard for English royalty, rather than closing off additional Atlantic diplomatic 
opportunities, in fact created other such kinship relations and augmented existing ones.  
The Stuarts were the sole English dynasty familiar to the Wabanaki thus far in the 
seventeenth century, and as such, Indians learned to repeatedly invoke its name to serve 
their interests.  Royal subjects had always questioned this dynasty’s commitment to a 
genuine English Protestant national identity, however, chiefly because of its ties to 
continental Catholic powers.  The latter two Stuart monarchs, particularly the openly-
Catholic James II, former Duke of York and architect of the Andros regime in New 
England, had in fact become firm allies of France’s King Louis XIV.  When Wabanaki 
“drank the health of the King and the Duke with all the honour and ceremony” at the 
1684 meeting, thereby authenticating their kinship with the Stuarts, their diplomatic 
strategy was not necessarily incompatible with their growing relationship to the French; 
both could be mutually reinforcing.  Native commitment to Stuart paternal authority 
thus was not a decision to firmly ally with England in a burgeoning imperial conflict, 
but a dual reaffirmation of royal kinship bonds that spanned from Wabanakia to London 
and to Quebec and Paris.
21
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 Indian migrants also continued to fortify networks connecting the Dawnland to 
French power along the St. Lawrence River in the 1680s.  By the end of the decade, 
Jesuits stationed at native communities in Maine and mission villages in New France 
admonished Indians to leave behind their homelands near New England and join their 
kin in Quebec.  French officials including the colony’s governor, Marquis de 
Denonville, sweetened the proposals by offering ammunition and firearms.  Throughout 
the decade, though, such material enticements increasingly trickled out of the French 
ambit along the St. Lawrence, carried south by native parties now traveling quite freely 
and regularly between their native and French kinsmen, between the Atlantic ocean and 
their new Atlantic socio-economic network.  In winter of 1684, for example, ten 
Wabanaki departed to Canada “for ammunition as is supposed,” an alarmed New 
England military officer reported, and are “expected back from Quebec in ten days 
more.”  In the same year, settler James Dennes was visited by a neighboring Indian 
woman who warned him that “the Ingans are going to Canada and say they will be Back 
againe in apreill,” news that so disturbed the farmer that it was immediately reported it 
to a local justice of the peace.  The following month, colonist John Hornibroke’s native 
source informed him that nearby Indians were on their way to New France to “fetch 
strength to fall on the English.”  Even “some of the Chefe of them is gon to Canada all 
Ready,” Hornibroke related, “to fetch guns and amanition and they said that they would 
make the greatest armie that [was] ever yet among them.”  Whether or not this arms 
trafficking was as extensive as anxious English colonists feared does not obscure a 
critical reality: throughout the 1680s the pathways connecting Wabanaki near the sea to 
kin and webs of material exchange on the St. Lawrence were becoming well trodden.
22
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 In summer of 1688, the delicate network of socio-economic power that Indians 
were forging within Atlantic imperial structures endured a shocking blow.  English 
subjects’ grudging toleration of their monarch’s conspicuous continental alliances with 
feared Catholic powers, coupled with his own avowed and unabashed Catholic faith, 
dissolved in a massive political upheaval that embroiled much of Europe.  The nation’s 
decision to overthrow James II in June, 1688 was spurred by widespread fears that his 
treasonous policies, and his personal piety, directly jeopardized England’s Protestant 
character, and thus its national security.  Anyone harboring serious doubts that a second 
coup d’état of the Stuart dynasty in recent memory was in the best interests of the state 
had their fears allayed when the Dutch prince William of Orange and his English wife 
Mary, whose Protestantism was beyond dispute, positioned themselves to rescue the 
kingdom and its throne.
23
   
Though seemingly distant and inconsequential to the native northeast, this 
colossal transition of power directly shaped the region’s subsequent development.  
Wabanaki perceived the Glorious Revolution as a profoundly salient force in their 
communities, in turn revealing just how interconnected the Atlantic had now become to 
their perspective.  To them, James II’s forced abdication was not the glorious triumph of 
true, benevolent, monarchical authority over an arbitrary and tyrannical regime, but a 
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troubling and disruptive process that disordered their kinship bonds and compromised 
their interests and security.   
In the Anglo-French imperial war that subsequently ignited in 1688, Indians 
discovered a valuable opportunity to not only stave off the disorderly effects of the 
Glorious Revolution, but to manipulate it to their own advantage.  Wabanaki warriors 
adroitly exploited a power vacuum exposed when Governor Andros’ administration was 
overthrown by Puritan-dominated Massachusetts during the conflagration’s early 
disorganized stages in the northeast.  The colony’s religious and civil leaders long 
resented the regime’s connection to the Stuart monarchy.  As Andros and several of his 
chief administrators and military officers sat shackled in Boston prisons, news of 
Europe’s tumultuous political and military affairs circulated among Wabanaki 
communities.  Madockawando was a prime catalyst for this transmission of intelligence.  
In spring 1689, the Penobscot sagamore had traveled to Boston to meet with Andros, 
but discovered upon arrival the governor’s incarceration and a flimsy regime erected in 
his place.  The colony’s new leadership, cognizant of the disarray that accompanied 
their coup, endeavored to placate Madockawando by lavishing him with gifts and 
procuring a safe passage back to Penobscot aboard the province galley.  Despite these 
overtures, the sagamore recognized a lucrative opportunity, and with his warriors seized 
the moment and laid waste to the open defenses of Maine.
24
   
Wabanaki understood their wartime violence as also contributing to the 
settlement of larger imperial questions regarding hereditary kingship and royal 
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succession.  It was conceived, that is to say, as a means of dictating in some degree the 
outcome of European political conflict.  With the assistance of a few French soldiers 
near Falmouth in early 1689, Indians captured a number of English settlers, including 
trader Sylvanus Davis, who were subsequently informed “that we were all rebels, and 
also Boston, against our king, in that we had proclaimed William and Mary king and 
queen, and that they were usurpers to the crown.”  After endeavoring to correct colonial 
misunderstandings of authentic royal authority, this Wabanaki party, accompanied by 
their French kin, declared that “they did fight for King James.”  Such striking savoir-
faire regarding imperial politics across the ocean emerged from the dense and extensive 
communication networks that Indians themselves were constructing.  These webs of 
information tied the Dawnland to Quebec, Acadia, and France, and continued to shape 
Wabanaki’s dynamic sense of their Atlantic world and its ever-evolving opportunities.
25
   
Indians proceeded to carefully target Maine’s colonial farmsteads, communities 
and garrisons left exposed by England’s political turmoil.  The ensuing campaign of 
native violence represented a powerful Wabanaki desire to manage the rapidly-changing 
power dynamics that lay at the heart of their Atlantic world, and simultaneously to exact 
retribution for the colonialism that reemerged since the purifying conflagrations of the 
mid-1670s.  The Atlantic political consciousness of Wabanaki communities, and the 
piercing destruction of the colonial presence that it afforded, were readily apparent to 
terrified New Englanders.  In the fall of 1689, leaderless Bostoners informed their 
colony’s representatives in London that the Wabanaki “are an intelligent enemy” who 
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“understand our condition” and will “prove troublesome.”  Since the recent political 
upheavals, the colonists continued, “the barbarians have taken heart and done us much 
mischief.”  So successful was this native strategy that colonists throughout New 
England imagined “the cries of the distressed will doubtless reach England.”  These 
hopeful pleas mirrored the Atlantic supplications of Wabanaki before them, who time 
and again appealed to the same locus of affective power.
26
   
Later in 1689, similar colonial lamentations emerged from the eastward.  There 
panic-stricken inhabitants of Maine petitioned the Crown for assistance after 
neighboring Indians “tooke new Courage & resolution” from the “Change of ye 
Government” spawned by the “most unhappy insurrection or Rebellion [that] broke 
forth at Boston.”  “The pulling down of Sir E. Andros’s Government has done no 
good,” another settler similarly acknowledged, “but the contrary, since they called home 
the army…the Indians have since made great slaughter and destruction.”  The collective 
native response to England’s reconfiguration of authority heavily relied on the 
leadership of Madockawando.  After “seeing the Governor in prison and the land in 
confusion,” the sagamore’s Penobscot warriors spearheaded several assaults, and 
continued to draw strength from the assistance of several southern Wabanaki displaced 
by the mounting violence.  Though the Stuarts’ paternal benevolence had been severed 
from Indians who long invoked its prestige, the resulting circumstances could be 
harnessed to mitigate its most detrimental effects in the Dawnland.  To these people, the 
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Glorious Revolution served as yet another instance of the pressures and processes 
constantly working to reorder their Atlantic vision.
27
 
Indians’ wide-ranging networks of communication linking them to imperial 
Europe had grown so elaborate that valuable news occasionally bypassed New France 
altogether.  Indeed, the extensive interconnectedness that Wabanaki cultivated with 
Europe, and the remarkably reliable intelligence it conveyed, could confound French 
authorities who found themselves reliant on native networks for the most current news 
from across the Atlantic.  These critical conduits of information emerged from 
Wabanaki’s strategic geo-political position, an advantage that allowed them to continue 
exploiting the imperial conflict that erupted in 1688.  Shortly after Massachusetts major 
general William Phips was driven from Quebec following his disastrous naval attack 
there in May 1690, a native cadre from Wabanakia arrived in the capital with pressing 
news, “announcing that the English had been beaten at sea in Europe.”  The Indians 
referred to the Battle of Beachy Head where Comte de Tourville’s command  destroyed 
a joint Anglo-Dutch fleet and captured some fifteen ships.  The rout became 
memorialized as the most significant French naval victory in the war.  Much to joy of 
incredulous French colonists and officials at Quebec, the stunning news “proved to be 
true,” and was followed by further intelligence that the Penobscots “had defeated a 
party of seventy Englishmen and thirty Mohegans.”  The War of the League of 
Augsburg, as the contest became known in Europe, was a vast hemispheric clash 
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encompassing European and non-European peoples.  To American colonists, the 
conflict was King William’s War and centered largely on a contest of power in the 
northeastern borderland.  To the People of Dawnland, when perceived through their 
elaborate information networks, that difference of perspective was immaterial.
28
 
Natives’ carefully constructed web of communication, and their valued geo-
political position from which this system emerged, were not solely employed to assist 
New France.  Such an asset first and foremost served Wabanaki interests.  More 
specifically, it made accessible another trans-Atlantic locus of paternal power, one that 
could fill the void left in the aftermath of the Stuart dissolution.  Though native 
diplomatic structures were dislocated by English political unrest, they could be 
reorganized and augmented through the manipulation of a similar royalist prestige in the 
French empire.  By 1691, Wabanaki had successfully forged kinship bonds with Louis 
XIV, and were regularly profiting from his benevolence in the form of material goods 
and promises of perpetual affinity.  Informed of the “good will of the chiefs” of the 
Penobscots, the king sent aboard the African Sun gifts of firearms, ammunition and 
“other necessary things” that he hoped would encourage hostility against his imperial 
enemies.  Two years later, this initial supply of war materiel grew into a more elaborate 
supply of presents that aimed to satisfy particular native tastes, some of them quite 
cosmopolitan.  Included now were Brazilian tobacco, Rouen blankets, plums, thread in 
“all sorts of colors,” and blue cloth.  Two hundred Spanish-made shirts were added to 
the “King’s presents” by 1694.  Astute French officials in Quebec and Acadia had by 
now come to recognize the high esteem with which Wabanaki held monarchical 
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authority.  French gifts to Indian allies were accordingly bestowed not from the colony, 
its governors, intendants, or any other local leaders, but directly from the king.
29
 
The unique spiritual and material power that resided in Europe and emanated 
through kinship bonds across the sea to Wabanakia could be cultivated in other ways.  
From the trans-oceanic journeys of ancestors, native northeasterners understood the 
Atlantic ocean itself as a conduit to this power.  French ships regularly departing the St. 
Lawrence River and Acadian settlements for France served Penobscot sagamores with 
the means to take advantage of this opportunity.  They accordingly sent several of their 
sons aboard them under the guardianship of trusted French colonials.  Their children, it 
was hoped, would one day return possessing invaluable knowledge of a distant people 
and a measure of the power from which French wealth flowed.  By 1693, however, 
native leaders, including most prominently Madockawando, had begun wondering when 
exactly their children would be returning home.  Pressure for answers was felt as far 
away as Versailles, where officials at Court scrambled desperately to formulate a 
response.  “His Majesty did not want to expose them to the danger of being taken by 
their English enemies” in the Atlantic, they reassured the sagamores in a letter, and 
decided it was in everyone’s best interest to keep them in France for awhile longer.  
Wabanaki regard for monarchical power was thus appreciated and manipulated even in 
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the metropole, where the King’s tender compassion and prudent judgment could be 
craftily deployed to allay native fears.  But even royal paternalism could not paper over 
what increasingly appeared as kidnapping to Indians.  By the following year, officials 
were still struggling to minimize the fallout from the missing children, though the 
French had now lost their status as trustworthy guardians.  At least one of the children, a 
son of Penobscot leader Moxus, died in France before he could fulfill the wishes of his 
community.  The transfer of their youth into and across the Atlantic now 
obtainedacquired a certain unexpected permanency profoundly troubling to native 
notions of equitable and reciprocal kinship.  These misfortunes instead were reminiscent 
of their ancestors’ forced Atlantic passages at the hands of deceptive slavers and 
adventurers.  When presented with a similar opportunity eight years later, this time 
among the English at a conference in Casco Bay, still-distraught Wabanaki “concluded 
not to send any of our Children to England, because Moxus his son when he was sent to 
France, he died there.”
30
  
Indians’ diplomatic cultivation of European power was only one avenue, albeit 
an indispensible one, to a properly-ordered Atlantic world.  King William’s War offered 
Wabanaki an opportunity to secure and enhance other critical elements of their Atlantic 
vision, and make right the disorder that had again threatened their home since the 
1670s.  Thus while France and England’s imperial contest permitted natives more 
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convenient and profitable access to European power and prestige, it also allowed them 
to more effectively concentrate on problems closer to home.  The struggles of colonial 
English leaders and settlers to once again sever Indian access to the ocean, render the 
native northeast amenable to English economic interests, and reintegrate the northwest 
Atlantic into the imperial economy all became prime targets of Wabanaki retaliation.  
King William’s War provided ample pretext, and material resources, to regenerate 
themselves and their world.       
Indians formulated and executed their campaigns of retributive violence in the 
1690s with a proven strategy that had brought them a significant measure of success in 
the mid-1670s.  The maintenance of Wabanaki authority in the northeast, they 
recognized, necessitated a reclamation of adjacent Atlantic waters.  Native grievances 
against the obstruction of anadromous fish in their rivers, for example, or the mass 
construction of coastal garrisons, or Governor Andros’ recently-ordered blockade of 
Wabanakia in 1688 that nearly starved entire communities were all inextricably tied to 
New England’s resurfacing as a dominant and aggressive power on and around the 
northwest Atlantic after 1680.  As they had in the 1670s, Indians accordingly 
concentrated much of their effort on the source of this threatening presence – the 
English fishery – by targeting the vehicles of that enterprise – English ships.  Indeed as 
early as summer 1689, New England’s terrestrial frontier in the northeast had already 
broken up, as most settlers retreated southward shortly after hostilities began.  
Wabanaki boasted to a colonial military officer that they “no care for the New England 
people” and “have all their country by and by.”  By that fall, it was well-known that 
Indians had consequently amplified their maritime presence, prompting one prudent 
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English privateer to sail through Wabanaki waters under French colors.  Indians there 
informed him that “not an Englishman was left in these parts,” and upon detecting the 
crew’s guise launched an attack of the vessel.  King William’s War, and each 
subsequent imperial conflict that Indians exploited in the eighteenth century, was thus 
to Wabanaki a principally-maritime contest of competing Atlantic visions.
31
        
The alacrity with which Indians began their destruction of the English fishery 
almost immediately after the outbreak of war in 1688 illustrates just how critical control 
of maritime space was to their Atlantic vision.  It also suggests that they continued to 
understand the fishing economy as an Achilles heel of a larger imperial economic 
system.  Within a few months of the Glorious Revolution, Falmouth resident Edward 
Tyng noted that the coastal town’s inhabitant began “exspecting more mischief dayly” 
after seeing Wabanaki in “their Birch Canoes passing & Repassing between our 
Islands.”  The following year, another local settler likewise indicated that “about 200 or 
more of Indians are Seen now upon [Palmer’s] Island, and we do Expect a Speedy 
assault by them.”  By early 1692, a large brigade of Indians coasted to “ye Eastward of 
Pascattaqua in their Canoos upon ye sea,” a sight so alarming to locals that they were 
quickly struck with “great fear of an Attack every day.”  Fortunately for Wabanaki 
marine-warriors, such portentous spectacles often failed to prepare, or were ignored by, 
English settlers.  Those of a nearby fishing village in southern Maine, for example, 
informed colonial authorities of their new ship “which was Launched & almost Ready 
to Sayle,” but “had the Misfortune Notwithstanding all the Defence the Master and 
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Company belonging to her Could Make, To be taken by the Indyans.”  Emboldened by 
this success over experienced English seamen, a squadron of Indian mariners near 
Damaris Cove in May of 1689 “indeavoured with their Canoos to take a Shallop,” but 
were ultimately “repuls’d with the loss of one of their men.”  With their primary target 
out of reach, the warriors resorted to land where they “burnt some houses there abouts.”  
In September, Indians did “some damage lately at Blue Point Garrison,” the most 
prominent of which consisted of torching “a small vessel.”  By striking at New 
England’s maritime presence early and often after the outbreak of imperial war in 1688, 
Wabanaki implemented once again a proven strategy of resistance and regeneration.
32
 
As it did in the past, the success of this wartime method depended on Indians’ 
intimate acquaintance with the region’s natural environment, including the rugged 
coastal landscape.  By synthesizing this natural knowledge with their dynamic maritime 
culture, Wabanaki effectively expanded and strengthened their naval acumen.  In spring 
1689, this advantage was paying dividends for Indians secreting away their prize ships.  
Elisha Andrewes reported from the fort at Sagadehoc near Casco Bay that an officer 
“went up the River from New Towne Garrison…to fetch Downe the Vessell ye Indians 
had taken and carry’d up the River,” but was driven off by a “parcel of Indians.”  After 
encountering the anchored ship of Denis and Benard Godet during peacetime in 1714, a 
salty Micmac crew along the Nova Scotia coast apprised the sailors of “four Rivers 
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from Menchique to Bay Verte fit to hold Shallops.”  Such valuable information, 
obtained over countless generations of contact with the maritime world, was coveted 
and trusted by Euro-Americans unfamiliar with the local seascape.  A battle for the 
coastal town of Wells in southern Maine similarly incorporated natives’ natural 
knowledge.  There, in 1688, Indian forces opted to lay siege to two English sloops not 
in an open water engagement, but by tactically positioning their armed warriors at “a 
Turn of the Creek.”  This posture allowed them to “ly out of danger, so near ‘em, as to 
throw Mud aboard with their Hands” while simultaneously making it “impossible for 
any of the Garrisons to afford ‘em any relief.”  After making little headway with this 
plan, the Indians took the fight to the ships, launching a more aggressive scheme that 
still permitted them to retain their entrenched position.  The assailants constructed “a 
Great Fire Work, about Eighteen or Twenty Foot Square, and fill’d it up with 
Combustible matter, which they Fired” and carefully arranged “it in the way, for the 
Tide now to Floate it up, unto the Sloops.”  Though an unexpected shift in the wind 
narrowly diverted the flaming barge, Wabanaki demonstrated that colonists’ oceangoing 
property was susceptible to confiscation from both sea and land.
33
 
The ingenuity and dynamism that characterized Indian maritime violence 
generated another means of exploiting the imperial rivalry embroiling the northeast.  As 
King William’s War progressed beyond its initial stages, Wabanaki began 
supplementing their maritime strength with French naval assistance.  This alliance 
strategy allowed Indians to coordinate their seaborne attacks against the most powerful 
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symbols of English Atlantic colonialism with French ships, supplies and men.  Yet the 
assimilation of an imperial neighbor’s naval aid was managed according to Wabanaki 
terms, allowing Indians to stave off dependency on foreign maritime power.  The native 
response to New England’s Fort William Henry at Pemaquid was a prime example.  
The garrison had been constructed by colonial authorities in the 1680s to protect the 
fishing economy and obstruct local Indians from access to the ocean, both of which 
were accomplished successfully.  Shortly after the war began, Wabanaki unsurprisingly 
targeted Pemaquid for destruction, first attempting to turn the English strategy on its 
head by cutting off the community from the sea.  During the frigid winter of 1692-1693, 
soldiers stationing the garrison grew desperate after their “wood sloop with thirty men 
in her at a miles distance from the Fort was seized by the Indians.”  With “the Master 
slayn” and “several wounded,” the rest of the shattered crew “fled by the boat and left 
their Sloope in ye Indians hands.”  With their presence made known, native warriors 
proceeded to “frequently shew themselves at ye Garrison,” effectively besieging the 
freezing soldiers and cutting off their only other egress.  Two years later, the fort still 
stood, though it was continually targeted by Indians who in September destroyed 
another boat set out “to fetch wood for the Supply of the Fort; which they had lately cut 
out.”  By 1696, vehement native complaints about Pemaquid’s damaging effect on their 
vital fishery were now regularly voiced to French officials at Fort St. Jean in Acadia.  
Finally in August, a colossal amphibious force of “six hundred Indians” descended on 
the English stronghold in “two French Ships” commanded by Pierre LeMoyne 
D’Iberville and accompanied by “one hundred french with Bombs, Mortars and field-
pieces and other Impliments of War.”  The annihilation of Pemaquid became a source 
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of tremendous pride to French colonials who triumphantly proclaimed it as one of the 
greatest routs of the war.  But to the Wabanaki indispensible to its success, the entire 
campaign had been waged over several years and was shrewdly spearheaded by their 
strategists.
34
       
Indians also appropriated French aid during the war to enhance their aggressive 
command of Atlantic spaces and frequent theft of English nautical technology.  En route 
to its sacking of Pemaquid in 1696, the massive French-Wabanaki convoy succeeded in 
capturing “the Newport Galley,” an official ship of Massachusetts conducting colony 
business.  A year later, another international naval force targeted English fishing 
shallops that were “Lying at anchor on sabbath day night and being too careles…not 
keeping a Watch.”  Under the cover of darkness, “the indians and french came on them 
at unawares” and after killing one and taking the rest prisoner, succeeded in 
commandeering “all the shallops being 6 in number.”  A similar joint effort aboard “a 
Sloop & a Ketch chased a boat” belonging to York fisherman Rowland Young off the 
coast of southern Maine.  After coming up alongside Young, the hijackers “fired a great 
gun at him, & made him Strike & took him,” at which point “the Sloop gave chase to 
the other boat which did escape in to York” with the rest of Young’s bewildered crew.  
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Though astonished witnesses could “give no account of their Strength,” they were able 
to conclude “that they sail Incomparably well.”
35
    
Over the course of King William’s War, both Indians and English witnessed 
with evermore clarity the sheer vulnerability of New England’s fishing economy in the 
face of Wabanaki campaigns of maritime violence.  Though this reality had been jointly 
recognized during the warfare of the 1670s, the inability of colonial authorities and 
fishermen to rectify the problem in the 1690s signaled to Indians the utter ineptitude of 
English authority much beyond the confines of southern New England.  It also exposed 
further the soft underbelly of colonialism in the northeast.  As early as the beginning of 
hostilities in 1688, Massachusetts fishermen were opting to relinquish their employment 
and take their chances pleading with the colonial government for compensation rather 
than risk their lives and equipment in the turbulent Wabanaki Atlantic.  The Indian 
threat at sea forced these desperate men to be “shut up in Garrison,” one supplicant 
wrote to the Andros authorities, “and not permitted to go to Sea or to bring their Fish 
about to Boston, which Lyeth there upon Spoyle.”  One official consequently declared 
“the fishery lost” in a report to superiors in England.  Two years later, Wabanaki 
enjoyed even greater fruits from their labors.  “All the fishery on the coast is deserted 
for many leagues,” beleaguered residents in northern New England wrote to officials, 
“the inhabitants not daring to stay for want of protection.”  Descriptions of impending 
doom made their way to Boston in 1691 from fishing communities on the Isles of 
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Shoals, an archipelago some ten miles off the coast of southern Maine.  The settlements 
here, “whose men being almost all at Sea every day & sometimes a whole week 
together,” were left exposed as easy targets for Indians “both from Sea & land to shoot 
their malevolent arrows against.”  Such places were on the verge of becoming 
“Receptacles and lurking places” for Wabanaki marines.
36
     
Yet more than the fishery was at the mercy of Indians during King William’s 
War.  Northern New England’s stands of enormous red and white pines were 
increasingly valued by imperial agents as masts for the Royal Navy.  Integrating this 
supply base into the imperial economy alleviated the crown’s dependence on 
Scandinavia and the Baltic states for ship stores.  But when Wabanaki violently 
obstructed this flow, it was readily apparent to English leaders that the Indians occupied 
a dangerous and unprecedented position at the very heart of the empire’s trans-Atlantic 
economy.  “The Indians have overrun the greatest part of the Eastern Country from the 
St. Croix to the Piscataqua, two hundred miles of coast,” an imprisoned official of the 
Andros government wrote to the Lords of Trade at Whitehall in 1689.  As a result, “the 
fisheries and lumber (our principal commodities) are quite destroyed” while “all the 
great masts for the Royal Navy are in the hands of the French or Indians.”  Andros 
himself declared to the same superiors later that year that “the fishery and the trade in 
masts and lumber is consequently almost wholly ruined.”  Captain John Holmes, 
employed in harvesting and shipping the mast trees aboard his vessel America, related 
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in 1690 that the Indians “have Burnt and Distroyed by fire and sword 150 miles in 
Length Eastward of Wells in the Province of Maine,” a line of destruction that 
swallowed “all the Sea Ports in those Parts.”  The conflagration, Holmes forecasted, 
would inevitably mean that “all the trade for Masts Timber Boards and fishing will be 
wholey Lost from the English.”  By 1696, New England official John Nelson confirmed 
that “we have in a measure lost our mast, timber and fishing trade” as Wabanaki 
completed their reclamation from retreating colonial settlers.  When Indians and French 
sacked Pemaquid and besieged the fort at Saco later that year, colonial leaders deemed 
the loss particularly calamitous because it was “from whence the Naval Stores do 
chiefly come.”
37
    
The disastrous trans-Atlantic repercussions of Indian violence ashore and afloat 
did not go unnoticed by frantic imperial agents.  A member of Edmund Andros’ 
beleaguered government reminded Whitehall in 1689 that “our enemies are Eastern 
Indians,” and our “country will be in danger of being overrun” if left unchecked.  “Then 
farewell to the West Indian plantations, which cannot subsist without our provisions,” 
Edward Randolph pointed out to superiors.  As Wabanaki intensified their violence 
against the fishery and on land a year later, Massachusetts agents in London read a letter 
dripping with irony from their panic-stricken colonists, begging them to “see the Sea of 
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trouble we are Swimming in.”  According to the damage assessment of royally-
commissioned agent John Nelson in 1697, an increased security presence was 
absolutely necessary if the crown wished to save “the fisherie,” upon which “depends 
the chiefest of the Trade of New England.”  Bidding adieu to the bountiful waters of the 
northwest Atlantic, and the equally-fecund West Indian islands, amidst an Indian sea of 
trouble was not exactly the imagery metropolitan officials wished to evoke when 
envisioning their Atlantic world.
38
     
Regardless of whether or not their warriors participated in the crippling of New 
England’s north Atlantic economy, Wabanaki communities experienced a coordinated 
campaign to displace them from the ocean and sever them from its resources.  Though 
this colonial strategy was nothing new, its amplification now signaled the increasingly 
violent incompatibility of Indian and English visions of the Atlantic.  Native power on 
the northwestern seas, Indians and imperial officials alike recognized, threatened to 
destroy England’s incorporation of the region into a larger nexus of authority.  Likely 
because of Massachusetts’ shattered government, Wabanaki decimated the fishery with 
impunity for nearly two years before the colony began formulating a coherent response.  
In spring of 1690, desperate Massachusetts leaders turned to recruiting able-bodied 
seamen to harass oceangoing Indians.  Captain Noah Wiswall was ordered to visit “the 
Enemy’s usual fishing places where in probability they now are,” while John Hathorne 
and Jonathan Corwin were directed to muster crews to “disrest and Attack the Enemy, 
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at their usual fishing places or Elsewhere, as there may be opportunity.”  Near St. Johns 
in Acadia, a brigade of forty Micmac warriors in canoes engaged with one of these 
forces headed by Boston mariner Cyprian Southack, losing two of their own and 
wounding four English.
39
   
By June 1691, Massachusetts leaders were ramping up their efforts.  In a 
measure engineered “to prosecute the Indian enemy,” officials informed the governor of 
New York that “We are now equipping of a Ship of War and another Vessel to cruise 
upon the Coast for defence thereof and Securing of Navigation.”  A month later, army 
officers from the colony were similarly organizing an “Expedition by water to Saco to 
visit the Indian fishing places in Expectation of Surprising some of them there.”  In the 
same year, Massachusetts commissioned another officer to take command of the sloop 
Mary, a vessel “mounted with fourteen guns,” for the better “guarding and defending of 
the Seas and Coast” against “piratical Sea Rovers” plaguing the fishery.  These Indian 
outlaws of the waves possessed such a sophisticated nautical expertise with Euro-
American sailing technology that they could be easily mistaken for veteran English 
sailors.  Cyprian Southack was accordingly instructed to scour Wabanaki waters while 
taking care to clearly communicate his identity.  “As you meet with any Coasters or 
Fishing Vessels make a Signal that they may know you when you come near to, or are 
minded to speak with any of them,” officials reminded him, “that they be not driven out 
of there course or from their employment for fear of your being an Enemy.”  The 
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colony’s response to the frantic pleas of fishing communities on the Isles of Sholes 
included sending Captain Willey there in winter of 1692 “for the defence of the said 
Islands and repelling any attack of French or Indian Enemies.”
40
   
 Despite the persistent struggle to eliminate their Atlantic presence and sever 
their access to the ocean, Wabanaki realized that their campaign for control of their sea 
had once again proved effective.  By 1695, the state of New England’s coastal 
settlements in Maine was so deplorable that most colonists simply retreated southward.  
“The people on shore are in extreme misery,” French officials at Acadia boasted, and 
“have not, since the war, had so much power at sea.”  In the midst of such desperation, 
all efforts by distant authorities in Boston to clear the ocean of Indians and their French 
allies were hopelessly inadequate.  Indeed by the regional conclusion of King William’s 
War in 1699, the entire coast of Maine was virtually devoid of English habitation, a 
sight that to Wabanaki mirrored the post-bellum status quo in 1678.  By the end of the 
century, then, native northeasterners had come to recognize another critical maxim 
regarding their ever-expanding Atlantic world.  The imperial rivalry between England 
and France – a contest that in large part stemmed from a desire to incorporate and 
dominate the Atlantic – offered Indians a lucrative opportunity to secure their own 
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vision of this world.  Only by cultivating an Atlantic amenable to Wabanaki interests 
could their security ashore be ensured.
41
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“Not to be under the command of any party”: Navigating the Shifting Winds of Imperial 
Conflict 
 
While the Treaty of Ryswick settled the Anglo-French imperial conflagration in 
1697, the terms of peace were concluded with Wabanaki at another conference along 
the familiar shores of Casco Bay in January 1699.  The parallels between the outcome 
of this war and its predecessor in 1678, however, extended far beyond the locale of 
peacemaking.  To native participants, both wars served to correct the disorder and 
destruction unleashed by New England’s Atlantic colonialism in the northeast after 
countless complaints about its poisonous effects were repeatedly swept aside by 
Massachusetts leaders.  Campaigns of maritime violence, Indians recognized by the end 
of King William’s War, once again rejuvenated a Wabanaki Atlantic world 
compromised by colonial aggression.  English ships, sailors, coastal fortifications, and 
trans-Atlantic commodities were all routinely targeted in a collective native effort to 
reorder their maritime world amenable to native interests.  When Wabanaki convened 
on the wave-swept shores of Casco Bay in 1699, they did so under very familiar 
circumstances.   
Yet the Atlantic vision which Indians regenerated through maritime violence 
again proved ephemeral.  In the precarious postbellum status quo that surfaced in its 
wake, King William’s War further mirrored its predecessor in 1678.  And this 
unmistakable parallel was not lost on native people.  This chapter explores the 
incongruent Wabanaki responses to, and their eventual collaborative participation in, 
another imperial conflict emanating from the Atlantic after a brief interlude of peace 
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from 1699 to 1703.  It argues that while Indians initially differed considerably in their 
willingness to exploit once again European political affairs, they very quickly coalesced 
around a familiar and proven strategy of seaborne aggression when neutrality became 
untenable.  This unifying approach, moreover, aimed not simply to stem the most 
threatening aspects of English maritime colonialism in the northeast, but also to cripple 
the trans-Atlantic economy that fostered its growth.  Wabanaki participation in Queen 
Anne’s War thus emerged as the latest phase in a developing pattern.  Imperial 
conflagration, Indians believed, afforded an opportunity to reorder a native Atlantic 
constantly disordered by its imperial counterpart.      
 But Indians were not the only people attuned to the lessons of earlier wars.  
Almost instantly after peace returned to the northeast in 1699, New England embarked 
on a massive project to resuscitate and augment the fishing and masting sectors of their 
Atlantic economy, a task that could not meet with success without first displacing 
Indians from the sea and confining their mobility on land.  Massachusetts authorities 
subsequently commissioned and subsidized the construction of several coastal 
fortifications, commercial fishing stages, and river dams, all of which would foster a 
rebirth of the imperial economy by dismantling the Indians’ maritime presence.  At the 
first sign of Wabanaki violence in Queen Anne’s War, the colony immediately ramped 
up these efforts, knowing full well what lay ahead.  Convoys of massive frigates 
patrolled the waves alongside fishing vessels, fishermen armed their sloops and shallops 
with artillery, and colonial troops targeted well-known Indian fishing grounds.  The 
emergent pattern of native-imperial violence, of which Queen Anne’s War was the 
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latest component, thus fundamentally represented a clash for Atlantic spaces, resources 
and visions. 
Southern Wabanakia’s transition from guarded cooperation with the English in 
the immediate wake of King William’s War to total war after 1704 was personified in 
the remarkable Atlantic exploits of Nescambiouit.  At the behest of the Massachusetts 
governor in 1699, this warrior-leader from the Saco River region apprehended and 
turned over to the English two notorious pirates wanted for their depredations against 
the imperial Atlantic economy.  But when his people joined with their northeastern 
Micmac and French kin a few years later in Queen Anne’s War, Nescambiouit gained 
further notoriety by spearheading a number of assaults against English settlements and 
soldiers in Maine.  French officials lauded his deeds as a valiant defense of empire, and 
rewarded him with a trans-Atlantic victory tour that included a rather lively royal 
audience with the Sun King.  The sagamore thus engaged on his own terms a large 
network of authority and prestige, one that stretched from the Dawnland to the elite 
power circles of metropolitan London and Versailles.  His kin in southern Maine would 
likewise move from cautious peace to outright war once the opportunities bound up in 
imperial conflict outweighed those of nonviolence.   
 
As with the gains made during warfare in the mid-1670s, the native victories 
achieved in King William’s War were accompanied by a tremendous cost.  Most Indian 
communities in southern Wabanakia experienced significant casualties from disease and 
warfare throughout the 1690s.  The conflict also took a shocking toll on France’s 
economy, and the king’s paternal benevolence in the native northeast consequently 
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languished.  As the quantity and quality of Louis XIV’s presents dwindled, Indians 
realized that the material benefits of royal power waxed and waned, a pattern often 
dictated by forces beyond their control.  To the vexation of French colonial officials at 
Quebec and Acadia, southern Wabanaki subsequently cultivated English gift-giving in 
New England even before the conclusion of King William’s War.  The governor of 
New France chided Indians for their fickle loyalties by invoking their royal kinship 
bonds.  Moxus, principal sagamore of the Kennebec River, received one such reprimand 
in 1700, “threatning him what the King his master would do to punish him and his 
Indians if they held any intercourse” with the English.  Wabanaki were thus now 
restructuring their economic relationships in significant ways.  The speed and impunity 
with which New Englanders resettled their northern frontier after 1678 also prepared 
Indians to expect a similar rebound in 1699.
1
   
The confluence of these factors at the turn of the century forced Indians in 
Maine to adopt a posture of accommodation with New England.  But socio-political 
forces from the west were also encouraging this new diplomatic tack.  Several 
Wabanaki representatives joined nearly eight hundred other Indian delegates from the 
Great Lakes and northeast at the Great Peace of Montreal in 1701, a meeting that 
formalized native neutrality between imperial neighbors.  The postwar change of course 
in the Dawnland was thus part and parcel of concurrent developments among 
Algonquians and Iroquoians in the broader northeast.  Later that year, Kennebec River 
Indians were according Massachusetts a prominent role in their Atlantic communication 
networks, imploring New England treaty commissioners in that year to “give us notice 
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of the likelyhood of a War between the French and the English.”  The transmission of 
such news would preserve amicable relations, the Indians assured them, because “we 
desire to keep ourselves free, and not to be under the command of any party.”  To 
Wabanaki, the imperial contest of the 1690s provided an effective opportunity to 
refashion their Atlantic world, but it also forced them to reconsider and restructure their 




The spirit of accommodation that surfaced from Wabanaki’s attenuated victory 
in King William’s War functioned as a catalyst for the peculiar and remarkable Atlantic 
adventures of Nescambiouit.  This prominent sagamore of the Saco River region in 
southern Maine was born around 1660 and first gained notoriety for his martial prowess 
against the English during King William’s War.  The Wabanaki title “Naskâmbi8it,” 
according to the French who so highly revered him, described one “who is so important 
and so highly placed because of his merit that his greatness cannot be attained, even in 
thought.”   His longtime English alias, Tom Sabaccoman, suggests that he had forged a 
unique status in English colonial society as well.  Nescambiouit’s astute manipulation 
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of English and French Atlantic worlds, and his subsequent development of a Wabanaki 
Atlantic, amplified his prestige among three cultures and across two continents.
3
      
 The genesis of Nescambiouit’s odyssey around the Atlantic lay in the 
Dawnland’s shifting postwar alliances.  As they did in 1678, accomodationist Wabanaki 
communities proposed exceedingly generous terms for New England’s resettlement of 
Maine.  In this spirit of conciliation, Nescambiouit traveled to Boston accompanied by 
other regional sagamores to assure the recently appointed Massachusetts governor 
Richard Coote, First Earl of Bellomont, that “King William Englishmans King is their 
King.”  After invoking royal authority to once again authenticate their intentions and 
express a desire to reestablish ties to the English monarchy, the Indians promised to 
allow “all Fishermen [to] improve and enjoy the Fishery and rights of ye shore for 
making their fish.”  The native delegates proceeded to express their desire for certain 
English concessions in the region.  An equally-conciliatory Bellomont, believing “the 
fishery on the Eastern Coast [to] be the staple of this Province,” acquiesced to native 
demands, promising them the convenience of a truck house at Casco Bay staffed by a 
gunsmith and stocked with goods at low rates.  Such allowances proved unpopular in 
the Massachusetts legislature, but were deemed necessary by the governor for the best 
interests of his colony and empire.  The Boston conference in 1699 thus signaled the 
desires of Wabanaki and English officials to refashion a more equitable relationship in 
the northeast, one responsive to the economic and political interests of each society.
4
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After forging a tenuous postbellum status quo, Bellomont took advantage of the 
convenient gathering to address one final matter weighing heavily on his mind.  The 
disquieting issue concerned Captain Joseph Bradish and his one-eyed associate Tee 
Wetherley, ringleaders of a pirate crew whose villainy had become legendary 
throughout the empire.  Both outlaws, the Kennebec sagamores were informed, 
remained at large after recently escaping from a Boston jail.  Born in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts in 1672, Bradish had remained close to the sea for most of his life, 
entering into service on merchant ships destined for ports around the Atlantic and 
beyond.  By the mid-1690s, he was employed by commander Thomas Gulleck aboard 
an interloper bound for the island of Borneo near India.  While watering at an island en 
route, the officers went ashore leaving Bradish and the other mariners aboard the ship, a 
decision they would later regret.  In the officers’ absence, the crew cut the ship’s cables 
and made off with their new prize. Bradish was chosen by the fugitives to captain the 
three hundred-and-fifty ton vessel equipped with twenty-two guns, an appointment that 
spoke to his respected nautical skills.
5
   
After provisioning their ship at Mauritius and dividing the new wealth, the band 
of pirates proceeded to the New England coast where several of them disembarked for 
new lives in the colonies.  Bradish, Wetherley and about twenty of their crewmembers 
were eventually recognized, captured, and incarcerated in a Boston jail.  Unbeknownst 
to authorities, the jailer was a relative of Bradish, and after two months he and 
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Wetherley disappeared in the night.  Bellomont recognized the rugged and remote 
coastline to the eastward, largely devoid of colonial habitation at the time, as an ideal 
and convenient haven for the outlaws, and thus turned to the inhabitants he knew were 
most fluent in the region’s intricate sea- and landscape.  By “promising him 200 pieces 
of Eight for Bradish and a 100 for Wesherley,” a desperate Bellomont acknowledged 
that cash rather than affinity or loyalty would most effectively procure the cooperation 
of Nescambiouit and his colleagues.  The Massachusetts leader thus aimed to exploit the 
sagamores’ conciliatory posture in order to appropriate their peoples’ natural knowledge 
and strategic geographic position in his campaign to eliminate a growing economic 
threat to England’s Atlantic empire.  This effort would in turn secure his, and his 
nation’s, ascendancy in a rapidly-rising imperial contest.
7
           
Bellomont’s commitment to recapturing Bradish and Wetherley was not a 
simple duty-bound desire to bring common criminals to justice or to uphold the rule of 
law in his colony.  Rather it was part and parcel of a much larger obsession that came to 
define much of his professional career.  His willingness to go so far as employ 
Wabanaki sagamores to hunt the fugitives pointed to his near neurotic compulsion with 
eradicating piracy in the English Atlantic.  This war against the pirates was too an 
essential component of his wider passion for metropolitan status-seeking and Atlantic 
empire-building.  Letter after letter to the Board of Trade detailed a relentless pursuit of 
oceangoing outlaws and a commitment to ensure that the right people were paying 
attention.  In fall of 1699, for example, Bellomont informed superiors that “Pyracy 
grows everyday in this part of the world” as pirates frequently “Robb us on the Coast 
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here and the other plantacions.”  The governor accentuated the gravity of this danger by 
noting that their “Ships that have 30 Guns and 150 men; and there men being all 
generally choise men.”  Bellomont followed up his description of these threatening 
particulars three months later with a personal account of his heroic apprehension of 
several pirate bands, encouraging superiors to rest assured of his unyielding 
commitment to the imperial cause.  “I hope your Lordships will please to represent to 
the King the extraordinary pains and vigilance I have used in taking these severall 
Pyrates,” he stressed to the Board, hoping that his efforts were duly noted in circles 
beyond Whitehall.  Notoriety and prestige, however, did not suffice; also critical for the 




Where pirates were not lurking in Bellomont’s world, Catholics were.  As joint 
governor and military commander of several northeastern colonies after the Glorious 
Revolution, and as one of the first royally appointed governors of Massachusetts, 
Bellomont believed he occupied a decisive position within William III’s new English 
Protestant imperial system.  His chief responsibility in this new order, he imagined, was 
the seamless integration of the northeast into England’s larger Atlantic empire, an 
accomplishment he hoped would catapult him into the elite power circles at court.  The 
adhesive that would bind his colonies – and his reputation – to the empire was anti-
popery, a particularly virulent national crusade after the coronation of William and 
Mary.  Indeed William became the figurehead of this campaign to safeguard the far-
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flung kingdom’s Protestant purity, an image that Bellomont went so far as to deify 
while seeing his own person as the king’s sanctified surrogate in New England.  “There 
is Something that is Godlike in what the King has done for us,” he reminded the people 
of Massachusetts in his first public address as governor.  By playing into common fears 
of yet another Catholic conspiracy threatening to undermine England’s Atlantic world, 
the governor carefully worked to unite the persistent distress of colonists and 
metropolitans under the paternal protection of the crown.  Specters of popish plots 
loomed everywhere in the governor’s mind, as they did for many imperial officials and 
subjects throughout the empire.
9
   
Bellomont’s curious supplication to the Kennebec sagamores thus dripped with 
irony.  Nescambiouit’s reputation as a notorious adversary of the empire was by now 
cemented in New England society.  One prominent military officer at York in 1700 
explained to superiors how the sagamore “is said to have been very active in Comitting 
of murder and rapine dureing the time of the late Rebellion.”  Wabanakia in general, all 
New Englanders now believed, was a fertile seedbed of popish plotting.  Throughout his 
governorship Bellomont expressed perpetual angst about “some mischief hatching 
between the Jesuits and those Indians,” and advocated for Protestant ministers to be sent 
eastward to displace the priests, “who of all men living are the least admired by me.”  
The Iroquois were even encouraged to round up the treasonous agents of Rome from 
their homelands and bring them into Albany for prosecution.  Before long, the governor 
had riled his council in Boston into a frenzy about the “Popish Missionaries” who 
“poison the Indians with their gross idolatry and superstition,” a crime “derogatory to 
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English laws and government.”  The Governor’s Council in New Hampshire, another of 
Bellomont’s colonies, praised King William as the liberator of Europe from popish 
tyranny and oppression, but whose efforts, they informed the monarch, were being 
thwarted among the Wabanaki by “Popish Emissaries” shrewdly “poysoning them with 
their Hellish doctrines.”  Before his speedy retreat from the Wabanaki in southern 
Maine in 1700, one of Bellomont’s Protestant missionaries wrote to him regarding “the 
activity of the priests and the concealment of some design.”
10
   
The suppression of piracy, coupled with the foiling of ubiquitous popish 
scheming, was thus Bellomont’s ticket to metropolitan fame and fortune, all the while 
facilitating the consolidation of an English Atlantic empire.  When the governor 
implored the aid of Indians notoriously complicit in these popish machinations, and in 
the recent maritime depredations against the imperial economy, he revealed just how 
desperate he had become to secure these lofty ambitions.  But the ends evidently 
justified the means, a reality with which Bellomont quickly came to terms while fearing 
his London superiors would not.  Nescambiouit and his attendant headmen – 
representatives of people equally-resolute to consolidate an Atlantic world and define 
its character – were subsequently presented with a unique and ironic opportunity in 
Bellomont’s imperial design and effort at self-promotion.  
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It was thus in an undoubtedly wild amalgam of relief, ecstasy, and astonishment 
that Governor Bellomont received news in late October, 1699, of Bradish and 
Wetherley’s capture at the hands of Nescambiouit.  With the assistance of several 
Kennebecs, the sagamore apprehended the pirates somewhere on the waves or in the 
forests of southern Wabanakia, and brought them in to English authorities at the Saco 
garrison.  “Tis Escambuit that has taken them,” a slightly embarrassed Bellomont 
acknowledged to imperial officials, unsure how much of the full story to unveil.  The 
cash reward – his own diplomatic scheme – “has prevail’d” far “more than Affection or 
principle” on the part of the Indians, the governor emphasized, and Nescambiouit 
accordingly “has receiv’d the 300 pieces of eight I promis’d him.”  And to further 
assuage the fears of metropolitan officials still questioning Bellomont’s competency as 
an imperialist and pirate-hunter, the governor added that “I have order’d ‘em to be well 
secur’d with Irons.”  Such efforts though were again bungled when the crafty and 
persistent pirates both “fil’d off their fetters” and “broke the floor of the prison & 
thought to escape that way.”  After their retreat was thwarted, “I ordered them to be 
manicled and chained to one another,” Bellomont explained, adding further that “this 




Over the next few months, the governor carried on his anxious struggle to 
transform Nescambiouit’s apprehension of Bradish and Wetherley – the first pirates 
brought to justice under Bellmont’s watch – into a more palatable account where he 
himself, rather than a notorious imperial enemy, was the central protagonist.  This 
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clever recasting of events soon began to pay dividends.  By the end of November, in a 
boast of his tally of several captured pirates including Captain William Kidd, Bellomont 
was reminding superiors of “my taking Joseph Bradish and Joe Wetherby” through the 
“extraordinary pains and vigilance I have used.”  When His Majesty’s Ship Advice 
departed from Boston to London that winter carrying Bradish, Wetherley, Kidd and 
about thirty other seafaring outlaws, it transported the effects of Bellomont’s ambitious 
self-posturing and the refuse of his struggle to structure an Atlantic world amenable to 
his empire.  After the arrival of the criminals in England, their trial before a Court of 
Admiralty, and their execution on the docks of Newgate “for several piracyes and 
Roberies,” the governor began to witness the fruits of his labors.  An impressed Board 
of Trade, ignoring completely the indispensible role of the Wabanaki sagamore, lauded 
“Your Lordships care in seizing the Persons and securing the Effects” of the pirates, a 
feat that “deserves great Commendations, and it has been accordingly represented to his 
Majesty.”  Bellomont, however, quietly understood the troubling and contradictory 
secret of his success.  But the ends justified the means, the governor again convinced 
himself, as he continued to co-opt the sagamore’s valuable natural knowledge to further 
enrich the colony.  By the end of that year, he was busy instructing his officers at Saco 
fort “to try to Ingage Essacambuit to fetch you Some of the Lead ore” in the 
neighboring forests, “and Send it to me as Soon as you Can.”
12
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 Nescambiouit had his own motives for participating in this trans-Atlantic game 
of power and prestige.  His interests, moreover, ironically paralleled those of the 
governor in striking ways.  When Bellomont broached his proposal during an official 
peace conference with the Indian headmen in Boston, its implications were situated in 
an immediate context of diplomacy and imperial negotiation.  The bounty on Bradish 
and Wetherley’s heads thus presented the Wabanaki sagamores in attendance with a 
lucrative opportunity to curry favor with New England officials in the wake of another 
destructive colonial war in the northeast, thereby permitting them to play off one 
imperial regime against the other.  Nescambiouit’s apprehension of the notorious 
villains of the English Atlantic, and his surrender of them to Massachusetts authorities, 
thus afforded a significant degree of prestige and power within English imperial 
structures.   
 Though Governor Bellomont accentuated the efficacy of his pecuniary reward in 
procuring the pirates, Nescambiouit and those Indians he spoke for were far from cash-
hungry market-driven consumers.  This diplomatic opportunity to augment Wabanaki 
authority in the northeast was far more valuable than any European currency.  Yet the 
substantial sum of three hundred pieces of eight also offered Nescambiouit a chance to 
enhance his prestige within Wabanaki society, and that of his people within the wider 
northeast, through material channels.  His new purchasing power in the trans-Atlantic 
exchange networks that now permeated Wabanakia could direct the flow of more and 
better trade goods into native communities throughout southern Maine, reinforcing 
Nescambiouit’s revered status among his own people.  Underlying Joseph Bradish and 
Tee Wetherley’s remarkable saga, then, lay multiple quests for freedom, material gain, 
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and esteem that stretched far beyond the northeastern coast.  The pirates’ ultimate 
failure cost them their lives, the governor’s attenuated victory hinged on dubious 
imperial allies, and the sagamore’s striking success dictated both.   
 Nescambiouit’s role in the pirate affair proved to be only the beginning of his 
astonishing odyssey in the Atlantic.  After another imperial conflagration enveloped 
Europe in 1702, this time over fears of a continental French-Spanish alliance, the 
sagamore accompanied by most Wabanaki communities exploited the opportunity to 
once again strike back against the further encroachment of English colonialism in the 
region.  By now, Nescambiouit’s military prowess throughout the northeastern 
borderlands had become so renowned among New Englanders that it earned him such 
colorful titles as “Bloody Devil” and “insulting monster” by such charitable Puritan 
figures as Cotton Mather and Samuel Penhallow, respectively.  Later Massachusetts 
governor Thomas Hutchinson referred to him as “a notable chief, much dreaded by the 
English upon the frontiers.”  Though Wabanaki warrior-leaders like Nescambiouit 
spurred the divine supplications of countless English colonists, to the French they were 
the answer to their prayers.  Indeed authorities in New France came to see the sagamore 
as their dependable ally, as a native empire-builder laboring under the fleur-de-lis in the 
forests of North America.  In 1705, for example, Nescambiouit led a contingent of 
Wabanaki warriors along with six to seven hundred French soldiers and inhabitants 
against the distant English fishing settlement of St. John’s, Newfoundland.  Within 
hours, the community was ransacked and all English were taken prisoners.  The native 
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headman was rewarded for his exploits with a trip to France in 1705, a tour that 
culminated in a memorable royal audience with Louis XIV at Versailles.
13
      
 Like the trans-oceanic peregrinations of Wabanaki before him, Nescambiouit’s 
journey to France was understood as another valuable Atlantic opportunity, and 
consequently as a chance to entrench native authority in the northeast.  Traveling as a 
guest of honor through the homeland of his French neighbors and meeting the font of 
paternal benevolence whose affection stretched to Wabanakia presented the sagamore 
with access to a rich and exotic knowledge that would enrich his own people upon 
returning home.  Yet to maximize the yield of this unique occasion Nescambiouit knew 
he must embody the strong fidelity that bound his society to that of his hosts.  This 
necessitated playing into French expectations of native affinities.  
The sagamore’s subsequent performance at the Sun King’s court was thus a 
carefully engineered spectacle aimed at manipulating a rare opportunity.  Standing 
before the royal audience at Versailles, adorned in full native regalia, Nescambiouit 
boasted of his battlefield prowess deep in the American wilderness.  While slowly 
lifting his arm before Louis and his courtiers, he proclaimed that “this hand of mine has 
slain one hundred and fifty of your Majesty's enemies, within the territories of New-
England.”  The monarch was so enamored by the warrior’s apparent commitment to the 
empire that he knighted him and bestowed an annual pension of eight livres for life.  
Upon returning to Wabanakia the following year, Nescambiouit continued his 
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aggressive resistance in the war against English colonialism, now bolstered by the 
ornate saber given to him by King Louis.
14
   
The native celebrity’s trans-Atlantic tour in France, particularly the spectacle of 
his legendary meeting with the king, was also carefully orchestrated by French colonial 
officials anxious about their increasingly tenuous alliance with the Wabanaki.  By 
lavishing one of their headmen with gifts, and lauding in the royal palace at Versailles, 
the French tapped into traditional Wabanaki customs of diplomacy and kinship-
building.  But this cross-cultural manipulation was by no means unilateral.  By playing 
into European fascinations with Indians and exhibiting the fearless devotion Wabanaki 
supposedly felt for their French colonial neighbors, Nescambiouit shrewdly positioned 
himself and his people as indispensible components of Louis’ imperial vision.  Because 
of the sagamore’s performance, the Wabanaki solidified their role as critical cogs in a 
larger Atlantic machine, and thereby secured the respect and rewards that such a 
position offered. 
Nescambiouit’s wartime exploits, and his performative narration of them at 
Versailles, belied the cautious neutrality that pervaded southern Wabanakia in the 
immediate wake of King William’s War.  As in 1678, the war had taken a tremendous 
toll on native populations closest to northern New England, and the seeming 
inevitability of colonialism’s return to the region prompted Wabanaki to readjust their 
management strategy.  It was hardly surprising, then, that when further political turmoil 
in Europe spawned another imperial contest in 1702, a spirit of ambivalence rather than 
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opportunism circulated among their communities.  With their coast and sea removed of 
any debilitating threats, southern Wabanaki at the outbreak of the War of Spanish 
Succession, or Queen Anne’s War, understood the risks of outright involvement to far 
outweigh its potential rewards.          
 Prevailing attitudes among northern Wabanaki contrasted starkly with those of 
their southern kin.  Far removed from the locus of English power in southern New 
England, and neighboring the French in Acadia, Micmac shunned any hint of the 
neutrality that dominated among their Wabanaki kin to the south.  To them, Europe’s 
incessant imperial rivalry offered an open door to a stronger and more secure native 
Atlantic.  Their response to the declaration of war in 1702 was swift, and their target 
was again the English fishery.    By the end of that year, Micmac marine-warriors had 
successfully hijacked upwards of twenty fishing vessels off the coast of Nova Scotia, 
and news of their exploits circulated throughout southern New England.  In late summer 
of the following year, settlers grew increasingly terrified when “about 200 Cape Sable 
Indians…came round the bay of Fundee” and “debauched all the Eastern Coast from St. 
Croix to the Province of Main, and with the greatest profidy and secrecy scatter’d 
themselves to the Length of 100 miles.”
15
   
The return of Wabanaki maritime violence not only revived the threat to 
England’s imperial economy, but also compromised the fragile metropolitan status of 
Massachusetts Governor Joseph Dudley.  Dudley succeeded the Earl of Bellomont after 
his death in 1701, inheriting not only the governorship but also Bellomont’s neurotic 
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self-consciousness.  In fall 1702, the governor found himself backed into an impossible 
corner when the renewal of Wabanaki seaborne assaults coincided with a request from 
the Board of Trade to ship soldiers and materiel to the war effort in Jamaica.  After 
carefully considering the conundrum and its repercussions for both his social standing 
and his colony, the governor reminded his superiors in September that “in every War 
we have been attack’t by the Indians… and Expect the same everyday now.”  If that 
was not enough to merit exemption from his quota, Dudley intimated that “we are the 
most distant Government on the Shoar of America from Jamaica being more than 500 
Leagues.”  The officials, however, remained obstinate.  In November, the governor 
grudgingly acquiesced and informed the Lords of his compliance “if this new motion of 
the Indians do not prevent me.”  Eager to get in the last word, he closed his 
correspondence on the matter by pointing out that now “there will be no Ship of War 
left for the Guard of Our Coasts here.”
16
    
Fortunately for Dudley, the Micmac’s southern Wabanaki neighbors continued 
to maintain their neutrality in the conflict into the following spring.  The persistent 
desire of Maine Indians to carefully navigate a nonviolent course with New England 
was economically expedient.  Native communities compensated for the waning quality 
and quantity of French goods in the region by negotiating with the English for more 
convenient access to their more profitable trade networks.  When Massachusetts’ galley 
sailed to the southern Maine coast with trade goods in summer of 1700, the Kennebec 
sagamore Moxes divulged to the captain a recent letter he had received from Quebec 
officials.  The letter, Moxes explained, detailed King Louis’ displeasure regarding 
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Wabanaki intercourse with Massachusetts authorities, and threatened punishment if the 
headman failed to suppress it.  The amicable Wabanaki-Anglo diplomacy so heartened 
New England leaders that they launched their first concerted campaign of religious 
conversion in the region.  By the following December, officials in Boston managed to 
muster two English ministers to instruct neighboring Indians near the garrisons at Saco 
and Casco Bay.  Coastal Wabanaki also came to expect regular exchange opportunities 
from Boston sailor Cyprian Southack’s trading ship as it sailed throughout regional 
waters over the next two years.  By 1702, Wabanaki had also successfully persuaded 
Governor Dudley to construct more truck houses northeast of Casco Bay with better 
terms of exchange, and thereby secured more convenient and dependable access to the 
colony’s new mercantile trade policy.  As Queen Anne’s War spread throughout the 
Dawnland, socio-economic circumstances in southern Wabanakia necessitated a course 
of action altogether different from that of their northeastern kin.
17
  
The profitable socio-economic relationships Indians forged and maintained with 
New England were placed at the service of native interests in another critical way.  
They could also function as conduits for the communication of valuable trans-Atlantic 
intelligence.  The extensive Wabanaki information networks that linked their 
communities to the metropoles of their imperial neighbors throughout King William’s 
War maintained a critical function during the subsequent interlude of peace, and 
increased in importance as another conflict loomed across the ocean.  After expressing 
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their satisfaction with being “so well supplied with what we want from the English” 
during a treaty conference at Casco Bay in June, 1701, Wabanaki from the Kennebec 
implored the Massachusetts agents to “give us notice of the likelyhood of a War 
between the French and the English.”  Such diplomatic intelligence was critical to the 
maintenance of native sovereignty in the borderlands, the native delegates assured their 
counterparts, since “we desire to keep ourselves free, and not to be under the command 
of any party.”  By making explicit their autonomy from French control, Wabanaki 
delegates endeavored to use their socio-economic relationships with New England to 
better position themselves within England’s extensive information networks.
18
       
The increasingly amiable rapport between southern Wabanaki and English also 
afforded Indians a measure of power in their relationship with Quebec.  The native 
attempt to compensate for the plummeting supply of French goods with English 
alternatives  was no secret among French colonial officials, and by the middle of King 
William’s War Versailles was regularly enjoined to ameliorate the problem by shipping 
more presents.  By 1700, increasingly desperate French leaders aimed to exploit the 
powerful kinship ties that continued to bind Wabanaki to the crown.  The governor of 
Quebec chided Moxes in 1700 for his correspondence with Massachusetts by warning 
the headman “what the King his master would do to punish him and his Indians.”  
When threats of royal wrath failed to modify Indian behavior, reinforcing royal 
benevolence with material support did.  Two years after the governor’s fear-mongering, 
southern Wabanaki were migrating to Quebec for more convenient access to the 
presents that “the King through his kindness” sent them.  In a heartfelt letter addressed 
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in 1705, the same Indians praised Louis’ paternal “kindness” – “a compassion so great” 
– after receiving renewed supplies of gifts and war materiel.  And in case this sincere 
expression of gratitude was not sufficient to augment the king’s benevolence, reminding 
him of their relationship’s fragility could.  Indians accordingly concluded their letter by 




Aside from accentuating the mutual obligations of their kinship with the French 
monarch, the Wabanaki letter of 1705 also indicated troubling developments in the 
Dawnland.  The pacific course pursued by native communities in southern Maine since 
King William’s War had since become untenable, and several joined northeastern 
Micmac campaigns of land-based and maritime violence during Queen Anne’s War.  
The rather rapid dissolution of Wabanaki neutrality from 1700 to 1705 was precipitated 
by certain renewed colonial pressures on Indians’ longstanding relationship to the 
ocean.  These threats had by now become all too familiar to southern Wabanaki, 
mirroring those that had surfaced in the aftermath of King Philip’s War and the return 
of a belligerent English colonialism in Maine.   
Like Edmund Andros before them, Massachusetts leaders at the turn of the 
century assumed command of a colony recently emerged from a destructive, costly and 
largely maritime war against its native neighbors to the north.  Like Andros too, various 
governors embarked on a remedial campaign to sever native access to the ocean, a 
move that aimed to prevent another naval conflagration in the future and secure the 
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northwestern contours of the ocean for England’s Atlantic empire.  As early as January 
1700, the colony commissioned the construction of a line of fortifications along the 
southern Maine coast, including the rebuilding of Pemaquid, sacked by a joint-naval 
force of French and Indians during the previous war.  This militant presence was 
absolutely “necessary for the Securing of the Timber and Fishery on that Coast,” 
officials deemed, “and to encourage the resettling the Province of Main and the more 
Eastern parts which have been destroyed and laid waste in the late War.”  A strong 
redoubt was similarly ordered for nearby Johns Island, “for its better defence in Case of 
an Attack from the sea.”  As they had after 1678, Wabanaki aimed to forge more 
equitable relations with New England, but increasingly encountered a heated 




Governor Dudley ramped up these efforts to fortify an English Atlantic by 
aggressively policing the ocean’s accessibility to Indians in early 1703.  Prominent 
Boston seaman Captain Cyprian Southack was accordingly commanded to lead a vessel 
“equipped, armed and manned” to the eastward “for guarding of the coast.”  Later that 
year, Dudley supplemented Southack’s mission by manipulating the ancient animosities 
between southern New England’s Algonquian neighbors and the Wabanaki.  A polyglot 
force bound by a common hatred of Wabanaki was accordingly recruited “of English 
and Indians with Sloopes to attend the Coast Eastward” in order “to keep the Indians 
from the benefit of the sea.”  By October, the governor acquired the support of his 
colony to sever Maine Indians from the other trans-Atlantic socio-economic network 
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sustaining their communities.  Wabanaki shortly thereafter discovered the 
Massachusetts “Galley and two Sloops well fitted Cruising upon the Eastern Coast to 
prevent any french Trade” with their settlements.  Such a strategy, Indians well 
understood, was by no means unprecedented, and its seventeenth-century antecedents 
were unmistakable.  Governor Dudley also comprehended the crippling effect of his 
disruptive policies on native authority in the region, boasting to the Earl of Nottingham, 
his primary connection at Court, that the Wabanaki “are in good order, I Having 
carefully guarded their coast.”
21
   
 Indians also encountered colonial infrastructure projects in the interior that 
targeted their utilization of the ocean.  The extensive riverine systems spread throughout 
Wabanakia linked the sea to the inland forests in a system that long sustained native 
communities with various anadromous marine life during their seasonal periods away 
from the ocean.  And as English learned over the course of two wars, rivers also 
provided quick and convenient access to the sea from locations far inland.  In 1700, 
Massachusetts thus formulated a project based on the recommendation of Colonel 
William Romer, His Majesty’s Chief Engineer in America.  The strategic design 
consisted of “a good redoubt made a mile and halfe from the Cascade or Fall” on Saco 
River, a fortification further strengthened by “a Boom cross the river to hinder the 
Indians in their Canoes from coming round about the said Falls, and so to the Sea for 
which reasons we ought to be Masters of the river.”  This scheme’s congruence with the 
damming of the Saco River in the 1680s with “Nets, and Sains [seines]” which “Stop’d 
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the Fish” was an unmistakable affront to Indians’ longstanding maritime economy.  
And as in 1688, this blatant offense was one in a confluence of colonial injuries that 
would impel Wabanaki to violently strike back.
22
 
In addition to a renewed pressure on access to their eastern frontiers, Indians 
also experienced colonial efforts to restrict their movement to the northwest.  Native 
migration routes to the St. Lawrence forged over the preceding half century had not 
only allowed southern Wabanaki to escape their war-ravaged homelands, but also 
linked those who remained to a valuable socio-economic nexus that served as a viable 
alternative to that of New England.  Yet through King William’s War the English also 
witnessed the violent implications of these connections for their own regional security.  
While they simultaneously maneuvered to remove Indians from the ocean in the east, 
Massachusetts leaders thus moved with an equal sense of urgency to cut off access to 
New France.  In a treaty council at Casco Bay in summer, 1701, Massachusetts 
commissioners admonished all Indians present to metaphorically “cut down trees” in 
the paths to Quebec, and stop the flow of migrants to and from the French.  The 
Wabanaki delegates quickly voiced their displeasure at this injunction, informing the 
colonial leaders that “many of our Brethren would be hindered from coming over to us” 
if these connections were severed.  “Besides,” they continued, “many amongst us care 
not to be deprived of the liberty of going whither they please.” The trajectory of these 
colonial policies, Wabanaki were coming to learn in the wake of another conflict, was 
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to confine the Dawnland to an evermore narrow space, geographically, economically, 
socially and diplomatically.
23
   
 Indians’ steadily-mounting disillusionment with their colonial English neighbors 
was fueled by more than the environmental and diplomatic pressures threatening their 
Atlantic relationships.  As was developing in their exchanges with French officials, the 
troubling trans-Atlantic fates of Indian children profoundly disrupted familial structures 
in Indian communities.  Native children willingly sent or unwillingly taken abroad with 
English travelers were by 1700 often failing to return home, and Wabanaki 
consequently began to comprehend with greater clarity a dangerous English Atlantic 
world locked in competition for ascendancy over their own.  Rather than affording 
native society a valuable cultural knowledge through the travels of their children, this 
threatening and increasingly unpredictable world severed Wabanaki from both their 
ocean and their children.                
 By 1702, one of these unsettling Atlantic journeys was severely complicating 
diplomatic relations with Massachusetts.  Sometime during King William’s War, a 
Wabanaki boy came into the custody of Sir William Phips, perhaps during one of Phips’ 
military excursions to the eastward.  After assuming the Massachusetts governorship 
during the war, Phips was summoned to London by the Board of Trade in 1694 over the 
concerns of a faction who wished to see him replaced.  The Wabanaki youth 
accompanied Phips on his trip, and like the governor, never returned to New England.  
He continued to occupy the minds and hearts of his native kin, and by 1702 Governor 
Dudley was struggling to manage the fallout.  “If I had known it in England,” Dudley 
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scrambled to assure Wabanaki delegates at a conference that summer, “I would have 
brought him, but since I arrived I have written to pray the Queen that he may be sent to 
me, and if my letters do not miscarry and he be living, I have no doubt but to restore 
him to you.”
24
   
By the following summer, the missing boy had still not been returned.  Indians 
then tried to expedite matters by using a few of their English captives acquired in King 
William’s War as bargaining chips.  Dudley subsequently marshalled his chief contact 
at Court, the Earl of Nottingham, to undertake a fact-finding mission, informing him 
that “the Sachims of these Indians have alwaies in their Treaties urged that an Indian 
boy carried into England by Sir William Phips might be returned, and I pray it on their 
behalf.  It would be a great benefit to us in our Treaties.”  Sir Henry Ashurst was likely 
the key to the child’s successful return, Dudley continued, given his earlier friendship 
with Phips in England.  Regardless, the governor wished Nottingham to know that 
“there are two or three Christian captives of the last war that I cannot get without the 
return of this Indian boy.”  Nottingham’s subsequent investigation revealed that the 
child had indeed been “in the service” of Ashurst for the past fourteen years.  Though 
Nottingham endeavored to negotiate the boy’s release, the outcome of his efforts went 
unrecorded.  The ongoing disappointment and anger in Wabanakia engendered by their 
native son’s unknown fate in England continued to sour relations with the 
Massachusetts leadership.  After southern Wabanaki joined their northeastern Micmac 
neighbors in arms against the English in late 1703, Dudley fumed to the Board of Trade 
the following spring that “the Indian boy mentioned in that letter will now be uselesse, 
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The mysterious fates of Indian children given over by their communities in good 
faith to English patrons were also a point of contention corrupting Wabanaki-New 
England relations.  And as they did with the boy kidnapped by William Phips, Indians 
used treaty negotiations to secure their return.  At a conference in Casco Bay in summer 
1701, Massachusetts proposed to take a few native youth to England for religious and 
academic instruction.  Wabanaki carefully considered such opportunities in the not-so-
distant past, but they had since become fraught with peril and dishonesty.  The native 
delegates respectfully declined the offer, relating how one of their sons, “when he was 
sent to France, he died there.”  They also reminded the English that they still possessed 
two of their children “called John & Robin, which we believe have by this time learned 
to read & write English enough, and they never yet have been returned amongst us.”  
The English, scrambling for a diplomatic rebuttal, explained to them that one of the 
children in question had since died while the other was sent to London, where he 
remained well provided for, though “he hath lost his Language” and “will not incline to 
return.”  Indians found this rejoinder anything but pacifying.  A year later, at a meeting 
to negotiate the release of English prisoners held at Penobscot, Wabanaki leaders agreed 
to hand over their captives only “for our chield in England which wee all soe much 
Desier to see.”  Though the outcome of this custody rights battle was left out of the 
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council minutes, Indian communities were learning difficult lessons about the 
inequitable nature of their relationship to English colonialism.  After 1704, Wabanaki 
children were seldom if ever sent abroad again.  When Protestant minister Samuel 
Moody requested the son of prominent Kennebec sagamore Bomazeen in 1715, so that 
he might be “instructed in the Christian Religion,” the headman and father simply 
“could not find in his heart to agree.”
26
  
The accumulating pressures poisoning southern Wabanaki relations with New 
England made neutrality in Queen Anne’s War less and less feasible.  But it was not 
until a violent spark touched off this combustible mass in spring 1703 that Indians 
abandoned their policy of nonviolence and joined the Micmac in war against the 
English.  As in 1676, this final impetus emerged quite literally from the English Atlantic 
in a bloody maritime “act of horrid cruelty and injustice.”  In March 1703, privateer 
Samuel Chadwell accompanied by his crew aboard the Flying Horse anchored off 
Naskeag Point in Maine, near the home of French settler Philip Meneer.  Meneer was 
married to the daughter of Saint-Castin and Madockawando’s daughter, and thereby 
related through kinship to neighboring Wabanaki communities.  The Penobscot 
sagamore Wanungonet later related that Chadwell’s crew came to the homestead and 
“prompted meneer to Pilot them into a french place which they were designed to 
plunder” and “threatened to carry him on board.”  When Meneer refused, “Chadwell 
struck him forward with the butt end of his gun” at which point the other privateers 
“immediately fired att him, and shott him through ye body.”  Kenegeto, a Wabanaki 
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neighbor, was taken aboard the ship while some of the crew “then abused meneers wife 
and rifled his hous,” robbing him of large quantities of beaver furs, “7 pistols, 5 pieces 
of eight, and 20 new Engd shillings.”  After leaving Meneer on shore to die, raping his 
wife and “most barbarously treating an old squaw that lived there,” the assailants set 
sail with their plunder.
27
  
News of the “unhappy Infraction” at Naskeag Point spread quickly through 
Wabanakia and inflamed native communities.  A few weeks later, three Indians 
accompanied by three French settlers in two canoes “Came a Perposs from the Estward 
to Ballance what Capt: Chadwall had Committed in those Parts,” hijacking a sloop and 
killing one of the crewmen.  In April, several Kennebec sagamores including Moxes 
approached Cyprian Southack’s ship near the mouth of the Kennebec River, and 
commanded him to sail on further “to Penobscott to Make Satisfaction to all Indians for 
what Captain Chadwell Took from Them.”  Around the same time, Samuel Penhallow 
and Theodore Atkinson’s colony-commissioned voyage to the Penobscot Indians 
encountered a general feeling of terror among local English settlers near Sagadehoc.  
Neighboring Indians’ “different carriages” and “frequent threatnings” led colonists to 
believe another war was eminent, and was “occasioned by ye late Infraction of 
Chadwell and his Company att Naaskeag.”  Moxes also approached Penhallow and 
Atkinson’s ship at Kennebec River, and when they assured him of their intention to take 
supplies to his aggrieved friends at Penobscot, he expressed much satisfaction 
“accounting that to bee the principall river,” and its leader the “ancientst and most 
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Principall Sagamore.”  Because of the Penobscot region’s preeminence as the nucleus 
of Wabanaki social and political life, Chadwell’s atrocities there were an attack on all of 
Wabanakia, from southern Maine to northeastern Acadia.  Indians stole and plundered 
another sloop near Kennebunk later that summer, and English settlements throughout 
the region were similarly targeted for retribution.
28
   
Governor Dudley quickly comprehended the catastrophic potential of 
Chadwell’s raid, and traveled to Casco Bay that summer to confer personally with 
sagamores from Kennebec and Penobscot.  There the governor lavished “all the 
Sachimes of Penobscot,” as well as “the three Tribes” under Moxes, with presents and 
assurances that the late “Mischeif doen upon them was without my knowledge.”  
Dudley and his associates sailed back to Boston confident that their careful diplomatic 
maneuvering successfully quelled the alarm pervading Wabanakia.  Yet the benevolent 
and bountiful treatment Wabanaki experienced at the peace council was 
counterbalanced by Dudley’s belligerent posturing that same summer.  As a preemptive 
measure after first hearing of the Chadwell incident, the governor mobilized two 
companies of ground troops which he “march’d into the Province of Mayne.”  “I have 
all things in readiness,” he informed superiors at Whitehall, and will “be not surprised if 
they rise.”  Dudley’s earnest words would prove ominous by the end of the summer.  
Confronted with a renewed campaign to aggressively police their access to sea, 
troubling incidents of trans-Atlantic kidnapping, a bloody atrocity from colonial 
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privateers, and the buildup of New England troops on their doorstep, southern 
Wabanaki pursued a proven recourse to mitigate these pressures.  The ongoing imperial 




The dissolution of native neutrality in southern Maine was also propelled by 
ongoing Micmac and French violence against New England.  When northeastern 
Wabanaki and their French allies renewed familiar methods of maritime aggression 
early in Queen Anne’s War, and experienced striking successes with it, they encouraged 
the participation of their increasingly disillusioned southern kin in the Kennebec and 
Penobscot regions.  As it had in earlier colonial conflicts, the cohering locus of 
Wabanaki socio-political life at Penobscot served as a headquarters for disparate 
communities from northeastern Nova Scotia to southwestern Maine.  In mid-summer of 
1703, “a great French ship” with several “Cape Sables Indians” arrived from Nova 
Scotia at Mount Desert Island near the mouth of Penobscot River to join Maine Indians 
and launch their campaigns against English settlements to the south.  In September, an 
additional two hundred Micmac “came round the bay of Fundee and…debauched all the 
Eastern Coast from St. Croix to the Province of Main,” striking as far south as Saco and 
Wells with southern Wabanaki warriors.
30
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By the end of 1703, native communities in southern Maine had all migrated to 
Penobscot under the realization that their homelands would again be consumed in the 
intensifying conflagration.  Samuel Penhallow and Theodore Atkinson’s expedition up 
the coast reported that there “was not an Indian to bee seen” northeast of Sagadahoc.  
After encountering a colonist in a canoe offshore, the crew learned that “the Indians 
were all fled 10 days before wee came,” and “most of them did retire att Penobscot 
fort.” When Governor Dudley mobilized six hundred soldiers on snowshoes to range 
the region’s forests for Indians and prove to them that “we can beare the frost” as 
heartily as they, the troops discovered that their targets had “early before Christ masse 
gone Eastward as far as Penobscot.”  The Wabanaki coalescence at the site of the 
“ancientst and most Principall Sagamore,” as Moxes referred to it, signaled not only 
their attempt to reinforce its integrity after Chadwell’s defilement, but also an intention 
to shore up their forces and renew a proven maritime strategy.
31
   
The native struggle with New England throughout Queen Anne’s War was 
largely a contest over Atlantic hegemony, over control of Atlantic spaces and resources.  
It thus mirrored prior colonial conflicts in the northeast not only in the long-term causes 
but also in its subsequent development.  As fighting broke out along New England’s 
northeastern frontiers, ashore and afloat, Wabanaki experienced a concerted English 
plan to ramp up earlier efforts to displace Indians from the sea, integrate marine and 
terrestrial resources into the English Atlantic economy, and augment colonial authority 
on the region’s waves.  This imperial crusade to redefine Indians’ maritime world until 
amenable to incorporation into a larger and more coherent English Atlantic world thus 
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surfaced as the fundamental problem threatening Wabanaki authority during the war.  
Indians responded by pursuing a familiar and historically-successful course.          
Queen Anne’s War in the northeast rapidly transitioned into a contest for the 
Atlantic shortly after disparate Wabanaki communities closed ranks and assembled at 
Penobscot.  To English colonial leaders familiar with native actions during the imperial 
war just a few years prior, this development portended the renewal of maritime violence 
that would again jeopardize the empire’s economic and political ambitions.  New 
England officials accordingly implemented a preemptive campaign that quickly struck 
at the native seafaring presence.  In early spring 1704, Governor Dudley ordered “about 
seven hundred men to Range the coast from casco bay for to St. Croix the extent of this 
Government to keep the Indians from their fishing,” a move designed “to distresse them 
farther against winter, which will demand twenty sloops with provision to attend.”  By 
that summer, the formidable sea-ranging force was bolstered by the presence of two 
frigates, the Gospir and Jersey, on loan from New York.  Indians discovered this 
formidable fleet lurking on the waves as far northeast as “L’accadia and all along the 
coast, on both sides the bay of fundee.”  Over the ensuing weeks, it successfully 
“Ranged all the coast from Kenebeck River as far as Saint Johns, and taken 
considerable plunder and burnt all the Setlements,” much to the joy of leaders in 
Boston.  Such naval measures were designed to further supplement Massachusetts’ 
earlier commissioning of six hundred men to “range the Coast” of Maine and “insult the 
Eastern Coast of Nova Scotia, & Port Royal.”  To entice volunteers for this effort, the 
colony established a bounty of one hundred pounds for each Indian scalp obtained.  The 
plan also made provisions to ensure that “the Fishery & Coasters may be guarded with a 
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Sloop or two suitable for their Security.”  A favorable outcome to Queen Anne’s War, 
Indians and English alike recognized, would be predicated on an immediate fortification 
of their maritime world.
32
   
After convening at their base of operations along the Penobscot, Indians from 
the farthest reaches of Wabanakia formulated a strategic response to the breakdown of 
native-English relations.  The reclamation of a distinctly native seascape would be 
forged through another campaign of maritime violence targeted not only at English 
sailors and their equipment, but also at the very heart of their imperial economy.  The 
victories achieved with this strategy again reverberated far beyond the northeast and 
aroused the worst economic fears of imperial leaders.  After his diplomatic tour of 
French Acadia earlier in the war, Boston merchant Samuel Vetch alerted officials in 
London of the miserable state of New England’s fishing economy in 1708.  Thanks to 
Wabanaki seafaring assaults, and the French support they often enjoyed, “their fishery 
is quite ruined,” Vetch alerted the Board of Trade.  “[W]hereas they had many hundreds 
of vessells, who formerly both catched and made their fish along this shore,” he 
continued, the English are currently “almost wholly debared this trade, to the 
unexpressible loss of New England in particular, and all the English Islands in generall, 
                                                 
32
 “Letter from Col Dudley to the Board; Dated the 20
th
 of April 1704,” in James Phinney Baxter, ed., 
Baxter Manuscripts IX: 179-184; “Letter from Col. Dudley to the Board, relating to ye State of the 
Massachusets Bay Dated the 13 July 1704,” in James Phinney Baxter, ed., Baxter Manuscripts IX:  189-





who used to be supplyed from thence with codd and mackerel, in great quantityes, and 
att low rates for the subsistance of themselves and slaves.”
33
   
Other alarming reports were reaching Queen Anne herself.  She learned from 
Governor Dudley in November 1709 that the Wabanaki “make Inroads upon us on the 
Land Side” and “Infest us to the last Degree on the Sea-part, in a great Measure to the 
Obstructing of Commerce & Navigation from Great Britain, and your Majesties 
Plantations in America.”  Royal assistance to combat this imperial crisis, the governor 
hoped, would ameliorate the inadequacies of his earlier strategy to arm Captain William 
Pickering’s fleet of ships “to attend and Guard the Fishing Vessells” against the 
incursions of “the Indian Enemy & Rebels.”  Pickering’s vessels were commissioned, at 
his own expense, to “Convoy the Fishing Vessells in a Fleet, both out and home and 
attend them on the Fishing Grounds, and in the harbours; Keeping them…together as 
their Fishing may allow, that you may be the better able to cover and Protect them.”  
Considerable resources at home and at Court, already stretched thin in this hemispheric 
war for empire, were thus cultivated and expended to mitigate the potential catastrophe 
looming over the imperial economy.
34
   
On the ground, and on the sea, there was ample cause for this collective panic.  
Andrew Robbinson, captain of a Gloucester fishing crew, applied to the governor’s 
office in August 1709 for a commission to arm his “good large Sloop” in a “warlike 
manner” to defend himself and his neighbors against the assaults of the “barbarous 
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Salvages” off the coast of Cape Sables.  The Indians, Robbinson complained, 
“frequently interrupt them in their Fishery, and commit outrages upon them.”  
Emboldened with his robust new force, the fisherman was bound and determined to 
“make Reprizal for the loss of his Vessell taken from him the year past, and to do other 
Spoiles upon the Enemy.”  Near the end of the war, “Indians sett on some fishermen 
watering their sloops” just off the Nova Scotia coast, wounding three and carrying two 
others into captivity.  Wabanaki warriors forced a mass evacuation of English fishermen 
and their families to a nearby offshore island at the mouth of the St. John’s River in 




The garrison at Casco Bay in southern Maine, long a prominent symbol of 
English maritime colonialism in Wabanakia, also became a regular target of Indian 
seaborne violence throughout the war.  Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, a 
massive force of nearly five hundred marine-warriors, accompanied by French allies 
from Acadia, launched an extensive amphibious assault of the bay that resulted in the 
capture of “one sloop, two shallops, and much plunder.”  Over the following two days 
and nights, Indians mobilized their new prizes to lay siege to the garrison from the 
water.  Their plans were foiled, however, with the arrival of Captain Cyprian Southack 
who effectively “shattered the navy, which was upwards of 200 canoes.”  Wabanaki had 
not entirely relinquished command of the region’s waters by 1707, when a fleet of their 
mariners successfully “intercepted a fishing boat as she was sailing between the 
islands,” killing three of the crew and capturing two more.  Terror spread through the 
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Casco Bay fishing community in summer 1710 after a number of shallops fired on 
Indians “some where about Penobscut” after trading bread to them under a flag of truce.  
Given the well-known efficiency of native maritime prowess, the colonists believed that 
the Indians undoubtedly “will indeavour to revenge themselves upon some 
fishermen…ye first opptunity they have.”  A year later, three Wabanaki slipped into the 
harbor of nearby York under the cover of darkness and “carryed away a Sloop” with 
“Sundry goods on Board Her” belonging to William Hinton.
36
         
Their marine-warriors’ ongoing command of the technical aspects of sailing 
indicated the perserverence of a sophisticated nautical acumen.  Euro-American 
witnesses of and participants in naval skirmishes with Indians found this expertise 
particularly alarming since it rivaled that of their own sailors.  To the horror and shock 
of settlers at a coastal community in southern Maine, “one hundred and fifty Indians in 
fifty canoes beset Winter Harbor, where were two shallops riding at anchor” in 
September 1707.  A heated three-hour clash ensued.  Indian marines leveled a furious 
barrage of gunfire at the vessels, forcing the English to abandon one and retreat into the 
other.  Shortly after this success, the Indians stormed aboard the abandoned shallop and 
“immediately hoisted the sails before our men could hoist theirs half-way atrip.”  Those 
warriors remaining in their canoes, meanwhile, continued to shower the British vessel 
with their firepower and drove it out to sea, providing ample cover for the Wabanaki-
commandeered boat to escape up the coast.  Even when completely confined to their 
ancient form of watercraft, Indians could outmaneuver English sailing vessels.  While 
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making “Dilligent Sirch for ye Enemie, on all ye Islands and Likely places on ye Sea 
Shore as far as pinnobscut” in 1711, Colonel Thad Walton’s naval brigade encountered 
“sum Conoos which we Chast but our boats Cum not up with.”  The dejected crews 
continued to scour local waters to “drive the Indian Enemy from their fishing,” but did 
so “without any Sucksess.”
37
         
Yet the fishery was not the only cog in England’s Atlantic wheel compromised 
by Wabanaki violence.  The emergent masting industry in northern New England’s 
dense red and white pine forests was still critical for alleviating the empire’s economic 
dependence on Scandinavia and the Baltic States for ship stores.  But as it had in King 
William’s War, the extractive and invasive enterprise at the heart of the Dawnland again 
became a target of Indian violence.  Though the inhabitants of Berwick, Maine were 
happy to report to the Board of Trade early in the war that the “masting of this Province 
is Secured” because “the Indians in all the parts near us are beaten & burnt out of their 
Forts,” circumstances quickly changed.  A contingent of warriors ambushed Colonel 
Hilton of Exeter and seventeen men employed in his service, “who being deeply 
engaged in the masting affair,” went to retrieve “several trees of value that were felled 
fourteen miles up the country.”  Shortly thereafter, Governor Dudley commissioned a 
great number of guards to protect the masting enterprise in Maine.  When he received 
word that a freighter had been diverted while en route to load a freshly-cut supply in 
January 1710, he immediately notified superiors that “other Ships Must be gotten least 
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ye Masts be hurt by the Indians.”  Such fears were realized the following year when a 
substantial quantity of prime masts “were all destroyed by the Enemy” in Nova Scotia.  
The adverse economic impact of these depredations was made clear to the Board of 
Trade in February 1710.  John Bridger, Royal Surveyor of the King’s Woods, reported 
from Nova Scotia that “the Charge thereof will be thereby very greatly increased” due 
to the “more Difficult, hazardous and Precarious” nature of the business, and “by the 
great distance those Masts… must be Cutt from the Waterside up in the Woods, the 
abode of the Indians.”
38
   
Micmac Wabanaki continued to target this vulnerable segment of their imperial 
enemy’s economy even after the British conquest of Acadia in 1710.  Native violence in 
the region still fettered British access to the most valuable stores of mast trees, and thus 
prevented the sort of maximized environmental exploitation imperial architects 
envisioned would accompany military conquest.  Circumstances were hardly improving 
a year later, when Samuel Vetch, first governor of the new colony, detailed plentiful 
stores of prime mast trees of “a much larger sise” throughout Nova Scotia, but that 
necessitated a “greater expense” for their harvest because “wee are verry much infested 
by sculking partys of Indians.”  That same summer, recently arrived British authorities 
at Annapolis Royal, nervous about “the considerable risque from the lurking Indians,” 
pressed local French inhabitants into service to harvest the pines in the interior for them.  
Such efforts to exploit the French-Indian alliance proved ineffective, though, when 
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Wabanaki destroyed significant quantities of “the sparrs and beams as well as plank and 
boards” before they reached the garrison.  The timber was customarily fastened into 
floats to facilitate movement on area rivers, but “the Indians had frequently cut lose 
those floats and turned them adrift as well as threatned the inhabitants if they either cut 
or brought us any more.”  The new nominal British authority in Nova Scotia, and the 
cordial relationships Indians long experienced with French settlers in Acadia, were 




The Wabanaki experience from the conclusion of King William’s War to the 
conclusion of Queen Anne’s War was the latest phase of a wider pattern developing 
since the mid-seventeenth century.  When an accretion of colonial pressures threatened 
their Atlantic, Indians consistently exploited larger conflicts rooted beyond their 
homelands in the northeast to assuage the disruption such problems engendered.  King 
Philip’s War in southern New England offered Wabanaki a valuable opportunity to 
restructure increasingly inequitable material exchange networks, stem rapid English 
encroachment on their hunting grounds and fishing stages, and strike back at callous 
acts of maritime violence perpetrated by unscrupulous English seafarers.  Identical 
crises returned to Indian communities in the wake of war, compounded now by the 
development of colonial infrastructure that endeavored to prevent Indian mobility on 
the ocean and disrupt the use of its material resources.  The European political turmoil 
that became King William’s War dismantled Wabanaki kinship ties to the Stuart 
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dynasty, but also afforded Indians a timely opportunity to mitigate the disruption’s 
damaging effects and undermine the pressures that had revisited their communities.  
Their success with this strategy again proved fleeting, however, and after four years of 
ambivalent cooperation with New England, Wabanaki again seized imperial exigencies 
to reorder their world ashore and afloat.  By 1713, the native Atlantic had been violently 
regenerated by manipulating wider socio-political developments.  This unambiguous 
trend had come to define the previous half century in the Dawnland.   
Perhaps most striking of all was another native strategy resonating through 
Wabanaki conflicts.  Indians swiftly and systematically entered each colonial contest by 
extending it to the sea.  This approach reflected not only native confidence in their 
nautical prowess against that of the English, but also their longstanding belief that the 
pressures and processes at the heart of the Atlantic Ocean had a direct bearing on the 
security and welfare of their communities.  Launching seaborne raids against the 
English maritime presence, wreaking havoc on the imperial Atlantic economy, 
commandeering ships and plundering them of their cargo and men became critical 
components of a much larger struggle to reclaim native power.  That English authorities 
undertook equally persistent and aggressive measures to police the ocean’s accessibility 
and displace Indians from its waves is testament to exactly what was at stake by 1713.  
Queen Anne’s War was the most recent manifestation of a violent and ongoing 
contestation for the Atlantic, and the spaces, resources and opportunities that comprised 
two competing visions of its utility.   
Yet the distinctiveness of these cyclical patterns ought not to obscure the 
adaptation and evolution that simultaneously distinguished Wabanaki society.  Their 
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experience between 1699 and 1713 also demonstrated the dynamism and expansiveness 
continuing to characterize the native Atlantic.  Nescambiouit’s remarkable engagement 
with – and widely-renowned successes in – a trans-Atlantic game of power and prestige 
linked the Dawnland to the elite power circles of London and Versailles, and revealed 
just how imbricated his society had become in a world far beyond its ancient homeland.  
The Atlantic exploits of Nescambiouit thus personified the nature of the Wabanaki 
Atlantic world by the turn of the century.  In the midst of boundless colonial pressure, it 
served as a locus of ever-expanding possibilities and resources with which to sustain a 


















“Ye last & only door”: Struggling to Secure a Fleeting Vision 
 
Despite the victories secured by Wabanaki marine-warriors on the sea during 
Queen Anne’s War, the conflict’s outcome in the native northeast represented a subtle 
though noticeable departure from earlier patterns of warfare.  In 1675 and 1688, 
Wabanaki responded to the most threatening aspects of maritime colonialism by 
exploiting larger conflicts, extending conflagrations to the sea and, in King William’s 
War, employing French assistance.  And in both instances these wars for the native 
Atlantic met with a striking victory.  But by 1713, in the wake of Britain’s Acadian 
conquest, Indians were finally experiencing the limits of their involvement in colonial 
wars and their ability to fashion positive and lasting changes through them.  The sheer 
resilience of British colonialism on the northeastern frontier, the tenuous nature of 
French assistance to contain it, and France’s unilateral transfer of authority over 
enormous tracts of Wabanakia at the Treaty of Utrecht all indicated to Indians the 
distant, unpredictable and arbitrary nature of imperial rivalry. 
This chapter traces the legacy of these realizations beyond 1713 by exploring the 
transformative effects of Queen Anne’s War on the new world that Wabanaki forged for 
themselves.  It argues that postwar Indians came to terms with the conflict’s difficult 
lessons by reordering their relationships to the Atlantic processes that had developed 
over the past century but that no longer addressed the demands of their contemporary 
world.  By rethinking and reconfiguring their position within trans-Atlantic exchange 
networks, by abandoning their dependence on colonial wars to strike at and plunder the 
British Atlantic economy and by more carefully manipulating another colonial 
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governor’s quest for metropolitan fame and fortune, Indians struggled to overcome the 
obstacles of Queen Anne’s War that endangered their Atlantic world.  
This change, of course, continued to demonstrate the dynamism and pragmatic 
elasticity of the Wabanaki Atlantic vision.  Much to the dismay of French civil 
authorities, Indian refugees from southern Maine re-migrated to their ancestral 
homelands after the war, where they enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy and more 
favorable terms of trade with New England.  To the northeast, Micmac forces sustained 
their relentless seaborne assaults against the British fishery, executing them now during 
interludes of European peace.  After receiving intelligence in 1715 of a Jacobite 
Rebellion in Britain, their communities anticipated another imperial war but resolved to 
begin it themselves.  On their own extra-imperial terms, they took this fight to the sea to 
secure their Atlantic spaces, resources, and relationships.  And when a series of Indian-
British raids and counter-raids concerning land ownership and trading rights culminated 
in Governor Dummer’s War in 1722, Wabanaki from all corners of the Dawnland 
waged war without French assistance for the first time since King Philip’s War in 1675.  
Taken together, developments such as these signaled a shift in the ways Indians aimed 
to maintain their Atlantic world. 
Yet over time the capacity of this new tack to regenerate and fortify the native 
Atlantic proved limited, a troubling reality cast into sharp focus by the end of 
Dummer’s War in 1726.  Buoyed by the destruction of Indian communities during 
Queen Anne’s War, growing numbers of powerful land proprietors from southern New 
England filtered into Maine and speculated in Wabanaki lands.  New coastal towns 
increasingly displaced ancient native fishing stages and further constrained Indian 
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access to the ocean.  In addition, New England’s destructive land-based campaigns 
during Dummer’s War easily offset Wabanaki conquests at sea, compounding the 
pressures experienced by nearly all native groups in Maine.  In response, most Indians 
retreated permanently to the Penobscot and St. Lawrence rivers, and by mid-century the 
Penobscots had emerged as the primary spokesmen through which nearly all 
communities in the northeast aired their concerns to British authorities.   The locus of 
native maritime power had also shifted northeast, where geo-political circumstances in 
Nova Scotia allowed for its precarious survival.  But by the end of the French and 
Indian War, the imperial equilibrium that had long sustained Indians’ control of the 
seas, and upon which so much of their Atlantic vision had now come to depend, was 
quickly dissolving.  The British construction of Fort Pownall at the mouth of the 
Penobscot River late in the war, a project Governor Thomas Pownall trusted would 
slam shut “ye last & only door That the Enimy had left to ye Atlantic,” consummated 
the final defeat of the Wabanakis’ Atlantic world.  The advances achieved in decades 
prior through an adaptive and dynamic Atlantic vision had proven ephemeral.
1
              
 
Once a critical access point to non-British Atlantic processes and opportunities, 
French Acadia was now primarily confined by the Treaty of Utrecht to Île Royale (Cape 
Breton Island), a small corner of France’s former maritime territory.  The empire as a 
whole was also fraught with economic problems.  The quantity and quality of the king’s 
presents to his native allies continued to deteriorate in the immediate aftermath of the 
war, a disconcerting trend made more unpalatable by Wabanaki exclusion from imperial 
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peace negotiations.  New England officials aimed to exploit this apparent royal betrayal 
by informing Indians in early 1713 that “all the negotiation of peace in Europe as well 
as here is at the Instance of the french king.”  Even more alarming to native interests 
was that “all the Articles are in favour of the English Interest Everywhere.”  When the 
British deployed this outcome to justify claims to Wabanaki lands a few years later, 
Indians shot back that they were “not subjects of the French, but only their allies,” 
thereby indicating their continual claims to equity within this coalition.
2
   
At the end of Queen Anne’s War, the native-French relationship was thus 
undergoing significant transformation.  Indians recognized with evermore clarity the 
fragility and imbalance that had come to mark their French kinship networks.  The 
disastrous effects of this perception for French imperial interests were not lost on 
Quebec officials, whose near-neurotic anxieties about cordial Wabanaki-English 
relations grew more acute.  When a contingent of Kennebec Indians arrived at Casco 
Bay garrison to “express a great deal of joy & Satisfaction at ye news of peace,” they 
professed that “ye French had deceivd & drawn them in & they now Saw their Folly.”  
Thenceforth, they assured British officials, they would “wholly renounce the French 
Interest.”
3
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Wabanaki responded to these difficult postwar realities by restructuring their 
diplomatic and economic alliances with imperial neighbors.  Relationships fashioned in 
prior years with French and British societies no longer served native interests.  Indians 
began to rethink and modify their associations to account for the sporadic fluctuations 
in French exchange networks and gift-giving patterns, French imperial officials’ 
betrayal of native land claims during peace negotiations, and Britain’s enormous 
colonial expansion after the conquest of Acadia.  Those Wabanaki refugees who fled 
southern Maine for the St. Lawrence during the war, for example, returned to their 
former war-ravaged homelands when peace seemed imminent, ignoring the persuasive 
pressures of French civil authorities in Quebec.  In the Dawnland they could enjoy a 
level of autonomy increasingly unavailable in the mission villages of Canada, as well as 
a familiar hunting and fishing economy.  The Jesuit priest Sebastian Rale, to the 
aggravation of civil leaders, encouraged Wabanaki to return southeast after 
experiencing countless problems from the corrupting influence of liquor-plying French 
settlers.  Accompanied by priests, Indians abandoned the French villages in Quebec in 
growing numbers after 1713 and returned to the lands of their ancestors near the sea.
4
    
 But Father Rale and his colleagues soon discovered more complex Wabanaki 
motives spurred their paishioners’ homecoming.  The French monarch’s heart, a 
seemingly-boundless font of benevolence in decades prior, had since hardened and 
grown cold, and the equitable trade opportunities that attracted Indians to Quebec in the 
past had also deteriorated.  French goods had become notoriously expensive, while the 
free trade policy of Massachusetts made British goods an increasingly attractive 
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alternative.  In 1716, Wabanaki at Penobscot and other communities along the coast 
pressured their kin still remaining in the St. Lawrence mission village of Becancourt to 
join them in their trade with the English “if the French continue to sell merchandise as 
expensive as they have in the past several years.”  Increasingly-assertive Indian traders 
“declared clearly” to the French that “if they are not provided for,” they will keep their 
beaver until the spring and “search out better markets.”  French leaders at Île Royale in 
Acadia encountered similar difficulties with formerly dependable, and progressively 
bolder, Indian allies.
5
     
Despite their weakened status, postwar Wabanaki refugees returning southeast 
actively sought to manage the terms of exchange they enjoyed with the English.  At a 
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, conference with Governor Dudley in summer 1714, 
Kennebec and Penobscot Indians confronted Massachusetts authorities about certain 
unfulfilled promises made in the peace treaty a year earlier.  In it, Dudley guaranteed a 
closer regulation of the trade and the establishment of truck houses in more accessible 
locales near native communities.  By summer 1714, these assurances appeared to be 
nothing more than empty gestures, and Indians promptly sought to hold the colony 
accountable.   
Penobscot headman Querrebenuit spearheaded native efforts to reform Dudley’s 
inept mercantilist policy.  He argued that the prices of trade goods had become too 
unsettled throughout the region, and requested that the “prices as formerly for Beaver” 
be restored.  “Whereas formerly wee had Two Yards of Broad Cloth for two skins,” the 
sagamore complained, “now it is three Skins.”  The diminishing beaver population in 
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the northeast, his traders had now come to recognize, ought to have encouraged an 
increase rather than a decrease in its value according to the economic laws of Euro-
American exchange networks.  The officials subsequently reminded Querrebenuit, and 
other like-minded native delegates present, of the impersonal and extensive nature of 
trans-Atlantic commercial forces.  “The price of Beaver is not halfe so much in Great 
Britain and Europe as some years past,” Dudley informed the Indians, a reality 
stemming in large part from the fact that “Europe has been along time in a flame with 
Warrs which has made goods very dear.”  Like the troubling outcome of Queen Anne’s 
War, the value ascribed to Wabanaki goods was determined by seemingly arbitrary and 
unpredictable factors in distant centers of European power.
6
  
However volatile and unmanageable Atlantic exchange networks seemed to 
Wabanaki, they were made doubly so by emergent political conflict among the 
Massachusetts leadership.  Governor Dudley always believed in the power of trade to 
ingratiate the colony to its northeastern native neighbors and draw them away from the 
ambit of French influence.  From his first days in office, he accordingly endeavored to 
implement and enforce a strict oversight of the Indian trade.  Ideally, this strategy would 
regulate the terms of exchange with Wabanaki traders and provide them with 
convenient access to trading houses and licensed merchants prohibited from selling 
alcohol.  The House of Representatives, conversely, often pressured by free trade 
interests among their constituents, actively opposed Dudley’s mercantilist plan despite 
its purported benefits to the security of the empire.  The legislature’s hard-line agenda 
effectively voided the Wabanaki peace treaty ending Queen Anne’s War.  The governor 
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thus found himself crippled by the local commercial interests and downright 
intransigence of his political opposition at the Portsmouth conference in 1714.  
Abandoning his impossible stance, Dudley hoped a new policy of open trade would at 
least appease the younger factions of Wabanaki traders who preferred dealing with 
unlicensed agents outside the strictures of colonial oversight.  Though the terms of 
English exchange networks often appeared to Indians to be dictated by unpredictable 
circumstances not always within their control, they were still more favorable than those 
of the French in the mid-1710s.
7
     
 Other Wabanaki managed the difficult consequences of Queen Anne’s War by 
pursuing a more militant course.  After the imperial regime change in Acadia in 1710, 
Micmac communities throughout Nova Scotia experienced a new proximity to British 
power at Annapolis Royal, and the subsequent confinement of the French to Île Royale.  
Though the regional British presence would remain quite tenuous for decades to come, 
it served as a conspicuous reminder of the French betrayal at the Treaty of Utrecht.  
Throughout the late spring and summer of 1715, some Micmac in southeastern Nova 
Scotia revived their proven strategy of maritime violence to plunder the British fishery, 
commandeer sailing ships and cripple the imperial economy.  The decision to launch 
another campaign of seaborne aggression, executed now during an interlude of inter-
imperial peace, signaled a critical change in the way northeastern Wabanaki understood 
their relationship to both the English and French.   No longer would Indians wait for 
another arbitrary and unpredictable European political conflict to spill over into their 
homelands and waters.  Nor would they rely on wavering assistance from French 
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authorities.  Now they were determined to seize the initiative and execute war on their 
own terms.   
 The Micmac formulated these terms from their own carefully-cultivated 
information networks that continued to link them to metropolitan Europe.  In August, 
Indians from communities scattered along Nova Scotia’s southeastern coasts and islands 
confronted commissary Peter Capon’s reconnaissance expedition and informed him of 
the reasons for their recent depredations.  Capon had been commissioned by the 
colony’s lieutenant governor to probe the “Divers Hostillitys committed by ye Indians, 
and Seizures made of divers Vessells.”  Indians from Pubmacoup, Le Have, Chibucto, 
Marlegash and Mackadome invariably responded to Capon’s inquiry “about ye Sloops 
ye Indians had taken from ye fishermen” with the same startling information.  From 
“some of ye fishermen,” the Indians related, they had learned of the “great Tumults in 
Great Brittain, and Warr expected to be proclaimed Speedily,” but which they “resolved 
to beginn first.”  Capon and other colonial officials deemed such unmonitored 
communications profoundly dangerous to the welfare of the nascent British colony.  But 
native trans-Atlantic information networks allowed Wabanaki to remain acutely attuned 
to the political affairs of Europe outside the oversight of imperial administrators.  
Imperial war- and peacemaking was, by 1715, no longer the exclusive expression of 
European interests as it had been in the recent Treaty of Utrecht; Micmac were now 
prepared to instigate conflict by asserting an independent role in imperial politics.  A 
force of Indian marine-warriors accordingly declared that “ye Lands are theirs and they 
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can make Warr and peace when they please,” as they commandeered several fishing 
vessels and took the crews hostage near Cape Sables in July 1715.
8
 
 The return of political strife to Britain in 1715 was much more than an 
opportune moment for Wabanaki to initiate another war for Atlantic spaces and 
resources.  It was also part of an ongoing contest whose intimate salience in their 
communities resonated since the Glorious Revolution three decades prior.  The “great 
Tumults” to which Indians made mention in their exchanges with Peter Capon referred 
to Britain’s first major Jacobite Rebellion.  “The ‘Fifteen” involved a coordinated 
invasion of Scotland, and plans for the subsequent takeover of England, by Stuart 
sympathizers at home and abroad.  The mission was to overthrow the Hanoverian 
dynasty and reinstate the Old Pretender, son of James II, to the throne.  Wabanaki 
communities never forgot their historical relationship with the Stuarts dating back to the 
seventeenth century and the war that had been waged in the Dawnland over its 
dissolution.  Some of this was kept fresh by periodic reminders from Jesuit 
missionaries.  Indians from Father Rale’s mission at Norridgewock in 1719, for 
example, tried to convince local settler John Minot that “King George was not the right 
King” and that “he came in at the back doar, and that there was another who was the 
right heir to the Crown.”  Even as late as 1764, “a verbal Jacobitism” was alive and well 
among the Penobscot who still insisted on referring to the British monarch as “King 
James,” since, they believed, it was “from James 1
st
 in whose reign New England was 
first peopled.”  The “great Tumults in Great Brittain” in 1715 thus breathed new life 
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into the affective bonds that once knit Wabanakia to the Stuart line and that had 
continued to flicker dimly ever since.  Micmac certainly marshaled their campaign of 
maritime violence to plunder wealth and strike at the fishing economy, but also to bear 
their share of a much larger coup d’état, an uprising that held out hope of restoring lost 
native power in an imperial system.
9
  
 By breaking with precedent and launching their amphibious assaults during 
peacetime, Micmac first surprised and then wreaked havoc on Britain’s fishing 
economy.  The implications of their destructive exploits, though, were not confined to a 
remote corner of the northeast, but reverberated throughout the Atlantic as they had in 
past conflicts.  Indians from the Cape Sables region had become “so incensed against 
the English, that they seise and plunder what fishing vessells they can come at,” former 
Nova Scotia governor Samuel Vetch alerted the Board of Trade, “and commit the same 
hostilitys as in open war.”  Such violence was orchestrated “in order to ruin that so 
noble and valuable fishery upon that coast, which is of so great consequence to the 
Crown.”  “Unless some speedy and effectual methods are taken for protecting and 
encouraging the English fishery,” Vetch concluded, the entire imperial project was in 
serious peril.  While on his fact-finding mission along southeastern Nova Scotia, Peter 
Capon similarly discovered at Chibucto “a great deal of damage done to my Vessells, 
Stages Warehouses &c by ye Indians,” and from “which Damage have lost all this 
yeares fishing.”  In Boston, too, the alarm had yet again been sounded.  An 
increasingly-exasperated Governor Dudley received word that Cape Sables Indians had 
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“seized Eleven Vessels of ours fishing on that Coast…and made Prisoners most of the 
ffishermen belonging to the said Vessels.”  Consequently, he informed the Board of 
Trade, they must “secure the Settlements on the Shoar Eastward, and the ffishery the 
whole length of the Coast from Newfoundland to Cape Cod.”  French officials at 
Quebec received news of the chaos with approbation, and eagerly informed 
metropolitan superiors of the twenty-some British fishing vessels recently hijacked by 
Indians.
10
   
 With the advantage of surprise on their side, Wabanaki mariners easily 
overpowered seasoned British seamen and quickly reasserted their command of the 
region’s waves.  After a force of Indian warriors attacked the crew of “Captain Wright” 
near Mackadome Island that summer, they “killed ye Doctor of ye Ship” and cut “ye 
Shipps Rigging and Sailes in peices.”  The surviving castaways washed up on the 
island, “narrowly escaping in theire boat,” where they “took up the remains that ye 
Indians left” before eventually being discovered, destitute and clinging to life, by Peter 
Capon’s expedition.  Captain Cyprian Southack, who crushed the Indian navy at Casco 
Bay during Queen Anne’s War, received an ungracious welcome when he attempted to 
establish a fishing base in southern Nova Scotia in summer 1715.  Headed by their 
sagamore, a party of local Micmac approached with alarming news that their kin had 
captured several fishing vessels in the area, “and now would come to take me & all I 
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had & would kille me.”  Southack abandoned his untimely venture and departed for 
southern New England.  Three years later, he had evidently recovered from his 
experience enough to launch another attempt, but his ship ran aground in the same area, 
which the “Indians discovering they set the Sloop on Fire, & burnt her up.”
11
 
Other Wabanaki boldly insisted on the payment of monetary ransoms for their 
new human and material prizes, thereby diverging from customary Algonquian protocol 
governing captive diplomacy.  During wartime, Indians often exchanged British 
captives for their own in colonial custody, assimilated them into their societies, or 
subjected them to elaborate execution rituals.  But rarely if ever were they deployed to 
accumulate pecuniary rewards.  In July, a contingent from Cape Sables “seized upon 
Two ffishing Shallops and kept some of ye Crew Hostages till paid of a Demand they 
have made of £40,” a puzzled Major Paul Mascerene described to superiors in Boston, 
adding  that “I don’t hear what reason they give for this Violence.”  Shortly thereafter, 
Indians from the same area hijacked several fishing ships and “kept one Vessell and 
some men as Hostages (and have sent home ye others) untill they return and bring them 
Such a Value as they have Sett which we think is about 30 pounds,” two Boston 
merchants detailed to a business partner.  The overwhelming successes of native 
marine-warriors were particularly dreadful for merchant William Pepperrell, who was 
granted the protection of his colony’s frigate by the Massachusetts Governor’s Council 
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so he could sail to Cape Sables and “Use all proper Methods to regain his Men & 
Vessels out of the Indians Hands.”
12
       
Almost as suddenly as the Micmac launched their naval war, they called it to a 
halt.  This abrupt end could have been due in part to further news regarding the Jacobite 
Rebellion’s doubtful progress, or at least its failure to ignite another Atlantic 
conflagration.  But Wabanaki also knew a mismatch when they saw one.  As it 
circulated among the native settlements of coastal Nova Scotia, Peter Capon’s sloop 
was escorted by an enormous British man-of-war dispatched from the garrison at 
Annapolis Royal.  Around the same time, William Pepperrell arrived in the same waters 
accompanied by Massachusetts’ frigate.  After Capon’s crew dropped anchor at Le 
Have, “some Indians came on board and said they had returned all ye Vessells and 
Hostages they had taken.”  Micmac at Marlegash similarly placated Capon by 
explaining that they “were sorry for ye Hostillitys they had committed & said they 
would never do ye like againe, and that for ye future they would not hearken to any 
Storys that should be told them, but would come directly to Annapolis Royall to know 
ye truth.”  In August, other nearby sagamores expressed remorse by confessing that 
they too “were inform’d ‘twas War between the English & the ffrench,” and as a token 
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of their sincerity “dismiss’d all the…Vessels & Prisoners which are every Day coming 
in,” much to Governor Dudley’s relief.
13
   
Other Wabanaki to the southwest joined the Micmac in their carefully-measured 
mea culpas.  By late fall 1715, Penobscot and St. Johns Indians were also eager to prove 
their transparency to British officials, assuring Lieutenant Governor Caulfield at 
Annapolis Royal that they would keep him in their Atlantic loop.  “Wee promised to 
Inform you of what News wee Should recieve from Europe,” they explained in a letter.  
“I Can acquaint you with None farther Then That The Kings Live Togeather in perfect 
peace,” the Indians continued, adding that “if on ye Side you Know any farther Inform 
me.”  After the destructive events of the past few months, Indians realized, British 
imperial administrators wished above all else to believe that they were vigilantly 
policing Wabanaki information networks.
14
     
Yet when the men-of-war and frigates departed over the horizon and the seas 
were left to Indians, Wabanaki continued to aggressively assert their authority on the 
waves.  And, unsurprisingly, this power continued to fester in the sides of British 
officials.  Already by summer 1716, “twelve Canoe loads” of Penobscot and Micmac 
had joined together for a meeting with southern Wabanaki at Pemaquid, a development 
that quickly generated a swirl of suspicions and rumors in Boston and Annapolis Royal.  
In early 1719, an Indian named Jo Muse along with a French settler bragged to Cyprian 
Southack near Port Rosway, Nova Scotia about their scheme to “head one hundred 
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Indians to destroy all the English Fishery on that Coast.”  There proved to be more 
substance than braggadocio in such saber-rattling when the following year a group of 
Indians attacked several British traders at Canso, “where they did in a most Clandestine 
and Salvage manner take us out of our beds,” pillaged the cabins and fishing vessels, 
and “drove several of us into the sea so that one of us were drown’d in hast of getting 
off,” one escapee recalled.  In summer 1721, Indians from the same region “plundered 
severall Vessells in the Bay and the ffishery at Cancoe Insomuch as the loss is 
computed to 10000£.”
15
   
Just as Wabanaki developed a new means of asserting power over their Atlantic 
world by commodifying British captives during the violence of 1715, so too did they 
begin to commodify rights to their Atlantic spaces and resources.  With an audacity that 
shocked colonial fishermen and officials alike, Indians along the central Maine coast “at 
Damaras Cove demand money of the English for fishing there,” a bewildered 
Lieutenant Governor George Vaughan of Massachusetts learned in 1716.  After 
Jonathan Alden’s trading sloop dropped anchor near Minas, Nova Scotia in September 
1720, Micmac sagamore Peter Nunquaddan led eleven Indians on board to apprise the 
crew of a new local policy.  The Indians immediately “demanded fifty livres for liberty 
to trade saying this Countrey was theirs, and every English Trader should pay Tribute to 
them.”  Five days later Nunquaddan’s men were still unsatisfied, at which point they 
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returned to the vessel with a larger force and “came on board in a Hostile manner,” 
drove Alden and his crew ashore, and “Plunder’d his Sloops cargoe to the value of Two 
hundred and Sixty pounds at least, without any provocation, or difference between them 
in the least.”  Native claims to their ocean, to the resources it offered and the enterprises 
it permitted, had by 1720 resounded with a bold new aggression.
16
  
New Wabanaki claims to their spaces, resources and captives through 
commodification paralleled an identical and concurrent colonial trend emerging in their 
homelands, and perhaps ought to be understood as a response to it.  The decade after 
Queen Anne’s War witnessed an unprecedented degree of land speculation throughout 
Wabanakia.  Individuals and newly-organized land companies from New England, 
emboldened by the destruction of Indian communities in the last war, moved into 
Maine, surveyed native lands, and established settlements quickly populated by new 
waves of immigrants from the south.  By 1720, the new surge of colonial land 
speculation in Indian country thus intensified a market-driven commodification of 
native space.
17
     
 Among the most savvy businessmen invading Wabanakia in the 1710s were 
Protestant missionaries sent by the Massachusetts government.  After troubling reports 
of Jesuit achievements on the colony’s frontier circulated in Boston, the legislature 
commissioned a salary for Reverend Joseph Baxter of Medfield to bring the light of the 
reformed Gospel message to Indians at the eastward.  Most of Baxter’s subsequent 
tenure in Maine, however, was dedicated not so much to the marketplace of souls but to 
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that of real estate.  He and his wife developed a keen speculative eye for properties in 
and around the burgeoning settlements of Georgetown, Brunswick, Augusta, and 
Topsham.  Their spare time was evidently spent preaching to Euro-American settlers in 
the area rather than ministering to Indians.    Wabanaki in southern Maine were also 
reckoning with speculators from the New England Company, a Protestant missionary 
society funded by members in America and Britain.  Indians’ aggressive opposition to 
the company’s land deals forced one of its most prominent commissioners, Samuel 
Sewall, to abandon plans to settle an offshore island in Casco Bay.  Instead he would 
lease it, Sir William Ashurst of London was informed, because of “so many Rumors of 
Trouble from the Eastern Indians, and it being a lonesom place; it is difficult to settle it 
to purpose, or to prevent the Waste they make, who lay claim to it.”  A group of private 
land developers from southern New England known as the Muscongus Company 
compounded these pressures on native resources, particularly after they began to 
organize settlements east of Pemaquid.
18
  
  Accelerated colonial land speculation from the south, coupled with the British 
conquest of Acadia to the north, convinced Indians throughout Wabanakia that their 
mobility on land as well as on sea was in ever greater peril.  As their Micmac kin 
launched seaborne raids against the fishery nearby, Indians of Minas, Nova Scotia, 
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posed a hypothetical question to Governor Phillipps in October 1720.  “If we wished to 
go and dwell in England, what would you do but order us to retire,” they stated, 
deploying a trans-Atlantic counterfactual argument to express their frustration with the 
intrusive new government.  “[F]or the same reasons we do not wish the English to 
inhabit our country, which we hold only from God, and which we will dispute with any 
men who wish to inhabit it without our consent.”  To the southwest, Jesuit Sebastian 
Rale voiced the objections of Indians at Norridgewock to the new wave of land 
speculators and British settlements.  When Massachusetts promptly responded by 
banishing him from their province, Indians retaliated by killing the livestock of 
neighboring colonial communities and plundering a sloop anchored in Casco Bay.  
Some Kennebecs pursued a different course when Terramugus, son of a local sagamore, 
delivered a letter from Norridgewock to Governor Shute indicating that residents there 
were “dissatisfied that people should settle in a body.”  Terramugus’ people amplified 
their grievances by expressing “threatning language to a Tennant of Coll. Winthrops,” 
one of the most successful of the Pejepscot Proprietors.
19
    
 The tensions saturating the Dawnland since 1715 continued to escalate into the 
1720s.  After an expedition sponsored by the Massachusetts government and 
spearheaded by Colonel Thomas Westbrook failed to capture Father Rale at 
Norridgewock in spring 1722, Indians responded by intensifying their assaults on local 
British settlements.  The subsequent series of raids and counter-raids culminated shortly 
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thereafter in open war between Wabanaki and British forces throughout Maine and 
Nova Scotia.  In what became known as both Governor Dummer’s War and Father 
Rale’s War, Indians once more leveled their attacks against familiar colonial threats 
with an unconventional method.  For the second time in a decade, Wabanaki waged war 
independent of a French alliance.  Indeed Dummer’s War saw no official French 
involvement whatsoever.  Their critical decision reflected the changing face of 
Wabanaki-Franco relations since the end of Queen Anne’s War, and signaled their 
desire to initiate violence on their own extra-imperial terms. 
 While concerns over land rights resonated in their grievances throughout the late 
1710s, Indians ironically took to the seas during wartime to correct the troubling course 
of dispossession.  This seemingly paradoxical strategy pointed to Wabanakis’ historic 
understanding of cultural preservation; the welfare of their society ashore necessitated a 
properly ordered world afloat.  As they had in every preceding conflict, Indians resorted 
to their naval prowess to confiscate nautical equipment and damage the foundation upon 
which the threat of British colonialism rested.  Dummer’s War, like all earlier conflicts 
that Wabanaki exploited with their seafaring strength, was not an exclusively maritime 
conflagration.  But it did witness Wabanakis’ most extensive and sustained commitment 
to seaborne violence in the colonial period.     
When Indians took the fight to the sea in Dummer’s War, they again set their 
sights on the fishery and quickly intensified their assaults on this vital component of 
Britain’s Atlantic economy.  By 1724, Indians off the coast of Maine had become “very 
bold in Enterprizing & boarding the fishing vessells on the Eastern Shore,” according to 
one nervous military officer stationed there.  The following year, Boston officials 
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warned garrisons in Maine that “the Indians of Penobscot will speedily be out in the 
Vessels they took last Summer from the English, & will infest the Eastern Coast to the 
great Disturbance & Loss of those concerned in the Fishery,” indicating too that 
Wabanaki continued to preserve their prizes over winters for long-term use.  So regular 
and destructive had these assaults become that Massachusetts formulated a strategy for 
luring native marine-warriors into open waters where they could be engaged in battle.  
Captain Durrell was accordingly instructed to “decoy them by Sounding for Fish & 
Concealing their Men” below deck until the Indians were persuaded into firing range.  
By “sounding for Fish, Concealing your Men & Appearing in all Respects in such a 
Manner as may most probably decoy the Enemy,” Captain Sanders was likewise 
advised, he could draw out Indians lurking amongst Maine’s coastal islands.
20
   
The devastating success of Wabanaki raids on the fishing economy was so 
pervasive that colonial officials and fishermen alike scrambled franticly to muster an 
effective response.  Governor Philipps of Nova Scotia fitted out armed ships and 
volunteers in 1722 because “the Fishery became Impraticable from the Attacks and 
Barbarities the Indians made on all Vessels that were a Fishing,” therefore threatening 
what little commercial value his colonial outpost possessed.  Massachusetts adopted an 
analogous approach when it encouraged Samuel Hinckes’ party of volunteers to hunt 
“indian pirets” in 1724 after learning “that the fishermen don’t go East of this place or 
scarce to sea.”  Lieutenant Governor William Dummer issued similar orders to an 
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officer after receiving news “of severall Vessels man’d with Indians infesting the 
Eastern Coast to the great Disturbance & Loss of those concern’d in the Fishery.”  By 
the following year, such strategies had proved woefully inadequate when frantic 
Marblehead merchants notified Boston of the “Deplorable Surcomstances” of their 
fishery, now in danger “of being wholly Destroy’d & Broken Up.”  Whatever affluence 
Britain enjoyed from this segment of their trade network, it was also the empire’s 
Achilles heel when Wabanaki reasserted their command of the northwest Atlantic.
21
 
Indian naval engagements with British forces were often extensive and 
protracted ordeals, and colonial underestimations of native maritime power frequently 
enhanced its overall destructiveness.  After Indians seized “a large schooner with two 
swivel guns” from the Isles of Shoals, for example, Governor Dummer saw fit to 
commission only a modest sloop- and shallop-full of Maine and Ipswich men to sail in 
pursuit.  Not long after their departure, the dejected crews “returned with their rigging 
much damaged by the swivel guns,” and able to “give no other account of the enemy 
than that they had gone into Penobscot.”  British volunteers from Piscataqua likewise 
encountered “the indian Privateer” in July 1724 plying the waters off coastal Maine in 
“a sconer once of marble head” but now “full of indians Extraordenary well fitted who 
Chased them 3 hours & shee Takes all she Can Come up with.”  Thomas Cox of 
Dorchester was on board one of two schooners anchored off Mount Desert Island where 
his crew spotted another schooner sailing into the harbor and “found them to be Indians, 
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Who ask’d us where we were going.”  A melee ensued for “about 4 Hours” as Cox’s 
ship “fired upon them very briskly.”  John Elliot of Topsham boasted to royal officials 
at St. James’s Court about a similar “engagement of several hours” with northeastern 
Wabanaki seamen while in the employ of the governor of Nova Scotia.  Elliot 
reportedly encountered “an Indian King who Commanded seven Sloops and Scooners 
Manned with many Indians well provided,” and ultimately killed the sagamore while 
rescuing ten English captives.  The intensity of the clash, Elliot emphasized, was such 
that he endured “9 Shott in his body” with “some of his wounds so dangerous that his 
life was for a time much dispared of.”
22
 
By Dummer’s War, Indians were accustomed to harvesting the abundant fruits 
of the British maritime presence.  Over the course of several colonial wars, the fishery 
had become much more than the soft underbelly of Britain’s imperial economy; it also 
functioned as a valuable extractive economy whose wealth could enhance Wabanakis’ 
customary method of maritime production and consumption.  The assimilation of 
commandeered sailing technology into this system both expanded the range and 
enhanced the efficiency of the ocean’s harvest.  Saccaristis, sagamore of the Penobscots 
in 1725, admitted to Colonel Thomas Westbrook that “ye Indians fitted out two of the 
Scooners that they took last Summer & went a fishing & getting Seils [seals] off at 
Grand Menan and the Mouth of St. Johns River.”  The Indian seamen embarked on their 
excursion during “the latter end of May,” which customarily followed Wabanaki’s 
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annual migration to coastal settlements from their inland winter hunting camps.  At 
other times, Indians streamlined their yield by exploiting the labor of British fishermen.  
Wabanaki near Norridgewock employed a more efficient fishing method when they 
stocked their community “full of codd fish out of 15 or 16 vessels they have taken” in 
1724.  The British maritime presence had thus become a convenient locus of wealth that 
Wabanaki confiscated and strategically incorporated to enhance their longstanding 
patterns of production and consumption.
23
 
 Indians also continued to extract maritime labor from this floating warehouse.  
Much to the consternation of imperial authorities, Wabanaki impressments of British 
fishermen severely detracted from the productivity of the imperial economy.  Very early 
in the war, Governor Phillips of Nova Scotia was so distraught over the success of 
Indian press gangs that he issued a public proclamation denouncing their increasingly-
frequent harassment of the fishery with “the Assistance of the prisoners whom thy take 
for Sailors.”  The announcement evidently did little good, as three months later Philips 
was still in a rage when “Indians cruised upon the Fishing Ships with the Sloops and 
Prisoners they had first taken who they Compelled to serve as Mariners which Alarmed 
the Fishery at Canco.”
24
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 Even high ranking imperial agents were humbled to servitude in the Indian 
navy.  In Nova Scotia, one customs collector – a royally-appointed position – was 
appalled by the callous disregard of his prestigious title when a Wabanaki force pressed 
him and his vessel into service in March, 1722.  “There came two Cannows with 
Thirteen Indians on board of me,” ten of which were hidden beneath furs, the agent 
testified.  After being seized and restrained, they “commanded me to go up the River St. 
Johns with my Sloop,” where they took on more Indians.  Now with forty-five warriors 
on board, the collector was compelled to sail to various native settlements throughout 
the Bay of Fundy where they “forced me to Anchor in uncommon places,” resulting in 
the loss of “two Cables and two Anchors.”  The mission was carefully premeditated, the 
collector comprehended, “in Order to joyne more and go and Surprize the Governour 
and Garrison of Annapolis Royall.”  Though this ambition was never realized, the 
mariners succeeded in plundering the vessel and finally forcing the collector to purchase 
it back from them “for One Thousand Livres.”
25
 
 While Wabanaki experienced prolonged exposure to labor pressed by their 
colonial British neighbors and to the omnipresent fear of impressment among seamen in 
the area, their own execution of this tactic was not simply imitative.  Exercising 
physical domination over prisoners taken in battle and subsequently employing them in 
servile tasks to benefit the community were central to the Algonquian protocol of 
captive-taking.  Though seen as enslavement by outsiders who had the misfortune of 
experiencing it, Wabanaki understood it as a necessary method of dispelling the danger 
wrought by foreign enemies and cohesively incorporating them as productive and useful 
                                                 
25
 “Journal of the Collector of Annapolis’s Sailing to Some other parts of Nova Scotia, and of his being 
Seized on by the Indians, March 22, 1722,” MHS, Frederick Lewis Gay transcripts, 1632-1786 – Ms. N-
2012 – Nova Scotia Papers, Vol. IV: ff. 37-40. 
279 
 
members of native society.  The productive value of this new labor source was highly 
valued, and could be bestowed on an individual or family who recently experienced the 
loss of a close relative.  Wabanakis’ naval strategy of impressment is perhaps best 
understood as an extension of this practice to Atlantic waters.
26
   
Sailing ships seized in this extractive economy obtained a cultural importance in 
native society commensurable to that of captive labor.  These vessels became so 
integrated into Wabanaki culture, in fact, that their new Indian owners were quite 
unwilling to relinquish them after the war.  The Penobscot sagamore Espequit chartered 
his ship to three prisoners so they could sail home to Marblehead during the conflict and 
retrieve a ransom.  When the men failed to return by the war’s conclusion in 1727, an 
irate Espequit issued an ultimatum to the Massachusetts government, declaring that he 
“Expectes his Vessel to be Returnd by ye furst, or satisfaction for her” made instead.  
After hearing rumors of the arrival of Wabanaki delegates in Boston in 1725, 
Marblehead fisherman Samuel Stacey informed the governor’s office “That they have 
one of my Schooners in their Hands, which they took from me some Time ye Summer 
before last.”  Stacey and a neighbor with a similar request endeavored to negotiate their 
ships’ release in person at an earlier conference in Boston, but were discouraged by the 
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Massachusetts commissioners who feared the poisonous effects such requests might 
have on docile Indians suing for peace.
27
   
Colonial authorities often attempted to retake their ships by force, but Indians 
went to great lengths to preserve and conceal them from their enemies.  A quite 
perplexed Colonel Thomas Westbrook informed his supervisors in 1724 that he 
“diligently Searched after the Vessells belonging to this Province (that were taken by 
the Indians) but Could find none.”  John Minot expressed similar frustrations to the 
Massachusetts governor that year after learning that Indians in Maine “have hal’d up 
our Vessells into the Countrey” where it was virtually impossible to discover them.  
Another Massachusetts military officer received orders instructing his men to 
“endeavour to find out the Vessles the Indians have taken & if practicable secure & 
bring them off.”  In July 1725, Captain Edward Winslow described how “two Shallops 
& a Scooner were…taken by a Scooner man’d with Indians” who immediately sailed it 
“in to the Harbour on the North Side of Monhegan [Island], which is the Place of their 
Rondezvouz.”  The retreat to Monhegan Island further indicated the ongoing centrality 
of the Penobscot region as both a nucleus of socio-political affairs as well as a wartime 
entrepôt.  Most of the ships lost forever to their British owners were quickly ensconced 
among the maze of rivers, bays and harbors linking the inland forests to the ocean, a 
natural network with which Wabanaki were most fluent.  The indispensability of sailing 
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 As Captain Mogg’s crew demonstrated at Black Point in 1676, Indian-
commandeered sailing vessels were also pressed into action against land-based symbols 
of British authority in Wabanakia.  In July 1724, a native squadron laid siege to Fort St. 
George, Massachusetts’ northeastern-most garrison in Maine at the time, and attempted 
to negotiate its surrender with an explosive display of naval force.  One evening, five 
ships blockaded the fort while an Indian approached the gates requesting a parley.  By 
simply “pointing to the Vessels coming up,” the Indian confidently anticipated a quick 
surrender from experienced military men who respected the destructive capacity of 
armed warships.  When the officer refused to comply with his demands, the negotiator 
promised just treatment of prisoners and a safe retreat to Boston aboard one of the 
native-held schooners.  A stalemate ensued after two days of offers and counter-offers, 
at which point the irritated Indians fell back to their ships and executed a tactic long 
popular among European naval strategists.  After “they put into a cove with one of their 
Vessels out of our Sight,” the British commander noted, the Wabanaki warriors 
proceeded to load it with “Wood and Combustible stuff” and, together with another 
vessel similarly prepared, “set it on fire designing to burn the Block House.”  The 
Indians launched this inferno “round the Point with her sails full” and watched it bear 
down on the British stronghold while they “kept firing on all sides.”  But the British, 
with the assistance of “a great Gun,” bombarded the Indian ships and sheared off the 
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masts of the approaching fire ships, narrowly averting disaster.  When the native forces 
saw “their design frustrated, they left us and went away very silently.”
29
  
Throughout Dummer’s War, British colonists began appropriating a discourse of 
piracy in their ongoing efforts to disparage native maritime power, a move that also 
implicitly acknowledged its brutal effectiveness.  A volunteer squadron was recruited 
from the eastward in July 1724, not to engage a credible naval force, but to go scouting 
“after indian pirets.”  Unable or unwilling to negotiate with Wabanaki mariners in 
August 1725, British authorities in Nova Scotia instead sought the assistance of a 
vilified, albeit legitimate, French government at nearby Cape Breton.  Notifying them of 
“a Marblehead Shallop piratically taken from the Subjects of Great Brittain by the 
Indians,” the Nova Scotia diplomats cast aside imperial enmities rather than confer 
directly with the Wabanaki.  The influx of accusations of Wabanaki “piracy” at this 
time corresponds to what maritime historians see as the “golden age” of piracy 
saturating the broader European Atlantic world.  This outbreak of seaborne crime thus 
afforded imperial architects a timely discourse to rationalize and discredit Wabanakis’ 
destructive naval strength.  Casting Indian maritime violence as the desperate and 
unprincipled acts of outlaws, as flagrantly “Illegall and Contrary to the Law of 
Nations,” permitted colonial authorities to rationalize their losses without 
acknowledging Wabanaki seafaring power as structured, coherent, systematic, and 
rivaling that of their own.
30
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Yet despite discrete efforts by British colonists, constructions of Indians-as-
pirates also signified the continuing dynamism and potency of native seaborne violence 
and the perpetual obstacle it posed to the entrenchment of colonial authority in the 
northeast.  As late as October 1743, Indian naval attacks near Nova Scotia flourished to 
the point where the colony’s governor, Paul Mascarene, issued a public proclamation to 
all English and French inhabitants who considered abetting them.  Furiously 
denouncing “the Indians in these their Piratical Villanys,” particularly those “guilty of 
the like Piracys in time of serene Peace,” Mascerene decreed, anyone who provided an 
outlet for any goods “from the Indians so Piratically by them Robbed and taken” would 
themselves risk prosecution for piracy.  And for good measure, the governor vowed his 
continued “suppression of all Piratical Robberys and Villanys.”  Mascarene’s carefully-
crafted language at once rendered Indian maritime power illicit and tacitly declared its 
profound efficacy and resilience.
31
   
 Wabanaki, conversely, understood their operations at sea as defined by 
continuity rather than a sudden transition to piracy.  Their pattern of naval aggression 
since the earliest period of European contact revealed a consistent joint-execution of 
resistance and plundering strategies in order to maintain and augment their  relationship 
to the Atlantic.  Some of this approach was likely shaped by frequent Wabanaki 
interactions with various Euro-American pirates from the earliest days of colonial 
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settlement.  The legendary Dixey Bull, for example, “first pirate in New England 
waters,” traveled from London to the Maine coast in 1631 and cultivated an extensive 
trading relationship with local Indians while simultaneously preying on New England 
shipping.  The crew of Dutchman Jurriaen Aernouts and Boston seamen John Rhoade, 
similarly, plied the Gulf of Maine and Acadian coastline in the 1670s, pillaging traders 
and attempting to conquer the sparsely colonized territory.  In September 1723, the 
notorious Captain “Lowder the Pyrate” commandeered some twenty French vessels 
near Cape Breton with his crew along with several other English crafts, “particular[ly] a 
Scooner belonging to Boston.”  Such cultural exchanges colored the potentiality 
Wabanaki communities envisioned in their Atlantic world and equipped them with new 
avenues for maintaining control of it.
32
  
The cultural maxims that governed pirate life were also strikingly compatible 
with Algonquian customs that dictated attitudes toward economic subsistence, the role 
of the individual in the community, power and justice.  Material collectivism, an 
aversion to personal acquisitiveness, authority through communal consensus, and 
retaliatory notions of justice were values that permeated the ethos of both Indians and 
pirates, and would have considerably blurred native and pirate societies in the northeast.  
Regardless of colonial rhetoric, then, Wabanaki warriors did not suddenly assume the 
guise of piracy after Queen Anne’s War; they had always been “pirates” in their 
attempts to sustain an Atlantic world under siege from dangerous new forces.
33
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Far from an objective categorization, it is also worth noting, “pirate” was an 
ideologically-laden label deployed, in this case, by a victimized majority to authenticate 
the suppression of an illegitimized threat.  What precisely comprised piracy, of course, 
depended on one’s perspective.  In the face of increasing land dispossession, a 
deteriorating natural resource base, and attempts to sever Wabanaki bonds with the 
ocean, Indian communities had entirely different conceptions of whom, exactly, the real 
pirates were.  
 The repercussions of this rhetorical development during the golden age of piracy  
stretched far beyond the pens and mouths of colonial officials.  When shored up with 
legal implications, as it was in a spectacle that shocked and infuriated the native 
northeast in October 1726, the juridical rhetoric of Indian piracy served as another 
attempt to regulate and restructure the Wabanaki Atlantic.  In that month, three Indian 
warriors stood trial before the Vice-Court of Admiralty in Boston, indicted for piracy.  
The accused were among a native force that nearly hijacked Captain Doty’s vessel “as 
he lay at Anchor in an Harbour at the Eastward” in Nova Scotia.  Behind a Frenchman 
who boarded the ship and immediately “snap’d a Pistol at one of” Doty’s men, the 
“Indians fell upon them with their Cutlasses” and captured the English crew.  Now 
pressed into service, Captain Doty was made to chase down a vessel on the horizon as 
the native captors vowed “they would take her, and kill all the Hands on board and then 
give him his Vessel again,” according to later depositions.  One of Doty’s men, though, 
had earlier escaped undetected to a small chamber below deck, from which he emerged 
at this point with his guns blazing.  Doty joined him, and “three of the Indians jumped 
out of the Cabbin Window, they being then a Mile or two from the Shore, and the rest 
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immediately submitted.”  Three Wabanaki prisoners, along with “a Squaw, and two 
Papooses,” were transported to Boston and ordered before the Court of Admiralty on 
October 4.  At the conclusion of the trial, newspapers decreed to Bostoners that the 
Indian pirates “were found Guilty” and “received Sentence of Death.”  Days later they 
hung from the public gallows.
34
  
The reaction in Wabanaki communities was explosive.  Rather than succeeding 
as a deterrent, the public trial and execution of Indian warriors orchestrated by an 
imperial judicial system in distant Boston escalated native fears of Britain’s maritime 
colonialism.  Retributive violence consequently spread throughout northeastern waters.  
As per the orders of Nova Scotia’s Lieutenant Governor Armstrong, “a Copy of the 
Tryal of the…Indians that were hang’d in Boston for piracy was read in the Church” at 
Chignectou in March 1727, in order to quash any backlash from the community’s 
French and Indian inhabitants and cement their loyalty to the British crown.  Despite 
such efforts, less than two months later Massachusetts’ Lieutenant Governor Dummer 
received desperate news from the garrison at Annapolis Royal of impending Wabanaki 
violence against “our Fisher Men in Revenge of ye Justice doen to ye French & Indian 
Pirates the last Fall.”  John Gyles, commander of the fort at St. George’s River in Maine 
and interpreter for the Penobscot Indians, shortly thereafter notified an already tense 
Dummer of a debate within Wabanaki communities “Concerning ye…Indian Pirotrs 
that wear hanged Last fall.”  The fears of British authorities were soon realized when 
“some Indians of Cape Sables,” as Dummer explained to his supervisors in London, 
“committed divers barbarous acts of hostility upon an English vessel…and some other 
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fishermen that were at anchor at Cape Sables.”  An enraged Lieutenant Governor 
Armstrong launched a frantic fact-finding mission as he wrote to the French governor at 
Cape Breton.  Condemning the “Robbery & Seizeure of the English Sloop,” Armstrong 
promised justice for the Indian culprits who attacked the master and crew in such “a 
piratical Manner Contrary to the Law’s of all Nation’s.”  If the “Authors of this 
Robbery are justly to be deem’d Pirats,” the governor fumed, the French were bound by 
honor to assist in their apprehension.  Such efforts ultimately proved futile.  The Boston 
piracy trial and its violent aftermath typified the ongoing contest to consolidate and 
define the contours of the Atlantic world, a struggle of incompatible and exclusive 
visions.
35
     
Despite the destructive advances made by Wabanaki violence on the sea during 
Dummer’s War, the conflict also left many of their communities ashore obliterated and 
their people destitute.  The most significant of these losses was the destruction of the 
most prominent village and Jesuit mission in southern Wabanakia.  Norridgewock was 
burned in August 1724 by a joint force of British soldiers and their Algonquian and 
Iroquois allies, who returned victorious to Boston with Father Rale’s scalp.  As a result 
of these successful raids, most southern Maine Indians fled northwest to join their 
extended kin in French mission communities along the St. Lawrence River, and this 
time chose to stay permanently.  This demographic transformation was exacerbated by 
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swelling colonial settlements along coastal Maine, most of which displaced ancient 
native fishing encampments.  These mutually-reinforcing trends psychologically, 
economically, and spatially distanced southern Wabanaki from the ocean to an extent 
previously unseen.  Their seasonal migratory pattern linking the inland forests and the 
Atlantic – an annual cycle that defined native life for generations – was increasingly 
interrupted by dammed rivers, sawmills, and commercial fishing stages.  The sparse 
native population that remained in the southern borderlands now experienced a greater 
proximity to the locus of British power in New England which, when coupled with 
limited access to the ocean, further undermined their maritime culture.   
As the dislocation and destruction marring the native northeast subsided after 
Dummer’s War, the Penobscots assumed the role of liaison between the British and 
Wabanaki communities throughout the northeast.  Their headmen, most notably Loron 
Sagouarrab, occupied a leading position in peace negotiations with New England in 
1726.  Other Indian leaders as far away as the St. Lawrence communities ratified the 
resulting settlement shortly thereafter.  The rising authority of the Penobscots, and their 
relationship to the colonial government, became so pronounced in the ensuing years that 
British officials attempted to secure their cooperation to hunt down their northern 
Wabanaki kin implicated in the piratical exploits of November 1727, “and bring them to 
justice.”  Into the 1730s, their sagamores also became the mouthpiece through which 
several Indian communities in the region addressed grievances to colonial leaders 
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concerning trade abuses, the availability of truck houses, and newly-constructed river 
dams that once again obstructed the flow of Atlantic marine life to their settlements.
36
 
Like the Saco River sagamore Nescambiouit after King William’s War, the 
growing postwar authority of Penobscot leaders such as Loron afforded them a lucrative 
opportunity in another trans-Atlantic network of power and prestige.  A few years after 
assuming the governorship of Massachusetts in 1730, Jonathan Belcher conjured a 
peculiar scheme to shore up his increasingly precarious and beleaguered reputation in 
the aristocratic circles of London.  There a strong opposition faction had emerged at 
court in the wake of Belcher’s highly unpopular pro-Indian policies in Maine.  Samuel 
Waldo, a wealthy proprietor of native lands at the eastward, mobilized the faction 
through his own trans-Atlantic connections.  But the governor aimed to undercut these 
threats to his status by appropriating the exotic material culture of his Wabanaki 
neighbors and deploying its novelties to dazzle the most powerful figures in Britain.  
Military commanders and traders stationed in Maine subsequently received a steady 
stream of letters from Belcher beseeching them to send “the most curious, rare Furrs 
you can pick up among the Indians,” with little clarification other than “I intend ‘Em for 
Presents.”  After several months lapsed, the impatient and still empty-handed governor 
reminded trader and translator John Gyles of “those Small Things I wrote for, especially 
Some curious Furrs.”   “[Y]ou must take Pains in the Matter Whatever the Cost may 
be,” another officer was ordered.
37
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Yet Belcher’s first-hand encounters with Wabanaki in their homeland and in 
Boston also familiarized him with the distinct diplomatic protocol enmeshed in native 
material exchange customs.  John Gyles was accordingly instructed to “Greet the 
Indians very kindly in my Name, and assure them of the Continuance of the good will 
& Friendship of this Government.”  Coupled with this oral extension of peaceful 
intentions was Belcher’s promise of material compensation to the Indians for their 
troubles.  So strong was the governor’s desire to abide by Wabanaki kinship and gift-
giving codes that he traveled to their territory to personally confer with them in the 
summer of 1732.  As a sign of his peoples’ gratitude for the council, one prominent 
Wabanaki sagamore gifted Belcher with a rare white otter.  Later, he ordered it made 
into a fashionable muff and sent overseas to the Duke of Argyle where Belcher hoped it 
would “Serve to cover your Grace’s Hands when you travel into Argyle Shire.”  Prime 
Minister Robert Walpole, Lord Wilmington, and the Duke of Newcastle were also 
frequent recipients of Belcher’s chronic gifts.
38
 
  Like Nescambiouit in 1699, however, Wabanaki in the 1730s would not be 
passively pulled into this trans-Atlantic game of power and prestige.  Most of Belcher’s 
attempts to enhance his own credibility overseas were frustrated and manipulated by 
Indian headmen at home equally concerned about their own status within Wabanakia.  
At their conference with the governor in 1732, Penobscot headmen Edewakenk, 
Espequit, Captain Lewis and Loron obliged Belcher’s request to “make a fine Cannoo” 
and send it to Boston.  Yet at the conference they also demanded reciprocal gifts of 
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powder and shot, corn, and more convenient access to trading houses near their 
communities.  Five months after the sagamores’ pledge, an ever-anxious Belcher 
inquired into the canoe’s status, telling Captain Gyles to let them know “I expect a very 
fine Cannoo that will carry Six Padlers & a Steersman.”  “[T]he Paddles,” Belcher 
specified, ought “to be very Handsome.”  Nearly a year later, Belcher was at wits-end.  
“I thank you for the fine White Beaver,” he told Gyles, but I “shou’d be glad to know 
what Toxus has done about my Cannoo.”  The albino furbearer did, though, temporarily 
appease the governor’s appetite for Wabanaki curiosities and metropolitan fame.  
Belcher promptly shipped the fur to a relative in England, describing it as “a great 
Rarity in this Part of the World” that “might perhaps make a nice White Hatt” that could 
be laced “with Gold for a young Lady.”
39
 
The delay of the highly anticipated birchbark canoe undoubtedly stemmed from 
the colony’s own tardiness in a much more pressing matter.  Throughout the mid-1730s, 
Loron leveled numerous complaints to neighboring authorities about Massachusetts’ 
inadequate fulfillment of earlier promises made in the Dummer’s War treaty.  
Sagamores were also likely irritated with Belcher’s persistent and unabashed 
acquisitiveness.  Though he went to great strides to rectify some of these problems, the 
governor’s efforts were often stymied by powerful land companies in the region.  So in 
July 1733, the governor tried a different tack to secure his present.  Gyles was ordered 
to “Tell ‘Em the Cannoo & Paddles must be very fine, because I design to send them to 
the great King George.”  Captain John Minot was likewise instructed to “remind them 
& tell ‘Em the Cannoo & Paddles must be very handsome & fine, Because it is to go to 
the great King George.”  Within the next few months, Belcher not only had his canoe, 
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but received a regular supply of them over the course of his tenure as governor.  He, in 
turn, shipped them overseas to his brother-in-law and son studying law at the Inns of 
Court, urging them to carefully bestow the gifts only among the most influential and 
prestigious of London society.  The Wabanaki novelties indeed proved enormously 
popular with their recipients, much to the governor’s long-awaited satisfaction.
40
  
Through Jonathan Belcher’s anxious social positioning, Wabanaki were drawn 
toward another valuable opportunity to forge a measure of status and authority in an 
imperial system.  Yet they again creatively managed this trans-Atlantic network of 
material curiosity and political power by contributing to it on their own terms and 
according to their own timeline.  When the name of the British monarch was eventually 
invoked, the full scope of Belcher’s petulant requests, and the far-flung implications of 
obliging them, was suddenly disclosed to the Wabanaki gift-givers.  Only then did they 
become cognizant of the unmistakably Atlantic nature of this game.  The Penobscot 
headmen, eager as any colonial official to cultivate and solidify the approbation of their 
peers, exploited Belcher’s scheme as another opportunity to achieve these goals, but 
only after its efficacy was made manifest in the full disclosure of its Atlantic 
dimensions.  Defeated and demoralized by his adversaries at court, Belcher was 
eventually recalled to London in 1741, reaping little of what he struggled so hard to sow 
throughout his tenure in Massachusetts.  But as Wabanaki society continued to grow 
politically-centralized around Penobscot during the eighteenth century, their sagamores 
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emerged as the real beneficiaries of this Atlantic exchange.  Their careful cultivation of 
these connections again enhanced their position in multiple circles.
42
 
Since the conclusion of Dummer’s War, the geo-politics northeast of Penobscot 
continued to diverge considerably from those in Maine.  The relatively weak position of 
the British in Nova Scotia, the numerical strength of French inhabitants, and the French 
stronghold at Cape Breton fostered an environment in which Micmac and other 
Wabanaki refugees from the southwest could sustain their extractive economy through 
maritime violence.  Southern New England merchants and fishermen continued to pay 
the price.  In 1737, Stephen Jones was plundered of goods worth fifteen hundred pounds 
when his “Sloop was Boarded in an hostile manner by six or seven Indians armed with 
Guns, Hatchets & Knives &c.”  When Jones offered resistance, he later noted, one of 
his captors “presented a Pistoll to his Breast several times” and “threatn’d to knock his 
Brains out.”  Mr. Trefry, another ship master, endured a similar experience in 1742 
when near Mines he encountered a number of “Indians who surprised his Sloop and Cut 
her Cables,” most likely after noticing that he was sailing without anchors on board.  
Trefry was reportedly “very Ill used By the said Indians,” who proceeded to confiscate 
the entire cargo.  The adroit exploitation of the British maritime presence, increasingly 
executed during interludes of official imperial peace, indicate that northeastern 
Wabanaki had long since abandoned their dependence on European imperial wars to 
strike at the British economy and plunder it of goods.  Instead they forged their own 
retributive and economic opportunities.  And with their cognizance of the Wabanaki 
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Atlantic’s ongoing dissolution in Maine, Nova Scotia Indians desperately sought to 
circumvent the fate of their southern kin.
43
   
Northeastern Wabanaki were not averse, however, to exploiting further imperial 
conflicts in the 1740s and 1750s.  By participating in these wars, Indians aimed to 
maximize the potential of their plundering economy and stymie British colonial efforts 
in the region.  With the arrival of King George’s War to Wabanakia in March 1744, 
Micmac and other Wabanaki revived their attacks on New England fishing vessels off 
the Nova Scotia coast.  Even after the war ended in 1748 and peace was settled between 
Wabanaki and Massachusetts the following year, these marine-warriors extended their 
seaborne campaigns against the British fishing station at Canso, taking several prisoners 
to the French fortress at Louisbourg to collect a ransom.  When another European 
conflict was declared in 1754, northern Wabanaki would again seize the exigencies of 
war in a final attempt to fortify their maritime world.  In 1758, a joint force of Maliseet 
and Penobscot continued to rely on Mount Desert Island at the mouth of the Penobscot 
River as their place of rendezvous.  From there, they planned “to proceed in the two 
Sloops (which they had lately Taken)” to attack British garrisons as distant as south-
central Maine.  But by the war’s regional conclusion in 1760, the opportunities bound 
up in the northeast’s imperial equilibrium had disintegrated, thereby marking the 
closure of a milieu that had allowed for the survival of the Wabanaki’s seafaring power.  
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Gone now were the markets for commandeered ships, the sources of material aid, and 
the presence that checked British land encroachment in Acadia.
44
 
While the end of the imperial status quo eliminated the conditions nourishing a 
Wabanaki Atlantic, the task of severing Indians from their ocean demanded a more 
culturally destructive strategy.  Not coincidentally, British efforts to dislodge the French 
from the northeast during the Seven Years War were executed concomitantly with 
renewed schemes for thwarting Wabanaki access to the ocean.  This longstanding 
policy had been most recently articulated in 1748 by Governor William Shirley who 
advocated Massachusetts’ construction of a blockhouse along the northeastern Maine 
coast “as a means of keeping them from the Sea Shore,” though his plans never 
materialized.  But when his successor, Thomas Pownall, triumphantly announced the 
construction of Fort Pownall to finally slam shut “ye last & only door That the Enimy 
had left to ye Atlantic,” he finally succeeded in accomplishing what his predecessors 
could not.  The dynamic longevity of Wabanaki power in the northeast, so damaging to 
British Atlantic designs, could not be uprooted simply by obliterating its communities 
or imperial allies.  Required, too, was a dismantling of Indians’ essential relationship 
with the Atlantic.
45
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 In early summer 1797, the Wabanaki community at Old Town, Maine welcomed 
a traveler to their small island in the Penobscot River, some thirty miles up from the sea.  
Stephen Peabody, Jr., a prominent Bucksport lumberman from a prestigious New 
England family, appreciated the warm hospitality as he passed through the area on 
business, yet could not help but notice the abject poverty and destitution he encountered 
among all Indians in the area.  Some lead lives of drunkenness and violence as they 
wandered the roads of the now numerous white lumbering towns at the mouth of the 
Penobscot, Peabody was appalled to report, while others removed further upriver where 
they lived in nearly-equal squalor.  In the midst of this misery, however, was a 
surprising “civility” and a “great politeness” on Indian Island, Old Town.  Peabody 
recorded very few characteristics of the hamlet as he toured it with his Penobscot hosts, 
except for a sight he must have deemed just as peculiar and unbefitting as the Indians’ 
cordial welcome.  Conspicuously “suspended near ye door” of the modest Catholic 
chapel at the center of their community was a “small ship’s bell,” which was used to 
summon villagers to Mass and other communal gatherings.
1
   
 By the end of the eighteenth century, the dissolution of the Wabanaki Atlantic 
had reduced native communities to a status they struggled so long to avoid.  The 
debilitating effects of alcohol and poverty were derivatives of a much larger socio-
economic transformation that dispossessed their people of the ocean and its manifold 
opportunities sustaining them for generations.  From the church door at Indian Island 
                                                 
1
 Entry for Wednesday, June 21, 1797, AAS, Stephen Peabody, Jr. Diary, 1796-1797, 1799; for accounts 
of alcoholism and crime see numerous entries for October and November, 1796 and February 6, 1797.   
297 
 
loomed a vestige of this former world, of what once was.  Its prominent position at the 
center of the community’s social life typified the ancient centrality of that world to a 
people intimately bound up in its ebbs and flows.  The tolling bell beckoned the salty 
waves that once carried warriors at ships helm, transported goods to and from faraway 
places, and conveyed critical information about distant sources of power.  Its location at 
the portal to the Catholic chapel also invoked former connections to the French and to 
the Atlantic’s imperial competition born out of the religious turmoil of early modern 
Europe.  This spiritual legacy, which Wabanaki had long since integrated into their 
culture, now constituted the sole vestige of the native Atlantic world.  The ship bell thus 
stood as an enduring reminder to all passers-by and to all who heard its peals of an 
extraordinary past, and the unwillingness of a people to part with it.   
The Wabanaki experience in the early modern world stands outside the narrative 
of so many other indigenous peoples who bid farewell to ancestral homelands and 
endured forced migrations across vast expanses of the American landscape.  Theirs 
instead was one of removal onto land.  The Atlantic opportunities, maritime traits and 
nautical power that defined so much of their culture and gave meaning to the Dawnland 
for centuries ultimately eroded with their peoples’ coerced relocation from the waters of 
the east and subsequent terrestrial confinement.  This transformation was completed by 
a fundamental deconstruction of their Atlantic vision.  By 1760, Wabanaki too had 
witnessed their pelagic world slowly drift into a sea of trouble.  Unlike the troubled sea 
of the frantic Maine settlers in 1690, theirs became irretrievably confined to the past. 
 Yet for over two centuries, the enduring pursuit of a native Atlantic afforded 
Wabanaki critical material and cultural resources to manage colonialism’s most 
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destructive and disorderly colonial pressures.  In so doing, Indians not only sustained a 
recognizable identity but frequently enhanced it, and aggressively engaged efforts to 
suppress and restructure their vision.  The result, more often than not, was a Euro-
American northeast terrifyingly helpless, pathetically weak and periodically teetering on 
the precipice of destruction.  Indian tenacity afloat is powerful testimony that the 
Atlantic was far from an organic and lucid formation facilitating the construction of 
European empires and their ascendant global economies.
2
  To the region’s native 
inhabitants and colonial newcomers, this extraordinarily generative and lucrative corner 
of the northwest Atlantic was a profoundly contested space, not only as two European 
empires frequently declared it so in the war rooms of London and Versailles, but also 
when Britain’s struggle to normalize and incorporate its productive capacity 
encountered Wabanaki attempts to secure and enhance their rich maritime heritage.  
The rationalization of a British Atlantic world in the American northeast never 
progressed systematically, but instead ran up against the hostility, disarray and 
devastation unleashed by a people equally determined to define the Atlantic’s 





                                                 
2
 One historian has recently voiced apprehension with an Atlantic model, arguing that conventional 
applications of it tend to naturalize the origins of modern-day global capitalism and its attendant social 
relations in a coherent early modern Atlantic world: Brian Connolly, “Intimate Atlantics: Toward a 
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